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“Antebellum Posthuman is a thought-provoking and timely contribution to the 
recent explosion of work on the desirability of moving beyond the ‘human’ 
as analytic framework or political horizon. Ellis’s consideration of Douglass, 
Thoreau, and Whitman uncovers posthumanism’s Romantic unconscious, 
challenging the contemporary faith in political progressiveness of the post-
human turn. Arguing for a renewed engagement with matter, Antebellum 
Posthuman persuasively models a close critical attentiveness that does not 
assume in advance what the outcome of that engagement will be.” 
—Dana Luciano, Georgetown University
From the eighteenth-century abolitionist motto “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?” to the civil rights–era declaration “I AM a Man,” antiracism 
has engaged in a struggle for the recognition of black humanity. It 
has done so, however, even as the very definition of the human has been 
called into question by the biological sciences. While this conflict between 
liberal humanism and biological materialism animates debates in posthu-
manism and critical race studies today, Antebellum Posthuman argues that it 
first emerged as a key question in the antebellum era.   
In a moment in which the authority of science was increasingly 
invoked to defend slavery and other racist policies, abolitionist arguments 
underwent a profound shift, producing a new, materialist strain of antislavery. 
Engaging the works of Douglass, Thoreau, Whitman, and Dickinson, Cristin 
Ellis identifies and traces the emergence of an antislavery materialism in 
mid-nineteenth-century American literature, placing race at the center of the 
history of posthumanist thought. Turning to contemporary debates now un-
folding between posthumanist and critical race theorists, Ellis demonstrates 
how this antebellum posthumanism highlights the difficulty of reconciling 
materialist ontologies of the human with the project of social justice.
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1
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Beyond Recognition: The Prob lem  
of Antebellum Embodiment
“Am I not a man and a  brother?” the eighteenth- century abolitionist motto 
demands. This question is meant to be rhetorical—to indict a blindness to 
one’s fellow  human so obscene that  today, as Hortense Spillers notes, it 
“might be denied, point blank, as a possibility for anyone, except that we 
know it happened.”1 Indeed, Anglo- American abolitionists regularly diag-
nosed slavery as the product of a monumental failure—or deliberate 
refusal—to recognize the humanity of enslaved persons, and their rhe toric 
survives  today in the commonplace assertion that slavery and racism are 
practices that operate by dehumanization. But while, as the famous aboli-
tionist motto suggests, the “question” of Black humanity was undeniably 
on the line in the debate over slavery, this focus on recognition overlooks 
the full scope of the strug gle that was pitched on the battleground of the 
Black body in the antebellum United States.2
In this book, I argue that the ideological strug gle over slavery in ante-
bellum Amer i ca was one that contested not just the constituency of hu-
manity (who qualifies?) but also the meaning of “the  human” as such. That 
is, I suggest that to understand the true stakes of the fight for recognition— 
and of the ferocity with which that recognition was denied—we must be 
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alert to the fact that the antebellum debate over Black humanity unfolded 
at a time when the definition of “ human” being was in flux, destabilized 
by the rise of a newly empirical episteme. At the dawn of the nineteenth 
 century, Western culture had, for centuries, defined  human being by con-
trast to its material body, identifying the mark of humanity in mankind’s 
supposedly transcendent freedom from material causality— a moral auton-
omy guaranteed by the uniquely ensouled or rational nature of the  human. 
Indeed, in the late eigh teenth  century, this faith in humanity’s inherent 
autonomy from nature fueled demo cratic revolutions in the United States, 
France, and Haiti by underwriting popu lar appeals to mankind’s univer-
sal right to freedom. As Michel Foucault argues, however, in this same late 
eighteenth- century moment a very dif fer ent conception of  human being 
was also beginning to take shape and transform this Western episteme of 
“Man.”3 As Foucault explains, thanks to a host of newly emerging fields of 
knowledge dedicated to the empirical study of  human life (fields such as 
natu ral history, biology, ethnology, demography, po liti cal economy, pub-
lic health, and statistics), “Western man was gradually learning what it 
meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of 
existence, probabilities of life, and individual and collective welfare.”4 In 
contrast to the humanisms that preceded it, then, this new empirical epis-
teme proposed to define  human being by physical traits— identifying 
 human thought and action with embodied pro cesses rather than by free-
dom from such material forces. In the wake of this epistemic shift, Fou-
cault writes, “the  human being begins to exist within his organism, inside 
the shell of his head.”5 The late eigh teenth  century thus marks the onset 
of a new volatility in the Western conception of the  human. Just as demo-
cratic revolutions began to enshrine the princi ples of liberal humanism, 
promising to extend rational subjecthood to all man- (and possibly woman-) 
kind, the burgeoning of empirical discourse was proliferating a new epis-
teme that threw humanity’s rational freedom into question.
Of course, the rough timeline I have just sketched indicates that this 
epistemic upheaval would have been already well  under way by the mid– 
nineteenth  century, the period on which this book focuses. Indeed, as 
studies by Jonathan Kramnick, Alan Richardson, and Justine Murison 
demonstrate, materialist discourses of mind circulated widely across a 
range of philosophical, literary, and popu lar outlets in eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth- century Anglo- American culture.6 But although the queasy co-
existence of liberal and biological epistemes was therefore no longer news 
in the antebellum era, this study proposes that the antebellum moment in 
Amer i ca nonetheless marks an impor tant point of inflection in the ongo-
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ing rearticulation of “the  human.” In  these years, the intensifying debate 
over U.S. slavery triggered a popularization of racial science that charged 
biological accounts of the  human with newly explosive po liti cal signifi-
cance. As Americans increasingly turned to the body for ostensibly objec-
tive empirical proof of the slave’s inherent equality or inferiority, the 
prob lem of  human materiality was thrust to the center of midcentury 
political— and, as we  shall see, literary— concern.
The advent of immediatist abolitionism in the 1830s and the ensuing 
intensification of antislavery sentiment in the North put mounting pres-
sure on proslavery apologists to justify their support for the embattled 
institution, and in their efforts to do so slavery’s advocates increasingly 
looked to what we now know as modern, biological racism. By the 1850s, 
the center of gravity in the debate over U.S. slavery had noticeably shifted 
from the question of  whether it is morally acceptable to enslave a  human 
being  toward the question of  whether Black bodies should be considered 
fully  human in the first place. Whereas the former question—is slavery 
humane?—is a moral one referred to the consciences of voting Americans, 
the latter question— are Black  humans  really  human?— was increasingly 
understood to be an empirical question “upon which science alone has the 
right to pronounce.”7 On the face of  things, this appeal to empirical analy-
sis merely redirects the central question of Black recognition (“Am I not a 
man and a  brother?”) from voters’ consciences to scientific analy sis. But in 
fact, as this study contends, this redirection fundamentally alters the stakes 
of the question at hand. For to refer the question of the Black body’s human-
ity to science is to presume that “humanness” is a quality best determined by 
the sort of features that science is equipped to investigate—it is, in other 
words, to assume that  human being is ultimately defined by corporeal 
(material or empirically demonstrable) as opposed to moral features. Thus 
the embodied episteme of  human being implicit in the latter version of the 
question (is the Black body  human?) can be understood to index a broader 
cultural transformation. If the spike in racial science’s popu lar authority in 
antebellum discourse suggests an intensification of racist antipathies, it 
moreover also signals the ascent of a new, materialist conception of the 
 human that brought with it the promise—or the threat—of newly materi-
alist, nonhumanistic ethical imaginaries.
This study therefore suggests that by the 1850s, the prob lem of recog-
nition had subtly but profoundly changed. In this de cade, the strug gle for 
the recognition of Black humanity opened onto an even more elemental 
disagreement about the meaning or stakes of that recognition, as liberal 
and biological epistemes competed to define the nature of  human being as 
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such. In light of this epistemic revision, we can begin to see how racism 
functioned, in the antebellum context, not simply to “dehumanize” Black 
Americans but moreover to justify indifference to the fact of Black human-
ity. For  under its empirical redescription, (biological) humanness strictly 
vouches for a basic physiological commonality across the  human species that 
makes no definite claim about the moral equality of all members.8 To 
recognize a Black body’s speciological humanity, then, need not entail 
acknowledging her moral equivalence to other  humans (her “full” hu-
manity). And thus we underestimate biological racism when we treat it as 
strictly an exclusionary logic— a rationale for refusing to recognize the 
humanity of one’s fellow  human. More radically, the spread of biological 
racism indexed the advent of an empirical reconceptualization of the  human 
which, as the chapters to follow  will investigate, posed a variety of acute 
challenges to the moral significance of  human belonging and to the con-
ception of  human being enshrined, at least in theory, in American liberal 
democracy. Our analyses of the debate over slavery therefore cannot af-
ford to stop at the politics of recognition: the fight for recognition pre-
sumes the integrity of a liberal humanist conception of the  human that was 
increasingly destabilized by the rise of biological discourse in the late eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, and by the new forms of racism that surged 
out of this empirical turn.
Accordingly, Antebellum Posthuman endeavors to think beyond the pol-
itics of recognition in an effort to explore the shifting sands upon which 
recognition’s liberal politics stood in the antebellum era. More specifically, 
this study  will endeavor to restore a sense of biologism’s remarkable po-
liti cal lability at midcentury— its ideological open- endedness. Against a 
common critical tendency to treat antebellum biologism as synonymous 
with biological racism, this study highlights alternative discourses of em-
bodiment that disputed racist ideology, charting the emergence of a mate-
rialist strain of antislavery thought in the 1850s.9 In chapters on Frederick 
Douglass, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman, I show how  these 
authors appropriate the materialist ontology, but not the racist politics, of 
antebellum racial science, producing an antislavery materialism that rebuts 
biological racism in its own empirical terms.
This strain of antislavery materialism did not amount to an explicit phil-
osophical program or po liti cal platform; rather, it surfaced as a leaning or 
tendency within  these authors’ writings in the 1850s as they began to ex-
plore new perspectives on  human identity and community that  were opened 
up by embodied discourse. We must, then, keep an ear to the ground for 
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this incipient refrain. But when we do, the effect is often quite striking 
 because the antislavery materialism  these authors develop takes them far 
afield of some of the most basic liberal princi ples (commitments to  human 
equality, moral freedom, and individualism) for which Douglass, Thoreau, 
and Whitman are widely remembered as spokespersons, and by the light 
of which we continue to read their work. This departure from the liberal 
princi ples  these authors espouse elsewhere in their writings signals the di-
vergence of antislavery materialism from the larger antislavery move-
ment: despite the congruity of its antiracist aims with abolitionism, this 
tentative new strain remains something philosophically distinct. I  will be 
suggesting, then, that “the  human” was fracturing along at least two dif-
fer ent fault lines in the mid– nineteenth  century. The contest to define the 
meaning of the  human played out not only in the clash between liberal hu-
manist and biological discourses of the  human, but also between pro- and 
antislavery strains of biological thought that vied to define the po liti cal 
ethics of this new empirical episteme.
Excavating this twofold volatility of the  human in antebellum discourse 
does two impor tant  things for our understanding of the politics of embodi-
ment in this fraught historical moment. First, by demonstrating that bio-
logical essentialisms like racism and sexism  were not the only ideologies 
of embodiment circulating in the nineteenth  century, antislavery materi-
alism reminds us that biologism does not inherently fund discrimination. 
On the contrary, as  these antislavery materialisms demonstrate, biological 
racism is as much a conservatively humanistic reaction against biologism 
as it is an expression of biologism’s challenge to humanist princi ples. Bio-
logical racism attempts to limit embodiment to subjugated populations, 
casting Black Americans, Native Americans, and  women as (in Saidiya 
Hartman’s phrase) “the ultimate  bearers of the bodily.”10 Quite apart from 
its empirical falsehoods, then, (i.e., quackeries like the suggestion that skull 
size varies by race), midcentury biological racism departs from strict 
 biologism insofar as the former treats materiality as if it  were  unevenly 
distributed among  humans—as if some  peoples are inherently more and 
 others less embodied, as if we are a species unevenly evolving from apes 
to angels.11 Seen from this  angle, biological racism begins to appear 
 antibiological—an attempt to quarantine privileged populations from 
the illiberal taint of their own materiality. The antislavery materialisms 
outlined in my chapters contest this differential attribution of embodi-
ment, and in  doing so help us to disarticulate biologism’s materialist on-
tology from ideological encrustations like racism that cling to it. In this 
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sense, recognizing the diversity of antebellum embodied thought can help 
to interrupt the reductive cir cuit according to which biologism is presumed 
to condemn us to fleshy prisons that justify discrimination against us.
As it happens, the idea that biological materialism is not inherently es-
sentializing and therefore po liti cally regressive informs some of the most 
exciting new work in critical theory  today. Across a range of fields, schol-
ars have begun to scout the possibilities for a progressive materialism as 
they recoil from what have come to seem like the excesses of the linguistic 
turn— a turn whose emphasis on interpellation and performativity fostered 
what Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman describe as a “flight from the ma-
terial” and a foreclosing of “attention to lived, material bodies and corpo-
real practices.”12 Recent critical theory has therefore sought to navigate a 
corrective “turn to the body” by exploring new ontologies that highlight 
the agency of  matter without collapsing into the essentialism, determin-
ism, and teleological evolutionism that drove critical theory away from 
discourses of nature and embodiment in the first place.
At the radical end of this pres ent groundswell are revisionary material-
ist ontologies that insist upon the constitutive entanglement of mind and 
body,  human and nonhuman being, material and cultural forces. For the 
purposes of this study, I  will use the term “posthumanism” to refer to this 
admittedly heterogeneous set of material ontologies  because, although not 
all of the critics I  will refer to  under the sign of posthumanism have em-
braced this term, it allows me to foreground both the epistemic stakes (the 
not- humanism) and the historical position (the  after- humanism) implied 
in the ontological shift that they frame.13 Challenging the immateriality 
of both poststructuralism’s discursively constituted subject and liberal hu-
manism’s transcendently autonomous subject, posthumanist materialism 
pres ents us with an embodied subject whose subjectivity pro cessually 
emerges from her neural networks and flows of subconscious affect, from 
relations with nonhuman beings and agencies, and from unpredictable in-
teractions between her physiological, material, and cultural environments. 
Posthumanist theory thus suggests that a truly materialist conception of 
the  human obliges us to relinquish—or at least steeply qualify— Western 
humanism’s conception of the  human as an autonomous subject  free from 
physical causality. In  doing so, posthumanism erodes the grounds upon 
which Western humanism has traditionally upheld the innate superiority 
of the  human to all other forms of being.
A second advantage, then, of excavating antislavery materialism now is 
that this antebellum discourse can offer insight into the prehistory of 
the posthumanist critical turn we are now witnessing. By keeping one eye 
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on the pres ent (as the deliberate anachronism of my title, Antebellum 
Posthuman, invites us to do), we may begin to discern the philosophical 
commonalities that link antislavery and con temporary posthumanist 
materialisms. As Marjorie Levinson points out, the anachronism involved 
in such a trans- temporal mode of reading need not be thought of as the 
 enemy of historicism— a license to overwrite the past with the pres ent. 
On the contrary, Levinson argues, reading “conjuncturally” across time 
can help us to recover dimensions of the past that have grown closed to us. 
By using “the knowledges and imaginaries of our own time to summon 
up par tic u lar pasts,” Levinson proposes, we can make  those forgotten 
histories “flash upon us in ways that neither they nor we could have an-
ticipated.”14 Thus, as I hope to show, reading for the resonances that 
con temporary posthumanist theory elicits from  these antislavery writings 
allows the conceptual lability of the  human in antebellum lit er a ture to 
become vis i ble to us in ways it has not been heretofore.
But while my chapters on Douglass, Thoreau, and Whitman  will sug-
gest commonalities their materialism shares with con temporary posthu-
manism, I am ultimately even more interested in the ways in which  these 
antebellum writers can help open up new vistas onto our pres ent theoreti-
cal moment. In par tic u lar, I find that reading con temporary theory through 
the lens of its antebellum precursor helps to focalize one of the most im-
perative critical challenges con temporary posthumanist theory currently 
 faces: namely, the con spic u ous absence of race as a critical term in posthu-
manist discourse. An increasing number of scholars have begun to voice 
concern at what Zakiyyah Jackson calls the “resounding silence in the post-
humanist, object- oriented, and new materialist lit er a tures with re spect to 
race.”15 This occlusion of race subtends what Alexander Weheliye has di-
agnosed as a more fundamental epistemological exclusion in posthuman-
ist theory: its minimization of the centrality of racism to the Western 
humanist tradition that it proposes to move beyond, and its failure to 
engage with counterdiscourses of the  human articulated in nonwhite 
and non- Western cultural traditions.16 But if race remains largely under-
theorized in con temporary posthumanist thought, race and racism are 
unmistakably at the center of its antebellum pre ce dent. Attending to post-
humanism’s prehistory in antislavery materialism can therefore serve as a 
provocation to reexamine the racial politics and racist po liti cal legacies in-
volved in the con temporary posthumanist turn. Examining recent critiques 
of posthumanism by theorists of race and social justice, my final chapters 
 will assess the considerable strengths as well as the limitations of posthu-
manism’s materialist politics.  These chapters  will outline opportunities for 
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posthumanism’s more rigorous collaboration with theories of race and 
social justice  going forward, as well as highlight philosophical obstacles to 
this closer alliance with which both posthumanism and materially minded 
social justice criticism have yet to fully reckon.
Thus in addition to highlighting the volatile and contested status of em-
bodiment’s politics in antebellum discourse, this study  will suggest that 
reading across the archives of antislavery and posthumanist materialism 
can help us to sharpen our sense of both, not only by highlighting their 
commonalities but also by clarifying their  angles of divergence. Below, I 
 will offer a very brief overview of the rise of materialist politics in the post- 
Enlightenment era, charting the contours of the biological turn from the 
late eigh teenth  century to the birth of biopolitics, and offering a fuller 
account of the posthumanist turn in critical theory  today. With a clearer 
sense of what posthumanism is, and of the ideological formations to which 
it responds, we can better recognize its historical and conceptual continu-
ities with the nineteenth- century materialisms of Douglass, Thoreau, and 
Whitman.
Embodiment from Biopo liti cal Racism to Posthumanism
When Edmund Burke published his conservative Reflections on the Revolu-
tion in France in 1790, his pamphlet triggered a deluge of liberal responses 
including, most famously, Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man (1791) and Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of  Woman (1792). Rather less 
notably, in 1792 Thomas Taylor published his parodic manifesto, A Vindi-
cation of the Rights of Brutes. Citing “ those wonderful productions of 
Mr. PAINE and Mrs. WOLLSTONECRAFT,” Taylor glibly proposes 
that their “sublime theory” of  human equality ultimately points to an even 
larger moral truth poised to “give perfection to our researches into the 
rights of  things.” This larger truth: “the equality of all  things, as to their 
intrinsic dignity and worth.” Taylor thus proceeds to facetiously argue that 
universal equality is indeed universal, and  ought therefore to include 
every thing from nonhuman “brutes” to “vegetables, minerals, and even the 
most apparently contemptible clods of earth.”17
For the most part, Taylor’s satire of liberal egalitarianism operates by 
the fallacy of the slippery slope— commoners equal to kings?  Women equal 
to men? What next? But his pamphlet finds its teeth when it subtly con-
flates two distinct logics closely associated with the French Revolution: the 
liberal discourse of  human rights and the ontology of radical materialism. 
This conflation appears in the pamphlet’s opening gambit, where Taylor 
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defines the disagreement between monarchist conservatives and liberal 
revolutionaries as a conflict of ontologies—as, in fact, a dispute over dual-
ism. Adapting Aristotle, he explains that conservatives believe  there is a 
naturally “slavish part of mankind” comprised of  those “born with strong 
bodily and weak  mental powers,” and that this slavish class “ ought to be 
governed by the in de pen dent [class], in the same manner as the soul governs 
the body, that is, like a despot or a tyrant.” By contrast, he observes, “this is 
a conclusion which  will surely be ridiculed by  every genuine modern, as 
it wholly proceeds on a supposition, that mind and body are two distinct 
 things, and that the former is more excellent than the latter, though almost 
 every one is now convinced, that soul and body are only nominally distin-
guished from each other, and are essentially the same.”18 Taylor thus as-
serts that the new materialism abolishes not only hierarchies of the 
 human but also hierarchies of being. For if what was traditionally called 
the  human “soul” or “mind” is now taken to be embodied— simply an ef-
fect of physiological processes— then this mind’s “ mental powers” are not, 
in fact, “in de pen dent” of  matter but rather enchained to physical causality 
in the same way as the physical body.19 This means that so- called rational 
men are not intrinsically more  free than the “slavish” men and  women— those 
(ostensibly) subrational persons defined by their machinic muscles, animal 
instincts, and organic appetites— over whom they presume to govern. Ex-
tending this logic, Taylor insists that, once divested of its transcendental 
“soul” or autonomous “mind,” humanity ceases to be ontologically excep-
tional and therefore can no longer claim to be morally superior to nonhuman 
beings. Hence Taylor’s conclusion that “genuine modern” (i.e., materialist) 
philosophy leads to the conclusion “that  there is no such  thing in the uni-
verse as superiority of nature.”20 By his reasoning,  there is no such  thing 
as superiority of nature  because  there is no such  thing as superiority to 
nature. Once we acknowledge that  humans do not enjoy a special exemp-
tion from the laws of  matter, then we  will be in a position to recognize our 
ontological equality not only with “brutes,” but with “vegetables, minerals, 
and . . .  clods of earth.”21
Ultimately, then, Taylor suggests that “genuine modern” philosophy is 
self- defeating, that in fact it abolishes the equality its exponents purport 
to defend. For Taylor,  there can be no ontological freedom in the absence 
of a corollary category of unfree being called “property” (embodied in 
wives, slaves,  horses, or  houses, and fi nally, most fundamentally, in one’s 
own body).22 Hence, at its grandest and most unsettling, Rights of Brutes 
maintains that a thoroughgoing materialism is logically incompatible with 
a rights- based version of the po liti cal: the latter, Taylor proposes, ultimately 
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depends upon an exceptionalist model of the  human that the former fatally 
undermines. Of course, as a critique of Wollstonecraft and Paine, Taylor’s 
satire misses the mark, for to arrive at his parodic egalitarianism he must 
first rewrite their liberal position as a materialist one. Nonetheless, the ar-
gument of Rights of Brutes remains compelling for the way it highlights the 
tension implicit in the Enlightenment’s dual (although not always si mul ta-
neously held) commitments to liberal and materialist philosophies.
At the turn of the nineteenth  century, then, Western culture sponsored 
what Taylor suggests are incommensurable epistemes of the  human: lib-
eral Man defined (in Foucault’s words) “by his freedom, or by the opposi-
tion of soul and body,” on the one hand, and empirical Man defined by his 
body and the economy of his biological interests, on the other.23 But al-
though the liberal and empirical figures of Man appear to be incommen-
surable in the abstract, in practice, as Foucault argues, their joint appearance 
at the end of the eigh teenth  century produced a reor ga ni za tion of Western 
politics— the birth of biopolitics— that oversaw their unstable imbrica-
tion. Briefly described, biopolitics refers to a subtle but profound recon-
ceptualization of state power according to which Western states came to 
conceive of their citizenry not (or not only) as rights- bearing liberal sub-
jects but as an aggregate biological population— a “multiple body” that 
“cannot . . .  be counted”  because its life is not proper (not the property of 
individuals) but rather pro cessual, unfolding across its fluctuating collec-
tive mass.24 Accordingly, although long dedicated to maintaining law and 
order, in the early nineteenth  century Western states began to take a new 
interest in managing the biological pro cesses of populational life, and to 
this end they began to develop policies aimed not at disciplining individ-
ual bodies— punishing criminals, for instance— but at controlling the 
collective body— regulating rates of health, mortality, reproduction,  labor 
productivity, and the like. In other words,  under biopolitics Western states 
began to conceive of the populace as so many liberal citizens and as bio-
capital, a statistical mass life whose biological economies and embodied in-
terests can, like any other material resource, be mined and administered 
for maximum productivity.25
As Foucault details, biopolitics erodes the freedoms of liberal subject-
hood by turning the state’s attention from the individual to the popula-
tion, even as it insinuates state power ever more comprehensively into the 
material conditions of individual life. Underscoring this shift, Wendy 
Brown objects that biopolitics gave rise to a “subject so profoundly inte-
grated and hence subordinated to the supervening goal of macroeconomic 
growth that its own well- being is easily sacrificed to  these larger pur-
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poses.”26 Hartman’s sobering study of the “amazing continuity” between 
slavery and freedom in the experience of nineteenth- century Black Amer-
icans amplifies this assessment by illustrating how the freedom of liberal 
personhood accorded to Black Americans by the  Fourteenth Amendment 
proved a vastly diminished prize in the wake of biopolitics’ ascendance.27
But as Hartman’s analy sis further demonstrates, if the birth of biopoli-
tics threatened the freedoms of the liberal citizen, it moreover also made 
biological racism insidiously structural to the logic of modern governance. 
Racism, Foucault explains, is fundamentally “a mechanism that allows bio-
power to work.”28 It does so by inscribing “caesuras within the biological 
continuum of life,” dividing what would other wise be an undifferentiated 
mass of interrelated material pro cesses (the immanent “biological contin-
uum” of life encompassing all being) into life that has been selected to live 
(“the population”) and life that has been “dysselected”— deemed biologically 
inferior, degenerate, a risk to the “true” population’s health and purity.29 
Biological racism thus distinguishes between types of life that are deemed 
“fully”  human and types of life (sub- or nonhuman) that are deemed biologi-
cally inferior and even potentially deleterious or infectious— populations 
that may, or even must be sacrificed in order for the designated population 
to thrive.30
Far from leveling all distinctions, then (as Taylor perhaps only half- 
jokingly feared), the ascendance of empirical Man instead funded a 
power ful new hierarchy of  human being. In the eigh teenth and nineteenth 
centuries, empiricism did not immediately displace prior Western epis-
temes of Man but rather fused with and rearticulated them. Thus Sylvia 
Wynter shows how the advent of the biological discourse of man did not 
supplant but rather wove itself around preexisting hierarchies of  human 
being that had been or ga nized first by Western Chris tian ity and  later by 
Western humanism. Reinflecting  those earlier hierarchies of the  human 
(faithful/pagan, rational/nonrational), biopo liti cal racism recast  human in-
equality according to an ostensibly empirical distinction between the bio-
logically “full”  human ( those endowed with moral autonomy and value) 
and the biologically less- than- human,  those anatomical  humans still en-
thralled to their animalistic embodiment.31 In this way, biopolitics brokered 
a toxic truce between Christian, humanist, and empirical epistemes of the 
 human, all of which would continue to tenuously coexist in the modern era.
In contrast to empiricism’s history of collaboration with  these hierar-
chical epistemes, con temporary posthumanist theorists now suggest 
that, properly understood, biological man is in fact (as Taylor facetiously 
 suggested) incompatible with any system of thought premised upon the 
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notion of humanity’s uniquely transcendental being. Whereas the West-
ern tradition that Wynter outlines presumes that  humans—or at least that 
subset of Homo sapiens deemed “full”  humans— enjoy autonomy from  matter, 
posthumanists insists that “ human life is embedded in a material world of 
 great complexity, one on which we depend for our continued survival.”32 
From this embodied perspective, an organism is never sovereign nor ex-
ceptional to nature but rather exists as and through a vast ecol ogy of 
interdependencies— a “biological continuum” of material flows within 
the multitude that is the organism, among organic and nonorganic entities, 
and between the organism and its natu ral, social, and technological environ-
ments. But if posthumanism thus limits  human freedom by highlighting 
 human beings’ dependence upon nonhuman beings and forces, unlike 
biological racism it denies that embodiment is strictly deterministic. Post-
humanism’s pro cessual ontology is materialist yet irreducibly unpredict-
able, premised (as Nigel Thrift eco nom ically puts it) “on the leitmotif of 
movement in its many forms.”33
Con temporary posthumanist materialism therefore undermines the 
humanist tradition in two ways. On the one hand, its embodied subject 
erodes the moral distinction between  human and nonhuman life. As we 
have seen, whereas humanism divides life into “the  human” (beings un-
derstood to be  free from material causation, and hence moral actors) and 
“the nonhuman” (beings, including “subhuman” Homo sapiens, who are un-
derstood to be simply embodied), posthumanism rejects this division by 
maintaining that a  human being is like all beings insofar as it, too, is strictly 
(albeit nondeterministically) constituted through physiological pro cesses, 
and insofar as its actions are, likewise, “nested in [material] forces beyond 
its control.”34 In other words, although posthumanism does not deny that 
 there are substantial differences between forms of life (between, say, 
 humans, octopi, and mushrooms), its materialism does highlight the im-
possibility of empirically justifying the categorical moral superiority of 
any one form of life over  others. Indeed, posthumanism makes categorical 
distinctions difficult by exploding the ontological closure that is charac-
teristic of liberal humanism’s transcendental subject. Emphasizing the 
“transcorporeal” and “intra- active” interpenetration of  human with non-
human bodies, posthumanism overwrites the image of the bounded, au-
tonomous, and sovereign  human self with the image of a heterogeneous 
yet continuous plenum that Roberto Esposito (borrowing from Merleau- 
Ponty, not Hortense Spillers) terms “the flesh.”35 Thus, as Jasbir Puar ob-
serves, posthumanist theory works to “deprivilege the  human body as a 
discrete organic  thing” by underscoring the fluidity, multiplicity, and 
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porosity of the embodied self.36 The posthumanist subject is at once em-
bodied and yet nonsingular, imbricated by virtue of her embodiment 
with bodies and environments beyond the border of her skin. In this way, 
posthumanism not only breaks down the categorical moral difference be-
tween  human and nonhuman being but moreover denies their physical 
separateness, highlighting the “vibrant” throng of unexpectedly “ani-
mate” nonhuman bodies and forces that subtend and infuse what we call 
 human bodies and agencies.37
This revisionary, nondeterministic materialism has spread across several 
areas of critical theory in the late twentieth and early twenty- first  century, 
becoming a defining feature of the current theoretical moment. It is, for 
instance, particularly salient in work downstream of Deleuze and Guattari, 
who coined many of the key terms and topoi that or ga nize con temporary 
posthumanist discourse. But although the prevalence of materialist ontolo-
gies may seem distinctive of the critical landscape  today, materialism is, of 
course, on the contrary, an ancient philosophical tradition with a long 
history in both Western and non- Western thought.38 Moreover, as Fou-
cault’s and Wynter’s genealogies emphasize, the epochal rise of empiricism 
in the late eigh teenth  century proliferated materialist discourses of  human 
being that predate con temporary posthumanism by two centuries, and 
which proceeded to crucially shape nineteenth- century politics.
We therefore need not be surprised to find precursors to posthumanist 
materialism haunting the antebellum literary imagination.  Whether fig-
ured as the transpersonal continuum of “the flesh” or as Whitman’s  great, 
peristaltic “ocean of life,” posthumanism’s vision of being as embodied 
and entangled may perhaps best be understood as a conceptual tendency 
nested within the epochal turn to empiricism— “a latency,” as Mark 
McGurl argues, “within the discourse of the ‘modern.’ ”39 Although post-
humanism has only crystallized as a theoretical movement in the last 
twenty- odd years, and despite its frequent association with distinctly post-
modern developments like poststructuralist philosophy and cyborg tech-
nologies, its materialism bears no necessary relation to the pres ent day. And 
if this is so, then the fluid, inclusive, and dispossessive ontology articulated 
by posthumanists  today has a prehistory we have yet to fully explore.
Antebellum Posthumanism
 Toward this historicizing effort, Antebellum Posthuman offers three case 
studies in antislavery materialisms of the last  century, highlighting the emer-
gence of a proto- posthumanist imaginary within American lit er a ture. 
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Acknowledging  these dissenting antebellum materialisms can help us to 
recognize that the debate over U.S. slavery was not simply a debate over 
the borders of the  human, with liberal universalists vying against racist 
materialists to define who gets included. Instead, this debate also  housed 
an epistemic disagreement over the relation of the  human to its embodi-
ment, and this study hones in on a strug gle between biologically minded 
thinkers to define the shape of embodiment’s politics  going forward. In 
its simplest terms, my claim is that although racism was by far the most 
prevalent and consequential form of embodied thought circulating in the 
antebellum era, it was not the only one: the authors I examine testify to 
the emergence of an alternative, antislavery discourse of  human material-
ity and biological collectivism. This is to suggest that the politics of  human 
embodiment did not go without saying in this de cade, and that while many 
antislavery activists worked to combat the rise of biologism,  others  were 
working in  these years to rewrite its politics from within.
My first three chapters profile the antislavery materialisms that Doug-
lass, Thoreau, and Whitman began to develop in the 1850s, when racial 
science had succeeded in making the biology of Black humanity a central 
feature of the debate over slavery. In each case I examine how  these au-
thors responded to this epistemic shift by adopting their own version of 
embodied discourse, condemning slavery in the same empirical idiom that 
proslavery racial discourse was then so powerfully wielding. As I  shall dem-
onstrate, however, if this reversal allowed Douglass, Thoreau, and Whit-
man to answer racist science in its own terms, their antislavery materialism 
was also unsettling to the liberal demo cratic princi ples and transcenden-
tal liberal subjectivity that  these authors are other wise known for having 
championed. In this sense, as I  shall argue, their forays into materialist 
thought led them to frame arguments against slavery that do not neatly 
align with the liberal po liti cal commitments they express elsewhere, pro-
ducing a minor refrain within their writings that speculatively resigns the 
doctrine of  human equality, queries the autonomy of  human agency, and 
explodes the singularity of  human identity. Although pitched against slav-
ery, the antislavery materialism  these authors develop cannot properly be 
called liberal. Tentatively, experimentally, and repeatedly,  these authors’ 
late antebellum works move in strange new directions, framing an alter-
native to both liberal universalism and racist essentialism that resonates 
unevenly, in ways I  shall explore, with posthumanist materialism  today.
Chapter 1 examines how the rise of racial science spurred Douglass to 
supplement his moral appeals to  human brotherhood with a new antislav-
ery argument that bracketed the question of his race’s humanity. As 
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Douglass perceived, by recasting “the  human” as a biological category, racial 
science was able to suggest that humanity’s embodied diversity indicates a 
basic moral diversity among  humans, making it pos si ble to imagine that not 
all  humans are equally entitled to the same “ human” rights. In the wake of 
racial science’s rise, then, abolitionism’s insistence on the slave’s shared hu-
manity did not carry the same moral weight. Frustrated with the in effec-
tive ness of abolitionism’s moral rhe toric at answering biological charges 
of Black inferiority, and disillusioned by the pervasiveness of racism on 
both sides of the Mason- Dixon, Douglass began to develop his own alter-
native ethnological discourse in the 1850s. Reading across several of Dou-
glass’s major and minor writings of this de cade (including “The Claims of 
the Negro Ethnologically Considered,” “What to the Slave Is the Fourth 
of July?,” and his sole novella, The Heroic Slave), this chapter details how, 
rather than simply denounce scientific racism, Douglass responded to its 
growing influence by strategically appropriating its discourse of Black ani-
mality. Douglass argues brilliantly and perilously that even if Black Amer-
icans  were proven to be less rational and more animalistic than white 
Americans, abolition would remain a pragmatic, if no longer a moral, ne-
cessity  because even irrational animals inevitably become violent when 
their instinct for self- preservation is aroused. Thus, ironically embracing 
the bestialization of Black  humans by scientific racism, Douglass rede-
ploys this as the basis for a new kind of naturalistic justification of revolu-
tionary vio lence. Deliberately evoking and recasting the found ers’ appeals 
to natu ral law, Douglass argues that re sis tance to violent oppression is not 
simply a  human right but an instinct embodied in all biological life. 
Therefore, he concludes, slavery is not just morally but practically un-
tenable: on the wrong side of physical law, it is, he writes, “dangerous as 
well as wrong.”40 In  these late antebellum writings, Douglass explores 
ways to bypass the stalemate over  human equality by strategically reap-
propriating racial science’s speciological discourse of the  human.
Chapter 2 traces an analogously materialist reconceptualization of the 
 human in Thoreau’s writings of the 1850s. In this de cade, Thoreau became 
immersed in empirical studies of ecological succession and speciological 
development, which spoke directly to the ongoing debate between monog-
enist and polygenist racial scientists. Working in the shadow of Harvard’s 
celebrity naturalist, Louis Agassiz, who was one of the most influential 
voices in midcentury American science and polygenism’s most erudite ally, 
Thoreau’s late antebellum naturalism set out to disprove Agassiz’s polyg-
enist theory of “special creation” and to substantiate the “developmental 
theory” of nature (a pre- Darwinian theory of evolution). As I show, 
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however, while Thoreau engaged with this midcentury discourse of species, 
he understood its po liti cal significance quite differently from most. Instead 
of weighing in on the question of racial difference and equality, Thoreau’s 
late antislavery essays translate his studies of ecological and evolutionary 
change into a vastly revised theory of po liti cal reform. Rethinking his faith 
in individual moral conscience, Thoreau began to conceive of conscience 
as a physiological trait (“a  matter of constitution and temperament,  after 
all”) that may be more highly developed in some persons than  others.41 In-
dividual agency thus begins to recede in Thoreau’s late po liti cal essays as 
he comes to understand moral judgment as a capacity that is unequally dis-
tributed, and unevenly developing, across the  human population. Accord-
ingly, his late antislavery writings suggest that Thoreau had begun to map 
the politics of abolition onto the inhuman expanses of evolutionary time, 
imagining that anomalously advanced moral “specimens,” as he calls John 
Brown, create “the possibility, in the course of ages, of a revolution” in 
Amer i ca’s po liti cal conscience.42 Against racist biopo liti cal arguments for 
segregation and fears of miscegenation, Thoreau’s evolutionary politics 
stress the inverse: not the necessity of deploying politics to prevent white 
Amer i ca’s biological (and moral) “degradation,” but the inevitability of 
Amer i ca’s biological (and moral) development by the unelected forces of 
material history.
This inversion— this emphasis on the constitutive priority of sub- or 
 suprahuman biological pro cesses over and against humanity’s power to 
control them— also haunts the popu lar Spiritualist discourse of bioelectricity 
which inspired Walt Whitman’s poetry of “the body electric.” Turning to 
the 1855 Leaves of Grass in Chapter 3, I argue that although Whitman is 
often credited with inventing a radically new demo cratic aesthetic, his early 
poetry in fact conjures a nation comprised of porous subjects who bear  little 
resemblance to liberal persons, and who are constituted by material at-
tachments that have no place in the voluntaristic landscape of demo cratic 
contractualism nor the  imagined community of white nationalism. 
Highlighting Whitman’s fascination with the theory of electrical em-
bodiment that he encountered in the mid- nineteenth- century Spiritualist 
press, I show how the bioelectrical subject inspired Whitman to reinvent 
the lyric subject— that is, both the persona and the propositional subject 
of the lyric poem—in the first edition of Leaves of Grass (1855). On the bio-
electric model of mind, perception is an embodied event: as Whitman 
puts it, in the moment of perception “ things enter with electric swiftness,” 
inscribing themselves on the body’s ner vous system and thereby “quiver-
ing [it] to a new identity.” In this chapter, I argue that the permeability of 
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the ner vous body led Whitman to conceive of poetry as an embodied me-
dium— a site for the communication not of meanings but of physical con-
tact, a means of orchestrating the bioelectrical inscription of the reader. 
Thus I suggest that Whitman’s perplexingly embodied poetics (his insis-
tence, for instance, that we should not read but kiss his poems, or his prom-
ise that reading  will turn our very flesh into a “ great poem”) makes strict 
sense within his materialist theory of mind. Moreover, just as Whitman’s 
antirepre sen ta tionalist poetics empties poetry of its meaning, so too it lights 
up the fictitiousness of bodily identity, exposing the porosity, impression-
ability, and historicity of the ner vous self. In place of the bounded and legible 
liberal subject, then, Leaves of Grass represents the embodied subject as a 
dynamic and open- ended pro cess, a site— like the lyric poem—of sensuous 
exchange in which the boundary between the sentient self and its environ-
ment cannot be confidently drawn. Whitman’s bioelectrical ontology is thus 
materialist and yet anti- essentialist— his permeable and networked subjects 
escape the biological determinism that characterizes so much antebellum 
racial science. And yet by the same token, as I discuss, liberalism’s basic 
grammar of po liti cal actors, identities, and interests breaks down in the face 
of Whitman’s unbounded pro cessual selves.
 These first chapters endeavor to highlight the proliferation of biological 
accounts of the  human and to examine how  these three authors responded 
to the racist tendencies within midcentury science by constructing dis-
courses of  human materiality that do not support slavery. But if their anti-
slavery materialisms are often ingenious, they are also costly to the liberal 
ideals  these authors espouse elsewhere in their writings: leading Douglass, 
for instance, to bracket his insistence upon  human equality, Thoreau to 
qualify his faith in conscientious action, and Whitman to unwittingly—
or perhaps blithely— detonate the lyric/liberal subject into an unfolding 
pro cess inimical to repre sen ta tion, including repre sen ta tional democracy. 
All three of  these authors therefore speculatively invite us to conceive of 
the nation as a material collectivity fused as biological continuums are— 
not by the formal similarity of their constituents, the shared sentiment of 
 imagined community, nor even the abrogable social contract of the Con-
stitution, but instead by the dense weave of material mutuality.
Thus I suggest that, in their more radical passages of thought,  these 
authors draft an image of material community that differs in subtle but 
consequential ways from some of the richly productive accounts of affective 
nationalism that have appeared in recent critical lit er a ture. From Christo-
pher Castiglia’s study of “the federalization of affect” in the early republic 
to Peter Coviello’s account of race as a language for inciting feelings of 
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“inborn connectedness” among strangers in the antebellum era, recent 
critical analyses of the prob lem of nation- building in the nineteenth 
 century have highlighted the importance of affective attachments as a vi-
tal supplement to the power of  legal instruments to bind the nation to-
gether.43 Against this vision of sympathetic or  imagined community, the 
authors I examine describe a nation bound, first and foremost, by material 
attachments: by physical dependencies and mutual vulnerabilities that con-
join the population regardless of how its members feel about one  another, 
which is to say, despite the ideological or affective rifts that might other wise 
divide the population by differences of belief or (race, sex, class, or even 
species) identity. In shifting our attentions from intentional and sentimen-
tal attachments to involuntary material intimacies,  these three antebellum 
authors anticipate con temporary posthumanism’s emphasis upon the ways 
in which  human life and politics are complexly entangled with diverse 
“publics” of nonhuman beings and agencies.
My purpose in identifying commonalities across nineteenth- and 
twenty- first- century materialisms is, however, not simply to discover post-
humanism avant la lettre. More urgently, I think that the materialist poli-
tics that Douglass, Thoreau, and Whitman experimentally develop can 
help us to confront deep and still unanswered questions about the desir-
ability or even viability of a posthumanist politics.  Today, posthumanist 
theorists often suggest that their materialist ontology helps us to envision 
a more radically inclusive and egalitarian liberal politics. Posthumanism 
lights up the way to a “parliament of  things” or “democracy of objects,” 
preparing us for a  future in which “the scope of democ ratization can be 
broadened to acknowledge more nonhumans in more ways, in something 
like the ways in which we have come to hear the po liti cal voices of other 
 humans formerly on the outs.”44 The proto- posthumanism we encounter 
in Douglass, Thoreau, and Whitman likewise appears to be progressive 
and po liti cally inclusive, at least within the context of their slaveholding 
era. And yet, as my readings  will underscore,  these authors’ materialism is 
also illiberal, so thoroughly corrosive to the fiction of autonomous individ-
uality that it obliges us to rethink the tenets of liberalism (including indi-
vidual rights, freedom, and equality) at very basic levels. Both then and 
 today, posthumanism’s materialist ontology challenges us to envision a 
world without discrete persons, “a world populated not by active subjects 
and passive objects but by lively and essentially interactive materials.”45 But 
what would a politics without persons even look like? And how could a poli-
tics premised on such a liquefying ontology address, let alone redress, 
demands for racial, gender, sexual, or speciological equality?
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My fourth chapter examines the tension between posthumanism’s illib-
eral ontology and its avowedly liberal politics by highlighting an absence 
that has, I suspect, particularly enabled this tension to go unaddressed: 
namely, the occlusion of race as a critical term in posthumanist theory. 
Indeed, in this re spect, con temporary posthumanism arguably still has 
much to learn from its antislavery precursors insofar as racism and the dis-
course of social justice  were defining features of the historical conditions 
of the latter’s emergence. On this cue, Chapter 4 seeks to recenter the ques-
tion of racial identity and  human difference for posthumanist materialism 
by reading con temporary posthumanist theory through the lens of con-
temporary discourses of social justice.  Here I survey some of the most tren-
chant current critiques of posthumanism’s blind spot for race and for the 
critical tradition of thinking about the politics of embodiment in postco-
lonial, indigenous, critical race, and social justice theories. In addition to 
examining the correctives  these studies offer to posthumanist theory, I am 
particularly interested in highlighting possibilities for collaboration be-
tween posthumanist and social justice criticism  going forward. To this 
end, this chapter stages a conversation between con temporary posthuman-
ism and Wynter’s postcolonialist critique of Western humanism, which 
anticipates key features of posthumanist thought while also insisting upon 
racism’s centrality to humanism’s construction of the  human. Exploring 
 these two theories’ congruencies, I argue that posthumanism’s proj ect is 
clarified and refined by a closer engagement with Wynter’s theory of so-
cial justice, and that both discourses are strengthened through collabora-
tion. At the same time, as my Coda takes up, this comparative work also 
raises difficult questions about the po liti cal and ethical limitations of a rig-
orously (i.e., philosophically self- consistent) posthumanist materialism.
It is thus my wager that reading antebellum and con temporary materi-
alist politics through one another can teach us something new about both. 
On the one hand, our current fascination with the ontology of embodiment 
can help to make us more attentive to the ontological speculations of 
antebellum authors. In this regard, this proj ect’s contribution to the field 
of antebellum literary study does not have to do with canon expansion 
(clearly, my authors are squarely canonical) but, rather, involves rereading 
known authors in ways that may be estranging to our assumptions about 
them. Moreover, by emphasizing the epistemic volatility that nineteenth- 
century biologism introduced, this proj ect seeks to unsettle the humanis-
tic assumptions according to which this canon has been assembled and 
read up to now. We have been too ready, I think, to read Douglass, Thoreau, 
and Whitman as mouthpieces for the humanistic princi ples of liberal 
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democracy and expositors of “the age of the first person singular” that Em-
erson so confidently pronounced.46 In neglecting the materialist turn of 
their late antislavery thought, we risk oversimplifying the epistemic stakes 
at play in the debate over slavery, and hence underestimating the scope of 
slavery’s legacy in the postbellum world. At the same time, the urgency 
of catching up to  these antebellum authors’ sense of the dense imbrications 
of po liti cal and material systems only continues to grow more distinct for 
us  today amid the gathering threat of ecological change.
Indeed, politics  after the biological turn may well challenge us to re-
think our assumptions about the correlation between freedom and exis-
tential well- being. Although the Declaration of In de pen dence insists that 
liberation is a  matter of disentanglement— stating that we must “dissolve 
the po liti cal bands which have connected [us] to another” in order to as-
sume a truly “separate and equal station”—it may be that,  going forward, 
we  will find ourselves tasked to embrace our relationality, which is in any 
case inescapable. Instead of championing freedom as a blanket princi ple, 
then, the pursuit of happiness  today may oblige us to reimagine emanci-
pation as something that does not follow from breaking bonds so much as 
from rearranging them, finding ways to be immersed and intertwined dif-
ferently, with an eye  toward the contingency, fragility, and irreducible 
collectivity of embodied life.
In that spirit of interdependence, I want to acknowledge that this proj-
ect’s exploration of antislavery materialism is indebted to the work of a 
number of critics whose proj ects have enabled my own. For instance, 
this book aims to affirm and extend recent efforts to document the prolif-
eration of embodied discourse across nineteenth- century lit er a ture. In 
par tic u lar, Justine Murison’s elaboration of the “open, vulnerable, and 
fraught” embodied self codified in early ner vous physiology (in The Politics 
of Anxiety in Nineteenth- Century American Lit er a ture), and Jane Thrailkill’s 
account of the “interanimation of the  human mind and body” in postbel-
lum scientific and literary works (in Affecting Fictions), both richly illumi-
nate the challenges that embodied accounts of the  human posed to liberal 
conceptions of subjectivity.47 Building upon  these studies, I aim to spot-
light the centrality and volatility of embodied discourse in the U.S. debate 
over slavery and racial equality which, I submit, served as a kind of cul-
tural lightning rod to focus literary attention on discourses of  human em-
bodiment while at the same throwing their po liti cal consequences into 
sharper relief. In this sense, I hope to contribute to recent efforts to trace 
the historical emergence of biopolitics through its reflection and contes-
tation in nineteenth- century literary imaginations. Like Kyla Tompkins 
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and Colleen Glenney Boggs, I situate the antebellum discourse of em-
bodiment within the history of biopolitics in order to explore the antebel-
lum body’s po liti cal ambivalence— the way in which it was si mul ta neously 
used to construct and, elsewhere, to deconstruct the distinctions (white/
Black, human/nonhuman, self/other) that nineteenth- century biopolitics 
sought to police.48 And in highlighting the ways in which this deconstruc-
tive tendency seems to prefigure con temporary posthumanist theory, I am 
preceded and inspired by Matt Taylor’s and Mark Noble’s investigations 
of proto- posthumanist materialisms that crop up across lit er a tures of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.49  Toward  those efforts, I hope 
that Antebellum Posthuman’s historical focus on lit er a tures of the 1850s can 
add to our growing appreciation of posthumanism’s prehistory by refram-
ing the crisis of slavery and the question of racial difference as a catalyst 
for materialist discourse in the United States. If the ascent of the embod-
ied subject at midcentury gave rise to new racist and biopo liti cal regimes, 
it also, I submit, precipitated the emergence of a new, proto- posthumanist 
materialism that indelibly transformed literary imaginaries in its wake.
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“We hold  these truths to be self- evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among  these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” It is no 
secret that the liberal revolution  these words seem to promise— affirming 
the basic po liti cal equality of all  humans— was not, and arguably still has 
not been realized in the nation  these words helped to envision. The truths 
the Declaration of In de pen dence finds so glaringly “self- evident” are, in 
fact, far harder to make out in the text of the U.S. Constitution, which cre-
ates some  humans only three- fifths equal, and in the voting laws of the 
early republic, which rendered most Americans something less than equal 
by imposing sex and property requirements on the franchise.
 Today we tend to describe this inconsistency as the product of hy poc-
risy: despite professing egalitarian princi ples, the found ers in fact held rac-
ist and sexist prejudices that allowed them to justify disenfranchising so 
many Americans. The  legal history of U.S. voting rights, however, sug-
gests a slightly more complicated story, for the initial justification for lim-
iting the franchise in the early republic in fact did not depend upon a notion 
of biological inferiority. It was, instead, not  until the wave of demo cratizing 
c h a p t e r   1
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reforms in the early to mid– nineteenth  century that the doctrine of natu-
ral in equality became necessary to the justification of voter exclusion. Thus 
ironically—or something worse—it was an upsurge in the egalitarian 
sentiment that “all men”  really  ought to mean all biological  humans that 
helped to crystallize the dehumanizing discourse of modern biological rac-
ism that this chapter  will explore.
Despite the revolutionary liberal rhe toric of the Declaration, the laws 
of suffrage in the early United States remained largely unchanged from 
the colonial period and thus reflected the more conservative po liti cal ethos 
of British republicanism.1 On this theory, voting is not a natu ral  human 
right  because rationality— the precondition for po liti cal suffrage—is not 
an inalienable trait of all  humans. Instead, republicanism holds that ratio-
nality is a faculty that may be enabled or disabled by one’s financial condi-
tion. Owning property gives one a rational stake in the nation— “a 
permanent common interest with, and attachment to, the community,” as 
George Mason puts it in the  Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776). By con-
trast to the landed man’s rational interest, John Adams suggests, “Men 
who are wholly destitute of property” are as “dependent upon  others . . . 
as  women upon their husbands or  children on their parents” and thus are 
not in a position to exercise the “good judgment” of “in de pen dent minds.”2 
The property restrictions on voting in the early republic thus implied that, 
 whether or not all  humans have a capacity for reason, the power to exercise 
that rationality is contingent upon the ideological freedom conferred by 
economic in de pen dence. On this eighteenth- century view, then, limiting 
the franchise to propertied men did not specifically entail denying the hu-
manity of nonvoters; instead, the prevailing republican logic presumed 
that humanity, alone, is not a sufficient qualification for full po liti cal 
personhood.
All this began to change in the first half of the nineteenth  century, when 
a wave of demo cratic reforms across the states reduced or overturned the 
property requirements for suffrage. “Stated simply,” Alexandar Keyssar re-
flects in his comprehensive history of U.S. voting rights, “more and more 
Americans came to believe that the  people (or at least the male  people— ‘ every 
full- grown featherless biped who wears a hat instead of a bonnet’)  were 
and  ought to be sovereign.”3 The extension of the franchise to nonproper-
tied white men in the early nineteenth  century thus not only expanded 
voting rights; crucially, it rearticulated their justification. The new laws 
rejected the notion that rationality is a power contingent upon freehold 
property: as one Virginian scoffed, the old arrangement was “ludicrous” 
in that it effectively proposed “to ascribe to a landed possession, moral or 
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intellectual endowments.”4 Instead,  those endowments  were presented as a 
speciological endowment characteristic of humanity (hence the tongue- 
in- cheek taxonomic reference to “featherless biped[s]”). The new demo-
cratic doctrine unequivocally held “that  every man has a right to vote, simply 
 because he is a man.”5
In the wake of this reconceptualization of the justification for suffrage, 
remaining restrictions on the vote posed a con spic u ous philosophical prob-
lem. For if the right to vote derives from a rationality that is inborn in all 
speciological  humans, then to deny a class of persons the right to vote is 
tantamount to denying their humanity. It is therefore, of course, no mere 
coincidence that the U.S. abolitionist and feminist movements  were both 
born at this moment in the early nineteenth  century. In 1829, at the crest 
of this wave of demo cratizing reforms, David Walker penned the opening 
salvo of what would become the radical abolitionist movement, citing the 
demo cratic promise of the Declaration and challenging white Americans 
to “tell me if their declaration is true— viz., if the United States of Amer-
i ca is a Republican Government?”6 Two years  later, inspired by Walker’s 
example, William Lloyd Garrison likewise invoked the Declaration to call 
for “the immediate enfranchisement of our slave population.”7
In making their appeals, Walker and Garrison exposed a contradiction 
in the demo cratizing spirit of the age that slavery’s defenders found them-
selves suddenly pressed to justify. Over the ensuing three de cades, a wide 
variety of proslavery arguments would circulate, but none  were more ef-
fectively calculated to deny Black equality while preserving the demo-
cratizing impulse of the era than  those that asserted the innate, biological 
inferiority of Black humanity. If the expansion of the franchise had affirmed 
the po liti cal equality of all biological men,  these new proslavery arguments 
set out to prove that not all biological men are biologically equal. Accord-
ingly, in the 1840s and 1850s the po liti cal exclusion of slaves— like that of 
 women and Native Americans— increasingly came to be justified biologi-
cally. The proliferation and popularization of racial science in  these de-
cades thus marks an impor tant shift in the debate over slavery: what had 
begun as a debate over  whether the enslavement of  humans is morally ac-
ceptable increasingly became a debate over  whether Black  humans  were, 
biologically speaking, fully  human to begin with.
To be sure, racist and misogynist prejudices  were hardly new in the 
1830s. The biological arguments that circulated in this era did not invent 
the idea of innate inferiority, but they did reinvent it by transposing it into 
empirical language and legitimating it with the stamp of scientific author-
ity. Thus, as the historian Mia Bay argues, although racism may have been 
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old, scientific racism— “a rationalized ideology of Black inferiority”— was a 
relatively recent invention which gave racial discrimination an unpre ce-
dented air of objectivity and cultural authority in the antebellum era.8 Sci-
entific racism was an outgrowth of racial science, which emerged in the 
eigh teenth  century as a field of inquiry that proposed to apply the meth-
ods of natu ral history to the study of the  human species. As we  shall see, 
racial science  housed a number of competing theories over the years, not 
all of which  were overtly racist—or, more accurately, all of which  were rac-
ist to dif fer ent degrees and in dif fer ent ways. But under neath this internal 
diversity, racial science was unified in its assumption that  human identity 
is conferred biologically, and that our moral and cognitive characters are 
essentially embodied traits. From its earliest beginnings, racial science pro-
pounded the notion that “the intellectual man is inseparable from the 
physical man; and the nature of the one cannot be altered without a corre-
sponding change in the other.”9
The increasing centrality of race as a justification for slavery— and thus 
the increasing centrality of racial scientific discourse to both pro- and 
antislavery argumentation in the late antebellum era—is a significant his-
torical development. In this chapter, however, I  will argue that to under-
stand the full impact that racial science had on the American po liti cal 
imaginary, we must also look beyond the role it played in racist defenses 
of slavery. For even more profoundly, as I  shall argue, the biologism im-
plicit in racial scientific discourse ( whether pro- or antislavery) presented a 
potentially fatal challenge to the then still novel liberal ideals of universal 
 human rights and equality. In place of the abstract and uniform figure of 
Man typically invoked in liberal demo cratic discourse, biologism draws 
attention to our embodied diversity: empirically speaking, no two persons 
are the same. Seizing upon the fact of diversity, racial science concluded 
that humanity, or Homo sapiens, is in fact fractured into a variety of distinct 
taxonomic subtypes. Regardless of  whether it was being used to bolster 
or to dismantle racist prejudice, then, racial science forwarded a newly bi-
ological conception of the  human that erodes the universalizing imagi-
nary enshrined in liberal politics. From this new embodied perspective, 
belonging to the  human race no longer ensures one’s basic similarity nor, 
therefore, one’s basic equality with other members of the species.
This chapter investigates this crisis in the meaning of “the  human” by 
tracing its effects on the remarkable transformation of Frederick Doug-
lass’s antislavery thought during the de cade or so of racial science’s ascen-
dancy in antebellum discourse. In the late 1840s and 1850s, Douglass 
reinvented his stance on slavery. Parting ways with the Garrisonian abo-
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litionists and abandoning their platform of disunionism and pacifism, he 
made new alliances in New York, throwing his weight into electoral politics 
and his money into his newspaper and John Brown’s armed re sis tance. 
Among the myriad  factors that contributed to his transformation, I high-
light Douglass’s growing sense that the  battle for freedom must not only 
be a campaign against slavery but against racism and the pernicious ideol-
ogy of Black inferiority that midcentury ethnology was then fortifying. As 
an example of how the growing influence of racial discourse altered anti-
slavery argumentation, Douglass is a fascinating case not  because his re-
sponse to racial science was typical, but  because it was not. Douglass’s 
writings of the 1850s show him to not only have sensed the importance of 
being able to frame his antislavery argument “ethnologically” (as a num-
ber of con temporary Black writers had begun to do), but to have also been 
keenly alert to the steep costs associated with  doing so. In his response to 
racist science, Douglass refutes Black inferiority on ethnological grounds 
but seems to recognize that simply by acknowledging racial difference— 
even if just to deny its po liti cal significance—he is weakening his case 
for  human equality. “Let it once be granted that the  human race are . . . 
naturally dif fer ent in their moral, physical, and intellectual capacities,” he 
ruefully observes, “and a chance is left for slavery.”10
As I  shall argue, Douglass solves this prob lem by developing a new strain 
of argument against slavery that is materialist yet not racialist—an argu-
ment that, speculatively and at  great po liti cal hazard, brackets the ques-
tion of Black humanity and embraces the materiality and animality of the 
 human. This difficult argument emerges intermittently across Douglass’s 
writings of the 1850s and sits uneasily alongside his continued affirmation 
of Black humanity and racial equality. It becomes particularly loud in his 
prophecies of an imminent racial conflict, whose vio lence, as I  shall dem-
onstrate, he proleptically justifies by portraying this as the natu ral and 
ineluctable expression of a universal biological instinct for self- preservation. 
In  these moments, Douglass invokes a rhe toric of assertive Black “man-
hood” that is paradoxically animalistic, proposing that Black Americans 
can best demonstrate their humanity through acts of physical re sis tance 
that Douglass consistently compares to the violent re sis tance of animals. 
Indeed, as I  will demonstrate, the comparison to animals allows Douglass 
to pres ent racial uprising as not only natu ral but,  because natu ral, inevi-
table—if the intolerable conditions of Black life in Amer i ca do not change.
Thus just when it would seem to have been most urgent to disavow all 
comparison to nonhuman animals, Douglass begins to think more consis-
tently through them, and it is my contention that he does this not in spite 
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of but  because of the rise of racial science and the dehumanizing discourse 
of Black animality it fostered. Recognizing the ways in which racial sci-
ence’s materialism erodes the epistemic assumptions under lying appeals to 
 human rights and equality, Douglass develops a rearguard defense against 
this new onslaught, framing an antislavery argument that is strategically 
agnostic  toward the “question” of his race’s humanity. As it diffusely takes 
shape in his late antebellum writings, this new strain of antislavery think-
ing depicts the systematic oppression of Black Americans as a moral crime 
that is, moreover, a mounting national liability: a practice that is “danger-
ous as well as wrong.”11 Although he by no means abandons his moral op-
position to slavery, Douglass’s late antislavery writings supplement that 
moral critique with a new strain of thinking that works from a logic of risk 
rather than wrong. Tactically engaging racial science’s biological recon-
ceptualization of the  human, Douglass experiments with a new, material-
ist antislavery argument that is indifferent to the question of the slave’s—or 
anyone else’s— humanity.
Racial Science’s Challenge to  Human Equality
By 1850, racial scientific accounts of Black inferiority had become deeply 
woven into the fabric of the proslavery position, providing a seemingly au-
thoritative rationale, coolly removed from the subjective chaos of moral 
sentiment, for the wisdom and justice of slavery.12 Proslavery ethnologies 
suggested that Black Americans  were, at best, innately dependent  humans 
(like  women and  children), and perhaps even not quite  human: “A man 
must be blind not to be struck by similitudes between some of the lower 
races of mankind . . .  [and] the Orang- Outan,” write the authors of Types 
of Mankind.13 This racist science was answered by antislavery ethnologies, 
many written by prominent Black thinkers, that decried this bestialization 
and fought to establish the full humanity of the Black race. To appreciate 
the true scope of the impact that racial scientific discourse had on the slav-
ery debates, however, we must look beyond this antebellum strug gle be-
tween pro- and antislavery ethnologies. As crucial as it was to empirically 
discredit racist science’s attempts to dehumanize and bestialize Black 
Americans, the very fact that this was a debate between racial sciences— 
that, in other words, racial science had become a vital new battleground in 
the debate over slavery— was itself consequential. For, as I  shall elaborate 
below, quite apart from its po liti cal usages, the materialist logic of racial 
science fundamentally challenges basic assumptions of humanistic ethics 
and liberal democracy. To understand the po liti cal significance of racial 
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   28 11/1/17   11:57 AM
Racial Science and the Prob lem of  Human Equality 29
scientific discourse, then, we must learn to recognize how, from the be-
ginning—in its basic conceptual premises, which became more explicit 
over the course of its historical development— racial science undermined 
Enlightenment notions of universal  human rights and equality.
The field of racial science was born when eighteenth- century natu ral 
historians began to apply their empirical and taxonomizing procedures to 
the study of  humans. Racial science was, in this sense, an attempt at reflex-
ivity: much as the word “race” had originated as a term of art in sixteenth- 
century animal husbandry before migrating to its usage in  humans, the 
discipline of racial science originated out of a taxonomizing science origi-
nally developed to systematize and instrumentalize the nonhuman world. 
Racial scientists proposed to study humankind as a species like any other 
animal, endeavoring to enumerate, describe, and account for the  causes of 
embodied diversity.
By its very premise, then, racial science undermined the categorical 
distinction between  humans and animals. Humanism differentiates the 
 human from the animal by positing that  humans are uniquely in posses-
sion of a moral quality (reason or soul) that marks humanity’s exception-
ality to nature— its in de pen dence from its animal body and freedom from 
the chains of physical causality. By contrast, natu ral history restricts its 
inquiries to physical phenomena, and from this strictly empirical perspec-
tive, as the eighteenth- century godfather of taxonomy, Carl Linnaeus, 
observed,  there is hardly “a distinguishing mark which separates man from 
the apes, save for the fact that the latter have an empty space between their 
canines and their other teeth.”14 Linnaeus proposed to sidestep the incom-
mensurability of humanism’s doctrine of  human exceptionalism and natu-
ral history’s commitment to empirical evidence by suggesting that the 
question of humanity’s moral nature “belongs to another forum” than 
natu ral history, a deferral he signals in his landmark volume, Systema na-
turae (1775), by suspending his taxonomic system at the  human, refusing 
to identify this species by any distinguishing physiological marks. Instead, 
he designates humankind by the curious epithet, Homo nascem te ipsum 
(“Man know thyself”)— a singularly recursive construction that Giorgio 
Agamben reads as a nod to the aporetic logic at the heart of Western hu-
manism, the circularity by which  humans do not prove but simply assert 
their moral and ontological exceptionality to animal life. But if Linnaeus 
thus foresaw and sought to deflect a confrontation between empirical and 
humanistic discourses of humankind by suspending the former, eighteenth- 
century racial scientists  were not so cautious and forged ahead with their 
speciological rearticulation of humanity.
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In  doing so, they  were developing a discourse that not only undermined 
the doctrine of  human exceptionalism and natu ral rights but moreover re-
made the logic of  human equality. In natu ral history, as Linnaeus reminds 
us, facts are determined by observation: what makes this five- pointed body 
 human and that five- pointed body starfish is a  matter of distinguishing 
physical marks, anatomical forms, and other mea sur able traits. In order to 
qualify as true by the standards of scientific authority, propositions like the 
doctrine of  human equality therefore had to be empirically verifiable: 
the equality of one person to another had to be a demonstrable, mea sur-
able “fact.” Accordingly, as Winthrop Jordan observes, “From the facts of 
natu ral history, [racial science] spoke for an equality among men which 
derived from their corporeal sameness. . . .  Men had been created equal by 
the Creator, yes, but the evidence for this creation now lay in man’s physi-
cal being.”15 In other words, natu ral history’s empirical episteme demanded 
that  human equality be manifest: equality could not inhere in a strictly in-
ward and disembodied  human trait—an unobservable soul or rational 
freedom— and still count as true. Thus instead of arguing for a universal 
moral equality or shared  human nature, racial scientists sought to ground 
the doctrine of  human equality in demonstrable physical likeness. Seeing 
is believing.
As equality migrated from an inward to an outward trait, the corporeal 
diversity of  human bodies consequently became freighted with unpre ce-
dented significance. As Irene Tucker argues, empiricism’s “demand that 
universalism be not simply a po liti cal aspiration but something that might 
be experienced” caused the vis i ble attributes of persons— and most especially 
skin color—to take on po liti cal import as a sign of a person’s categorical 
likeness (or not) to  others in the po liti cal body.16 That racialist ideology 
was on the rise in the West in the same historical moment when demo-
cratic and antislavery sentiment was spreading can seem like a glaring hy-
poc risy, or at least evidence of a conservative retrenchment against the 
Enlightenment’s liberal ideals.17 But Tucker’s point is that, however anti-
thetical they may seem, abolitionism and racialism are equally logical 
outcomes of the Enlightenment, expressing its commitments to liberal 
universalism and the empirical method, respectively.18 The necessity of em-
pirically confirming  human equality made physical diversity fraught with 
po liti cal meaning to a degree it had not been before. And thus, previously 
negligible to the question of  human likeness, material embodiment— and 
more particularly, the infinite diversity of bodies— now posed a power ful 
obstacle to liberal universalism.
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This impasse, however, was not fully apparent before Douglass’s day. 
In the eigh teenth and early nineteenth centuries, the reigning paradigm 
in racial science, termed “environmentalism,” worked to reconcile physi-
cal diversity with  human equality by asserting the latent empirical like-
ness of all  humans. This theory held that all  humans descend from a single 
ancestral stock (an idea called monogenism), and that this original  human 
race diverged as  humans dispersed across the globe and came  under the 
influence of dif fer ent climatological and social circumstances. “The pli-
ant nature of man is susceptible of many changes from the action of the 
minutest  causes,” Samuel Stanhope Smith explains in his Essay on the  Causes 
of the Variety of the Complexion and Figure in the  Human Species, “and  these 
 causes habitually repeated through a sufficient period of time, can create 
at length, the most con spic u ous differences.”19 Environmentalism was not 
antiracist: its expositors generally described racial diversification as a pro-
cess of degeneration from the original and ideal racial standard embodied 
in Eu ro pe ans.20 However, the same scientists also proposed that the pro-
cess of racial degeneration could be reversed— that nonwhite races  were 
capable of reverting to the original, ideal form of humanity (could quite 
literally turn white) through changes in climate and education.21 By treat-
ing racial differences as secondary acquisitions superimposed over an orig-
inal and inalienable (if only virtual) empirical sameness, eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth- century environmentalism finessed the tension between 
embodied diversity and  human equality.
This uneasy détente fell apart in the nineteenth  century, when environ-
mentalism increasingly lost ground to more rigidly essentialist theories of 
race. The first wave of the new ideology arose in conjunction with romantic 
philosophy, at one step removed from the discipline of natu ral history, 
which celebrated the distinctiveness of dif fer ent races and national volk. 
Like environmentalism, romantic racialism believed racial differences to 
be the product of adaptations to local climate and culture; however, it 
tended to view  these differences as irreversible once acquired, and deeply 
determinative of personal identity. The fixity of race in romantic racial the-
ory thus revoked environmentalism’s notion of a latent  human unifor-
mity; however, romantic racialists generally did not use the permanence 
of racial difference as an excuse for erecting a divinely ordained hierarchy 
of  human races. “ There was in fact some tendency to celebrate diversity, as 
showing the richness and plenitude of the  human spirit,” George Freder-
ickson notes.22 The result was a discourse that was not aggressively racist, 
although it was essentializing and often patronizing—as, for instance, when 
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George Catlin enthuses over “the proud yet dignified deportment of 
Nature’s man” in his Letters and Notes on . . .  the North American Indians 
(1841), or when Moncure Daniel Conway praises Black Americans for 
bringing “an infusion of this fervid African ele ment, so child- like, exuber-
ant, and hopeful.”23 As  these ste reo types attest, even absent overtly racist 
intentions, romantic racialism codified a new view of race that was much 
more difficult to reconcile with a universalizing discourse of “the  human.” 
Transforming race from a reversible acquisition to a permanent identity 
determined by deep biology, romantic racialism ushered in a new era of 
racialist thinking in which, as Frederickson describes it, conversation 
increasingly tended “to start from a common assumption that the races 
differed fundamentally.”24
This new aesthetic of difference paved the way for a much more aggres-
sively racist strain of racial science known ( because its leading expositors 
published in Amer i ca) as the “American school” of ethnology. In 1839, at 
the tail end of a de cade of increasing racial conflict in the United States 
(with the passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1830 and its brutal imple-
mentation thereafter; Nat Turner’s Rebellion in 1831, Black Hawk’s war 
in 1832, the Amistad mutiny in 1839, the organ ization of the immediatist 
abolitionist movement and underground railroad, and the galvanization of 
their proslavery opposition), Philadelphia physician and naturalist Samuel 
George Morton published Crania Americana, a craniometrical study 
of the indigenous  peoples of North and South Amer i ca. Morton’s work 
inaugurated the American school of racial science by reviving a lesser 
eighteenth- century racial theory known as polygenism. Unlike monogen-
ism, polygenism holds that the  human races  were created separately, con-
stituting originally distinct and unrelated populations. “Each Race was 
adapted from the beginning to its peculiar local destination,” Morton 
asserts in Crania Americana; “In other words . . .  the physical characteristics 
which distinguish the dif fer ent Races are in de pen dent of external  causes.”25 
The American school’s case for polygenism relied heavi ly on Morton’s 
craniometrical research as well as the work of the renowned Swiss- born 
Harvard naturalist, Louis Agassiz (on whom more in Chapter  2), and 
American Egyptologist George Gliddon. More unusually, American school 
ethnology was aggressively promoted to lay audiences by nonscientists, 
including the savvy propagandist Josiah Nott, as well as John Van Evrie, 
George Sawyer, and Samuel Cartwright.
The American school’s polygenist brand of racial science gradually 
gained ground through the 1840s, but it was with the publication of Nott 
and Gliddon’s Types of Mankind in 1854— a monumental compendium of 
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polygenist ethnology— that its thesis reached a new apogee of popularity. 
Despite Types’ cumbersome eight hundred pages and even heftier $7.50 
price tag, this lavishly illustrated volume sold out in four months and went 
through ten editions by 1870.26 Drawing from a smorgasbord of anatomi-
cal, zoological, archaeological, and philological research, and liberally 
quoting from the work of other prominent ethnologists (both polygenist 
and not), Types gathered evidence that “mankind is divisible into distinct 
species” and that “the differences existing between the races of men are of 
the same kind as the differences observed between the dif fer ent families, 
genera, and species of monkey or other animals.”27 Nott and Gliddon thus 
explic itly denied that the slave is “a man and a  brother”; instead, they ar-
gued that “the  human race” is a misnomer, obscuring a much more atten-
uated taxonomic real ity. By 1860, this polygenist thesis had won impor tant 
converts among the shapers of Southern opinion, including editors of De-
Bow’s Review and Southern Quarterly Review, John C. Calhoun, James Henry 
Hammond, and Jefferson Davis.
At midcentury, racial scientific discourse in the United States was thus a 
heterogeneous yet consequential free- for- all. Scientifically, polygenists 
and monogenists disagreed over the nature of  human origins. Among 
themselves, environmental and romantic monogenists further disputed the 
nature of racial difference, debating  whether racial characteristics  were 
fixed or mutable, and  whether interracial mixing was physiologically pos-
si ble and, if so,  whether it was so cio log i cally desirable. Theologically, all 
sides laid claim to biblical authority. (Although monogenists had an easier 
time of this, given the congruence of their vision of humanity’s single ori-
gin with the doctrine of Adamic descent, many polygenists also worked 
hard to prove that the theory of separate  human creations accorded with 
Scripture.)28
But what is most perplexing,  these competing biological and bio- 
theological arguments  were attached to a strikingly fungible range of po-
liti cal ideologies. To be sure, polygenism had very strong ties to proslavery 
politics (Douglass estimated that “Ninety- nine out of  every hundred of the 
advocates of a diverse origin of the  human  family”  were proslavery apolo-
gists).29 Polygenists certainly came the closest to claiming that Black and 
Native American  peoples constituted distinct and inferior species of hu-
manity taxonomically closer to the animal life over which the biblical God 
granted Adam’s descendants dominion.30 For this very reason, however, 
many proslavery advocates decried polygenist science. To men like George 
Fitzhugh, whose defense of slavery turned on its being a benevolently 
patriarchal system more humane than Northern capitalism’s brutally 
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   33 11/1/17   11:57 AM
34 Racial Science and the Prob lem of  Human Equality
impersonal “wage slavery” (Southern “slavery protects the weaker mem-
bers of society, just as do the relations of parent, guardian, and husband,” 
he insisted), polygenism’s literally dehumanizing thesis was anathema. “It 
encourages and incites brutal masters to treat negroes, not as weak, igno-
rant, and dependent brethren, but as wicked beasts without the pale of 
humanity,” Fitzhugh objected.31
Meanwhile, that polygenists  were likely to be proslavery does not mean 
that monogenists  were not. As nineteenth- century racial science had in-
creasingly come to perceive race as a deep and permanent feature of iden-
tity, monogenism became increasingly consistent with patriarchal proslavery 
ideologies like Fitzhugh’s (think, for instance, of Moncure Conway’s praise 
for the “child- like” exuberance of the African race). Proslavery racial sci-
ence thus also encompassed monogenist theories like that of the Reverend 
John Bachman, whose treatise on The Doctrine of the Unity of the  Human 
Race insists “that nature has stamped on the African race the permanent 
marks of inferiority,” rendering this race inherently dependent beings, like 
 women and  children.32 As tracts like Bachman’s prove, monogenist “unity” 
pres ents no necessary impediment to proslavery politics, affirming Nott and 
Gliddon’s claim that “the doctrine of unity gives no essential guarantee of 
universal liberty and equality.”33
Indeed, what Nott and Gliddon seem to recognize is that racial science’s 
challenge to the doctrine of  human rights does not turn on the question 
of  human origins (shared or separate) but rather inheres in racial science’s 
antagonism to the idea of a shared  human nature. Increasingly and across 
the board, nineteenth- century racial discourse moved away from eighteenth- 
century environmentalism to portray race as a fixed and determining fea-
ture of moral identity— indeed, as Bay has shown, even Black ethnologists 
in this era (whom I  will discuss below) assigned transhistorical characters 
to the races, reifying race as a meaningful marker of moral difference. 
This emphasis on  human diversity emptied the category of “the  human” of 
moral significance: instead of indicating a fundamentally shared moral es-
sence, humanity now functioned as a speciological designation that guar-
anteed a baseline morphological, but not moral, similarity. From this 
perspective, the differences between polygenist and monogenist racial sci-
ences recede:  whether  human races represent dif fer ent species of  humans 
or simply dif fer ent va ri e ties of a single species starts to look like a taxo-
nomic squabble of minor po liti cal importance. For,  either way, midcentury 
racial science seemed to reveal that  there simply is no universal “ human 
nature,” nor any “ great fundamental laws of humanity to which all  human 
passions and  human thoughts must ultimately be subject.”34 Thus if poly-
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genism seemed to suggest that the slave was not, in fact, “a man and a 
 brother” to white Americans, monogenism suggested that the fact of the 
slave’s humanity might,  after all, be moot, since to be recognized as a 
 human in the new empirical dispensation now only specified a nominal bio-
logical likeness that made no claims about your moral endowments. To be 
speciologically  human did not guarantee your equality with other  humans 
and thus did not vouchsafe your entitlement to the same  human rights.
But though it is fair to conclude that antebellum racial science was more 
overtly racist than eighteenth- century racial science, in another sense what 
we are seeing is not simply the rationalization of racial prejudice but the 
belated unfolding of the incommensurability of empirical and liberal demo-
cratic discourses of the  human. As I have argued, racial science’s empirical 
epistemology precludes it from asserting an essential moral equality that 
is not also materially mea sur able. Given that, from a strictly materialist 
perspective, mea sur able equality is impossible (no two bodies could ever 
be empirically identical), the materialist outlook of racial science (of any 
stripe) necessarily throws the liberal assertion of  human equality into 
doubt. In this sense, racial discourse reverted to the hierarchical view of 
“the  human” enshrined in the republican doctrine and voting laws of the 
early republic, which likewise represented the  human race as unevenly 
capable and hence unequally qualified for po liti cal rights.
Over and above the debate between monogenists and polygenists, then, 
the under lying shift to an empirical discourse of “the  human” enshrined 
in all strains of racial science undermined demo cratic arguments for uni-
versal equality and  human rights by disabling the logic according to which 
 those arguments operate. Across the spectrum of its po liti cal affiliations, 
racial science’s biological conception of the  human was transforming what 
it meant to recognize someone as  human. Transposing “the  human” from 
a moral to a taxonomic designation, racial science’s empirical epistemology 
destabilized the liberal demo cratic conception of humanity, exploding the 
latter’s abstract uniformity into an embodied diversity and placing  humans 
in an ontological continuum with nonhuman life. The rationale for equality 
and  human rights— the idea that “all men are created equal”— once again 
rested on ideologically shifting sands.
Antislavery Ethnology: Douglass Responds
Given the difficulty of aligning racial science with liberal humanistic doc-
trine, it makes sense that many antislavery advocates simply refused to 
engage with it. Leading abolitionists like Garrison, Theodore Weld, and 
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Wendell Phillips remained staunch humanists through the 1850s, reject-
ing the invidious distinctions of race. “Convince me that liberty is not the 
inalienable birthright of  every  human being, of what ever complexion or 
clime, and I  will give [the Declaration of In de pen dence] to the consuming 
fire,” Garrison pronounced in 1854, the year Types of Mankind was pub-
lished.35 For  these abolitionists,  human equality is a right endowed by the 
exceptional yet unobservable moral value that is inherent in all  humans 
irrespective of race, gender, or other features of  human embodiment.
And yet, for all its ideological purity, this principled indifference to 
racial distinctions became a liability to the antislavery cause. Like it or not, 
racial science was increasingly central to the debate over slavery in the years 
leading up to the Civil War. Surveying the landscape of proslavery argu-
ment in 1861, one Southerner wryly observed that the case for slavery was 
now being made “theologically, geologically, oryctologically, paleontologi-
cally, archaeologically, chronologically, genealogically, orismologically, 
philologically, etymologically, zoologically, osteologically, myologically, 
ethnologically, psychologically, [and] so cio log i cally.”36  Here was an arsenal 
of empirical and quasi- empirical discourses to which abolitionism’s moral 
platform had no way to directly respond. When men such as Josiah Nott 
demanded evidence of  human equality, asserting that “numerous attempts 
have been made to establish the intellectual equality of the dark races with 
the white; and the history of the past has been ransacked for examples, but 
they are nowhere to be found,” abolitionists like Garrison could not provide 
proof without abandoning their moralistic high ground.37 This abstention 
cost them, Frederickson argues: “The inability of the abolitionists to ground 
their case for the Black man on a forthright and intellectually convincing 
argument for the basic identity in the moral and intellectual aptitudes of all 
races weakened their ‘strug gle for equality’ and helps explain the per sis tence 
of racist doctrines  after emancipation.”38
But of course, that invoking humanity’s “inalienable birthright” or in-
nate moral essence no longer constituted an “intellectually convincing ar-
gument” for  human equality was precisely the prob lem. If equality must 
be empirically demonstrated to be compelling, then liberal humanism has 
already lost crucial ideological ground. In this sense, racial science’s influ-
ence worked to disable Garrisonian- style abolitionism’s primary rhetori-
cal strategy, moral suasion. For once moral standing is understood to inhere 
in a being’s embodied attributes or capacities, testing and mea sure ment 
become the only sure ways to decide how a being  ought to be treated. Hence, 
as the phi los o pher Cora Diamond argues, the idea “that what is involved 
in moral thought is knowledge of empirical similarities and differences” 
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deflects us from the work of examining our consciences and the prompt-
ings of moral sentiments such as sympathy, compassion, pity, and love.39 
Instead of consulting our hearts, we are tasked with analyzing the marks 
and features of the other—an empirical proj ect in which, as Dana Nelson 
and Kyla Schuller point out, sentiment is banished as irrelevant if not mis-
leading, replaced by a “male sensibility” that is embodied in the disciplined 
sensuality of empirical methods, privileging purity, professionalism, and 
self- control.40 As racial science’s cultural authority grew, it threatened to 
moot moral suasion by suggesting that the question of whom or what de-
serves our full sympathy is a topic “upon which science alone has the right 
to pronounce.”41
The rapid ascendency of racial scientific discourse in the late 1840s and 
1850s may thus help us to account for Frederick Douglass’s dwindling faith 
in moral suasion in  these years. As we know, his ideological and po liti cal 
stance underwent a transformation between 1847 and 1851, during which 
time he moved to Rochester, founded a newspaper, the North Star, began 
to associate with James McCune Smith and Gerritt Smith of the Liberty 
Party, and fi nally broke with the Garrisonians by publicly proclaiming the 
U.S. Constitution to be an antislavery document. From this point forward, 
he renounced the Garrisonian platform of disunionism to throw his weight 
into electoral politics, and he abandoned their pacifistic commitment to 
moral suasion to embrace an increasingly fiery rhe toric of racial uprising— 
words he backed up with deeds by providing material support to John 
Brown. To many observers both then and  today, Douglass’s foray into po-
liti cal and even militant antislavery circles has seemed like a concession to 
expediency— a calculated betrayal of his lofty humanistic ideals.42 In his 
1899 biography of Douglass, Charles Chestnutt somewhat apologetically 
accounts for this de cade by explaining that Douglass was not above “sub-
ordinating the means to the end.”43
But if it is the case that the Garrisonians retained the moral high ground, 
as we have just seen  there is also evidence to suggest that lofty arguments 
 were losing traction against racist prejudices that  were, with the help of 
midcentury racial scientific discourse, luxuriating in the light of newfound 
cultural authority. By 1850,  after two de cades of abolitionist appeal, the 
number of slaves in Amer i ca had doubled, and the passage of the Fugitive 
Slave Law made the likelihood of emancipation seem to be, if anything, 
on the wane. Moreover, by this time Douglass’s personal experience of 
freedom had also been soured by the racism he encountered in the North— 
prejudice he experienced even among his Anti- Slavery Society colleagues, 
and which became all the more evident to him  after his sojourn in Ireland 
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and  Great Britain, where he noticed that, for the first time in his experi-
ence, “no delicate nose grows deformed in my presence.”44 Thus though 
Douglass certainly did not cease to believe that slavery is morally abomi-
nable, he does seem to have concluded, as Marianne Noble suggests, “that 
moral sense was evidently so overwritten by racist ideology that it was not 
useful in the fight for justice.”45 As Douglass became convinced that Amer-
i ca would not be  free  until racism was defeated, he repositioned himself to 
fight not only for emancipation but also for racial equality, and in  doing so 
he seems to have realized that moral suasion alone would not defeat the 
ideology he was up against.
Indeed, Douglass watched the rise of racial scientific discourse closely 
and with growing alarm.  After the publication of Types of Mankind in 1854, 
he was sufficiently convinced that “Messrs. Nott, Gliddon, Morton, Smith, 
and Agassiz”  were now being “duly consulted by our slavery propagating 
statesmen” that he felt compelled to respond to their science directly.46 He 
did this in the form of an address entitled “The Claims of the Negro Eth-
nologically Considered,” delivered at Western Reserve University in Au-
gust of that year (in what was also the first U.S. commencement address 
given by a Black American speaker).47 The public demand for a transcript 
of this speech was apparently clamorous enough that Douglass ventured 
to republish his text as a pamphlet— a move that also indicates how cen-
tral biological discourse had become to the discussion of slavery, and how 
urgent it now seemed that slavery’s opponents be able to frame their case 
“ethnologically.” Indeed, in his opening remarks, Douglass justifies his 
topic by remarking that science was now established as a crucial arbiter of 
racial politics. “The relation subsisting between the white and Black  people 
of this country is the vital question of the age,” he writes, and “in the solu-
tion of that question, the scholars of Amer i ca  will have to take an impor-
tant and controlling part.”48
In writing “Claims,” Douglass was contributing to a tradition of Black 
American ethnographic writing that stretched back to the late 1820s.49 
Well before racial science had become a lynchpin of proslavery discourse, 
Black activists, editors, ministers, and men of science had become aware 
and alarmed by racial science and “felt compelled to disprove, rather than 
dismiss, even the earliest, tentative arguments for Black inferiority made 
by white Americans.”50 Thus, for instance, two de cades prior to the for-
mation of the American school of ethnography, John Russwurm, an edi-
tor of Freedom’s Journal, decried craniological speculations that the Black 
race was endowed “with faculties  little superior to the tribe of the Ourang 
Outangs,” and forms “something between man and brute creation.”51 Re-
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sponding to similar accusations in 1837, Hosea Easton ruefully observed, 
“What could better accord with the objects of this nation with reference 
to Blacks than to teach their  little ones that a negro is part monkey?”52 
Against such bestializing racial theories, Black ethnological writers con-
structed counterarguments that blended aspects of eighteenth- century 
environmentalism with romantic racialism. Men such as Russwurm, 
Easton, Henry Highland Garnet, and James Pennington argued that 
Black Americans suffered “an intellectual and physical disability or infe-
riority” that was directly caused by the “damning influence of slavery.”53 
However, once emancipated, they argued, Black Americans would be  free 
to develop the unique characteristics that are truly endemic to their 
race.  These “true” characteristics  were typically understood to include 
intellectual gifts, as demonstrated by the genius of ancient Egyptians and 
Ethiopians, who “astonished the world with their arts and sciences.”54 “The 
world now would be in a heathenish darkness, for the want of that infor-
mation which their better disposition has been capable of producing,” 
Easton writes.55 The race was also understood to be naturally endowed 
with a particularly Christ- like moral temperament, a capacity for long- 
suffering endurance that contrasted sharply with “the love of gain and the 
love of power,” which  were understood to be “the besetting sins of the 
Anglo- Saxon race.”56 “Nothing but liberal, generous princi ples, can call 
the energies of an African mind into action,” writes Easton, who looks 
forward to an age,  after the “continual scene of bloodshed and robbery” 
that has characterized the era of white dominance, in which Africa’s sons 
 will naturally “take the lead in the field of virtuous enterprise, filling the 
front ranks of the church, when she marches into the millennial era.”57 
Whereas the extant character of the Black race in Amer i ca was under-
stood to be the product of social conditioning,  these latter intellectual and 
moral endowments  were understood to be expressions of the race’s natu-
ral and permanent character; this blend of environmentalist and romantic 
racialist rationalization typifies the Black ethnological tradition that 
Douglass inherited.
In taking up ethnological discourse,  these men sought to do what the 
Garrisonians would not: refute racist science on its own empirical terms. 
But if their adoption of ethnological discourse helped to challenge the cul-
tural authority of proslavery science, their strategy did not come without 
price. On the one hand, as Bay notes in her masterful study of Black eth-
nography, the effort to combine environmentalism with romantic racial-
ism produced an inherently contradictory theory of racial difference. “By 
assigning transhistorical characteristics to the races, African- American 
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thinkers seemingly undercut their own environmentalist explanations of 
 human differences,” Bay explains.58 This ambivalence might itself be seen 
as a symptom of a more basic prob lem: simply engaging in racialist dis-
course required Black writers to concede to the notion of racial identity, 
reifying the idea that racial differences fragment  human likeness, making 
the princi ple of  human equality more difficult to uphold. Hence Bay sug-
gests that Black ethnologists  were, “to some degree, ensnared by the idea 
of race even as they sought to refute racism’s insult to their humanity;” as 
she argues, Black ethnology’s “arguments for difference and equality  were 
beset by some of the same difficulties contained in the late nineteenth- 
century white segregationist doctrine of ‘separate but equal.’ ”59
Given this logical difficulty, it is not surprising that some Black activ-
ists called for racial separatism, invoking the romantic idea that nations 
had to be racially homogeneous. In the same year Douglass wrote “Claims,” 
Martin Delany published his manifesto of Black nationalism, “The Po liti cal 
Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent,” announcing 
that “we are not identical with the Anglo- Saxon,” and arguing that Black 
Americans must therefore emigrate elsewhere: “A  people, to be  free, must 
necessarily be their own rulers.”60 For Delany, however, racial segregation 
is only a temporary solution to the prob lem of  human difference; ulti-
mately, he anticipates an  apocalyptic future showdown between the world’s 
races, “upon which must be disputed the world’s destiny,” and in which 
“ every individual  will be called upon for his identity with one or the other” 
race.61 Controversial though it was, Delany’s antagonistic separatism of-
fered a solution to the logical tension between difference and equality by 
 doing away with the latter.
The larger context of Black ethnological writing and the prob lems it 
faced prepares us to recognize just how nuanced Douglass’s self- positioning 
is in “Claims.” If Douglass was determined to answer racist science on its 
own terms, he nonetheless seems to have been acutely aware that  doing so 
meant conceding vital ground in the strug gle for  human equality. At the 
same time, he was also determined to stave off Black separatism (a policy 
he did not endorse), which meant that he would have to navigate an alter-
native route through the internal contradictions of the Black ethnological 
tradition. Juggling his ambivalence  toward racialist discourse and his com-
mitment to a multiracial Amer i ca, Douglass constructs an argument in 
“Claims” that is curiously double- voiced. The bulk of the essay sets out to 
refute the dehumanizing theory of polygenism by putting forward a fairly 
conventional environmentalist defense of racial unity. In  these principal 
sections of “Claims,” Douglass marshals archaeological and physiological 
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evidence to support the thesis that the world’s existing racial lineages con-
verge in ancient Egypt and that their subsequent divergence reflects “the 
effect of circumstances upon the physical man.”62 And yet, at the outset of 
the essay, Douglass signals his wariness of the ideological concessions that 
this kind of ethnological argumentation wrings from him. Indeed, if the 
main body of the essay offers an environmentalist defense of  human unity 
(along with occasional assertions of racial distinctiveness), its opening and 
closing remarks introduce a countervailing, speculative strain of thinking 
that trenchantly queries the assumptions that underpin the racialist  discourse 
the main body takes up. In other words, “Claims” manages to si mul ta-
neously deploy and detonate racial science. Bracketing— even preempting— 
the essay’s central argument, Douglass’s framing remarks embrace racial 
science’s embodied conception of the  human only to challenge the notion 
that embodiment has anything to teach American politics.
In his opening remarks, Douglass invites us to ask what the assignation 
“ human” means in the first place. As he points out, the question at hand is 
 really two: before approaching the question of humanity’s multiple or 
“common ancestry,” he must first address the question of “the manhood 
of the Negro.” In the effort to prove that he is “a man,” Douglass admits 
he finds himself immediately at an impasse: “I cannot . . .  argue; I must as-
sert.”63 This impulse to assert his humanity by fiat rather than empirical 
demonstration echoes Linnaeus’s designation of the  human as the being 
who must recognize itself as such (Homo nascem te ipsum). Linnaeus arrives 
at this aporetic self- reference  because he recognizes that what we mean by 
the  human when we invoke it in humanistic discourse is ultimately a  matter 
of moral rather than empirical judgment and thus belongs “to another fo-
rum” than natu ral history. But if man is therefore the animal that recog-
nizes itself as not- animal—if  human life is that which deems itself morally 
exceptional to animal life— Douglass is also aware that self- nomination is 
a privilege that has been revoked for members of his race. His own asser-
tion of his humanity is thus rendered inadmissible by the racism that pre-
sumes him to be subhuman  until proven other wise, obliging him to first 
“establish the manhood of anyone making the claim.”64
This catch-22 forces Douglass to seek other means of demonstration be-
sides assertion, and so he gamely proceeds to review the criteria according 
to which humanists have historically distinguished  human from animal 
kind. “Man is distinguished from all other animals, by the possession of 
certain definite faculties and powers,” he reminds us, including the power 
of self- recognition: “Men instinctively distinguish between men and brutes.” 
But  here Douglass’s argument again threatens to collapse, for having named 
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the ability to instinctively distinguish between  human and animal as a 
characteristic mark of the  human, he proceeds to point out that “The  horse 
bears [the Negro] on his back. . . .  The barnyard fowl know his step. . . . 
The dog dances when he comes home, and whines piteously when he is 
absent. All  these know that the Negro is a MAN.” Douglass offers this 
animal testimony as proof of his humanity, “presuming that what is evident 
to beast and to bird, cannot need elaborate argument to be made plain to 
men.” But the irony of this evidence is as rich as it is paralyzing. For, on 
the one hand, one cannot help but notice that it is “brutes” rather than 
“ humans” that  here demonstrate the capacity to “instinctively distinguish 
between men and brutes.” By the classical criteria Douglass has just re-
hearsed,  these animals are therefore more reasonable— more  human—
than racist Americans, who have come to rely on specialized sciences to 
tell them what  every barnyard animal already intuitively knows. But in a 
further irony,  these animals’ testimony to Douglass’s humanity is inad-
missible for the same reason that he has already recognized his own is— 
because of its presumed animality. Douglass’s effort to distinguish himself 
from an animal thus manages to reify the categorical moral difference 
between men and animals even as it si mul ta neously demonstrates the log-
ical indefensibility of this distinction’s aporetic center. Emphasizing the 
obviousness of the moral boundary between  humans and nonhumans (“a 
distinction as eternal as it is palpable,” he insists), Douglass’s now twice- 
failed efforts to invoke it highlight the insusceptibility of this boundary to 
rational argumentation. If only  human speech is admissible testimony to 
one’s humanity, then one must first be acknowledged to be  human before 
one can testify to one’s humanity. In “Claims,” however, Douglass does not 
linger to press this point. Instead he merely gestures to this circular logic 
by concluding his opening discussion where it began: “I assume . . .  that the 
Negro is a man,” he reiterates, and without further comment, shifts tack.65
Douglass now reframes the question before him: assuming his race is 
 human, he proposes to consider  whether the races are genealogically re-
lated. Still he delays his ethnological argument  here, prefacing the case for 
monoge ne tic descent that he is about to deliver with reflections on science’s 
susceptibility to bias and distortion. “Science is favorable to distinction,” 
he notes, cautioning that it tends, by disciplinary habit, to proliferate types 
regardless of  whether  those distinctions  matter. Indeed, Douglass  here 
pres ents science as a kind of aesthetic— “a demand for classes, grades, and 
intellectual capacities,” a taste not just a technique for discriminating be-
tween  things. Building upon this insight, he observes that “fashion is not 
confined to dress” since science, too, has its vogues: “Scientific writers, not 
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less than  others, write to please, as well as to instruct,” and hence they may 
“unconsciously . . .  sacrifice what is true to what is popu lar.”66 Moreover 
when the case is race, the room for bias— unconscious or other wise—is 
irremediably broad, for as Douglass observes, “viewed apart from the 
authority of the Bible, neither the unity, nor diversity of origin of the 
 human  family, can be demonstrated.”67 It is, in other words, “impossible 
to get far enough back” to definitively determine humanity’s origins, leav-
ing ethnologists to weigh the evidence on both sides— a task in which “the 
temptation . . .  to read the Negro out of the  human  family” does  battle 
with the desire to uphold “the credit of the Bible” and to honor “the in-
stinctive consciousness of the common brotherhood of man.”68 By way of 
preface to the ethnological argument he is about to launch, then, Douglass 
gives us a discourse on the myriad ways in which science, too, is subject to 
unempirical bias.
Douglass’s prefatory remarks in “Claims” thus cast doubt both on ra-
cial science (with its disciplinary and extradisciplinary biases) and on hu-
manistic discourse (with its groundless self- assertions), leaving us to cast 
about for an authority that could help us to definitively answer “the vital 
question of the age.” In this way, the essay’s opening provocatively creates 
what Jared Hickman describes as “a situation in which the rhetoricity of 
all knowledge- claims is somewhat uncomfortably exposed.”69 Indeed, the 
vacuum of authority extends even to Douglass, who has by this point pre-
empted the force of the ethnological argument he is about to deliver. Had 
Douglass concluded his essay by resting his case for monogenism, we would 
have been left with an essay that is perversely self- defeating. Instead, at the 
end of “Claims” Douglass expressly lets his case for monogenism unravel 
in order to reframe the question of his humanity once again. In his final 
paragraphs, Douglass abruptly turns aside from his exposition of  human 
unity to acknowledge the possibility that science  will ultimately side against 
him. “What if all this reasoning be unsound?” he speculates; “What if in-
genious men are able to find plausible objections to all arguments maintain-
ing the oneness of the  human race?”70 In a climactic final pivot, Douglass 
sets aside his defense of monogenism to make one last pitch for “the claims 
of the Negro” from a slightly dif fer ent materialist perspective.  Here Dou-
glass invokes a new authority to fill the vacuum his essay has exposed; 
unlike the essay’s earlier candidates, this authority is immune to “the 
rhetoricity of all knowledge- claims”  because it makes no claims to truth, 
only power.
Working in an entirely new vein, the conclusion of “Claims” frames an 
alternative theory of  human rights that does not depend upon establishing 
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that all races share a common identity. In other words, as Douglass shows 
us, the genealogical debates that absorb racial science may not, in fact, be 
decisive. “I sincerely believe, that the weight of the argument is in  favor of 
the unity of origin of the  human race, or species,” he assures us, but
What, if we grant that the case, on our part, is not made out? Does it 
follow, that the Negro should be held in contempt? Does it follow, that 
to enslave and imbrute him is  either just or wise? I think not.  Human 
rights stand upon a common basis; and by all the reasons that they are 
supported, maintained and defended, for one variety of the  human 
 family, they are supported, maintained and defended for all the  human 
 family;  because all mankind have the same wants, arising out of a 
common nature. A diverse origin does not disprove a common nature, 
nor does it disprove a united destiny.71
The major claim Douglass makes  here is that even two races of “diverse 
origin” may nonetheless, serendipitously, share a “common nature” and 
therefore be entitled to the same rights. But this discussion also introduces 
a rather dif fer ent line of argument. Alongside his image of a biologically 
unrelated “ human  family” conjoined by a “common nature,” Douglass de-
scribes a biracial nation related by mutual interests (“wants”) and bound 
together by a “united destiny.” In pointing to this “united destiny,” Dou-
glass reminds us that genealogical kinship is not the only form of relation 
 there is. Geo graph i cal proximity— the shared nature that is one single 
American landscape— produces its own kind of relations, as neighbors can-
not help but impinge on each other in  going about the business of seeing 
to their “wants” in a shared physical economy. And the  thing about  these 
kinds of relations is that they bind populations together through interde-
pendence and mutual vulnerability regardless of  whether  those populations 
are homogeneous or diverse.
In this sense, Douglass’s appeal to an American  future bound to a bira-
cially “united destiny” sets up a new kind of argument on behalf of the 
claims of his race. As Foucault observes, “the subject of right and the sub-
ject of interest are not governed by the same logic,” and in his closing re-
marks, Douglass underscores this difference by suggesting that denying 
his race’s demand for freedom is not only not “just” but also not “wise.”72 
Against the conclusions of white segregationists and Black emigrationists, 
he insists that “the Negro and white man are likely ever to remain the 
principal inhabitants of this country.” Ironically repurposing proslavery 
arguments about how the African race is uniquely designed to withstand 
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hard  labor in harsh climates, he notes that “the history of the Negro race 
proves them to be wonderfully adapted to all countries, all climates, and 
all conditions,” thus proving that, barring genocidal “extermination” (“not 
probable”) or mass exodus (“out of the question . . .  [the Negro’s] attach-
ment to the place of his birth is stronger than iron”), “all the facts in his 
history mark out for [the Negro] a destiny, united to Amer i ca and Ameri-
cans.”73 What ever racial differences might divide them, Black and white 
Americans, Douglass suggests,  will inevitably remain united by another 
“common nature” in the national landscape to which their “common des-
tiny” is bound. And in this shared physical environment, interdependence 
is unavoidable even if other forms of relation (familial, ideological, or 
sympathetic) are not.
Having established the inevitability of ongoing proximity, Douglass 
closes with the clear and ominous warning that acknowledging his race’s 
right to freedom, life, liberty, and knowledge is therefore not just right but 
prudent.
 Whether this population  shall . . .  be made a blessing to the country 
and the world, or  whether their multiplied wrongs  shall kindle the 
vengeance of an offended God,  will depend upon the conduct of no 
class of men so much as upon the Scholars of this country. . . .  There is 
but one safe road for nations as for individuals. . . .  The flaming sword 
of offended justice falls as certainly upon the nation as upon the man. 
God has no  children whose rights may be safely trampled upon. The 
sparrow may not fall to the ground without the notice of His eye, and 
men are more than sparrows.74
With  these portentous words, Douglass suggests that to refuse to accom-
modate the interests of Black Americans is to put the interests of white 
Americans in peril. Couched in the language of divine vengeance, 
Douglass summons the specter of an imminent Black uprising against 
the “multiplied wrongs” of slavery and racial oppression, presenting the 
ethnological “Scholars of this country” with the prospect of their own 
violent death as a dif fer ent kind of rationale for granting that Black Amer-
icans are entitled to freedom. Moreover, in this shift from identity to 
interests, the significance of the ethnological question with which Doug-
lass started (is the Negro  human and related to the white race?) falls away. 
For the prob lem of proximity— which necessarily pres ents a choice between 
peacefully accommodating one’s neighbors’ needs or  else denying their 
interests with vio lence— remains the same regardless of who (or what) the 
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players are. Indeed, as Douglass’s citation of Matthew 10:29 above suggests 
(and as passages discussed in the next section of this chapter  will underscore), 
the same truth holds for men as for sparrows: “God has no  children whose 
rights may be safely trampled upon.”
Thus without relinquishing his claim to humanity, Douglass concludes 
“Claims” by bracketing the relevance of that claim’s controversy. Instead, 
he points to the prob lem of interdependence—of the mutual vulnerability 
to which we, of all species, are exposed by virtue of our proximity in a 
terrestrial “common nature,” the resources of which we all rely on to 
supply our needs and wants. What is so fascinating, then, about this final 
pivot in Douglass’s response to ethnology is the way that the prospect of 
our physically “united destiny” takes him beyond the question of “the 
 human”— beyond, that is, both liberal humanist and racialist logics that 
make moral consideration contingent upon speciological belonging. In the 
next section, I  will explore how Douglass develops this nonhumanistic 
reasoning across his other writings of the 1850s. As we  shall see, animals, 
animal instincts, and the physical laws of nature loom large in this work, 
supplementing his moral critiques of slavery and appeals to  human sympathy 
with a new logic of material risk and existential necessity.
Abolitionist Animals
The rising cachet of scientific racism in American po liti cal discourse in the 
1850s made it increasingly urgent for abolitionists like Douglass to disavow 
any similarity between slaves and animals, and yet his writings of this de-
cade are in fact strewn with animals, deliberately courting animal com-
parisons in ways his earlier writings do not. In the very historical moment 
in which he might have had the most at stake in distancing himself from 
animals he starts to think more regularly through them about the moral 
claims— and perhaps more impor tant, as I  shall suggest, the amoral 
claims— that the nonhuman world holds on the  human. For through the 
animals he represents— animals that stampede, rear, kick, and bite— 
Douglass highlights the speciologically universal instinct to violently resist 
any threat to one’s life and liberty, marking  these  things as basic, more- 
than- human rights. I  will thus argue that Douglass’s identifications with 
animals in the 1850s are part of his systematic effort to frame an abolition-
ist argument that is strategically agnostic  toward the question of his race’s 
humanity—an argument that operates outside of the liberal discourse of 
 human equality and moral right by tactically embracing, instead, the 
specter of  human animality and the threat of physical vio lence. In other 
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words, I suggest that Douglass embraces animals in the 1850s not in spite 
of but  because of scientific racism and the doctrine of Black bestiality it 
codified.
Around the same time Douglass published “Claims,” he was also at work 
on a revised and expanded version of his autobiography, titled My Bondage 
and My Freedom, which he published the following year in 1855. The re-
written text includes a striking alteration in his account of the pivotal year 
he spent hired out to Mr. Covey, a man known locally for “breaking” slaves. 
As Douglass had recounted in The Narrative, on his first day at Covey’s he 
was whipped for losing control of a team of “unbroken oxen” who twice 
make a break for freedom, overturning their cart and destroying a gate in 
their stampede. In his retelling of this scene in the 1855 autobiography, 
Douglass inserts a curious moment of reflection, set off on its own in an 
uncharacteristically short paragraph in the text. Now, in the midst of this 
harrowing experience, the young Douglass stops to take note of his like-
ness to the oxen causing him so much trou ble. “I now saw, in my situation, 
several points of similarity with that of the oxen,” he writes. “They  were 
property, so was I; they  were to be broken, so was I. Covey was to break 
me, I was to break them; break and be broken— such is life.”75
In 1855, Douglass was well aware of the compelling reasons to disavow 
any “points of similarity” between himself and  these beasts of burden— 
reasons that had, if anything, grown more acute in the interim since his 
first autobiography. The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass betrays 
no such inclination to sympathy: where comparisons between slaves and 
animals appear in this text, it is to critique the glaring injustice of a sys-
tem in which “horses and men,  cattle and  women, pigs and  children, all 
[hold] the same rank in the scale of being.”76 Yet despite the intervening 
ascent of ethnological discourse and the seemingly authoritative support 
racist science lent to the idea that the African race comprises, as Russwurm 
encapsulates it, “something between man and brute creation,” My Bondage 
and My Freedom underscores two basic commonalities: both oxen and slaves 
are subjected to an overwhelming physical power and, when pressed, both 
may also assert a violent force of their own.
This lesson is even more explicit in the opening scene of Douglass’s 1854 
novella, The Heroic Slave. During a quiet moment in the forest, the story’s 
hero, Madison Washington, observes the bold be hav iors of the wild ani-
mals around him and ruefully contemplates his own acquiescence to slav-
ery. “ Those birds, perched on yon swinging boughs . . .  though liable to 
the sportsman’s fowling piece, are still my superiors,” he chides himself. 
“They live  free, though they may die slaves.” Noting that even a nearby 
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“miserable” snake, “when he saw my uplifted arm . . .  turned to give me 
 battle,” Washington confesses, “I dare not do as much as that. I neither 
run nor fight, but do meanly stand,” answering the lash with “piteous 
cries.”77 The example of  these forest animals leads Washington to conclude 
that he, too, has a natu ral right to self- determination, and the scene ends 
with his resolution to resist: “Liberty I  will have, or die in the attempt to 
gain it,” he proclaims. Thus echoing Patrick Henry’s iconic revolutionary 
ultimatum, the rousing conclusion of Washington’s forest soliloquy (which 
carries on for several more climactically declamatory lines), rings with an 
eloquence that Ivy Wilson glosses as “an exercise in liberation through 
literacy”— a per for mance of both Washington’s and, by extension, Doug-
lass’s rational intelligence.78 However, the irony of Douglass’s callback to 
Patrick Henry  here is that, in this case, Washington’s willingness to mar-
tyr himself for his liberty is explic itly modeled on the defiant freedom of 
birds and snakes. The humanism implicit in Washington’s insistence that 
liberty is “the inalienable birth- right of  every man” is thus preemptively 
undercut by the fact that this is a lesson he has learned by observing the 
inalienable instinct of animals to live  free or die. Rather than exempli-
fying Washington’s uniquely  human rationality, then, his principled 
insistence upon self- determination  here appears as a belated obedience 
to a much more basic and universal instinct for self- defense. The right 
to freedom does not depend on one’s species designation—in fact, we 
might say that, on this view, freedom is not a “right” or moral entitle-
ment at all so much as it is a reflexive urge that is built into the nature 
of organic life.
Douglass seems to have begun developing this line of thought as early 
as 1851— before he had weighed in on racial science, but when he was 
deeply embroiled in rethinking his relation to the U.S. Constitution. In 
that year, Douglass wrote an editorial on the “Christiana Riot,” an 
armed skirmish that erupted in a border town of Pennsylvania when a 
Mary land farmer arrived to reclaim four fugitive slaves and was rebuffed 
by a local party of primarily  free Black men who assembled to defend the 
fugitives. By the end of the fighting the Mary land farmer was dead and 
the four fugitives, as well as the freeman who had  housed them,  were en 
route to Canada (aided in a leg of their escape by Douglass himself). What 
inspired Douglass’s editorial on this first real test of the 1850 Fugitive 
Slave Law was a rumor that the federal government intended to indict the 
four fugitive slaves for treason, a proposition Douglass found outrageous. 
As he argues in his paper, it makes no sense to try a man for treason 
against the government that enslaves him:
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The only law which the alleged slave has a right to know anything 
about, is the law of nature. This is his only law. The enactments of this 
government do not recognize him as a citizen, but as a  thing. In light 
of the law, a slave can no more commit treason than a  horse or an ox 
can commit treason. A  horse kicks out the brains of his master. Do you 
try the  horse for treason? Then why the slave who does the same 
 thing? You answer,  because the slave is a man, and he is therefore 
responsible for his acts. The answer is sound. The slave is a man and 
 ought not to be treated like a  horse, but like a man, and his manhood 
is his justification for shooting down any creature who  shall attempt to 
reduce him to the condition of a brute.79
Douglass’s diatribe  here is deceptively  simple. On a first reading, he seems 
to call back to humanism’s founding assertion of the “natu ral law” that 
distinguishes between animals (who are slaves to their nature) and men 
(whose rationality renders them autonomous from biological compulsion, 
and hence morally accountable beings). Thus Douglass points out the hy-
poc risy of legally denying the slave’s humanity while proposing to hold him 
morally responsible for his actions. However, Douglass’s reasoning  here 
also moves outside the lines of this very rationale that he invokes. For even 
as he suggests that the slave who shoots his master is a moral agent, while 
the  horse that brains his master is not, the argument he ultimately advances 
is that neither  horse nor slave could rightfully be hauled into court. As he 
explains, the slave’s act of vio lence can only be judged by natu ral, not na-
tional law, and according to natu ral law the act is innocent, since by na-
ture a man has a perfect right to “[shoot] down any creature who  shall 
attempt to reduce him to the condition of a brute.”  Under this descrip-
tion, the slave’s re sis tance becomes morally identical, not antithetical, to 
the re sis tance of the  horse, who likewise kicks his master when his master 
attempts to “reduce him to the condition of a brute.” Thus though Doug-
lass attributes the slave’s right to self- defense to his “manhood,” the anal-
ogy he draws to the instinct for self- preservation in a  horse testifies to the 
trans- specific universalism of this natu ral law— “manhood,” in other words, 
shades  here into something more like “self- assertion.”80 Neither men nor 
 horses  will tolerate being treated like beasts, and in violently resisting their 
oppression they exercise an instinctive and naturally ordained right to self- 
defense. This passage therefore courts a very dif fer ent reading than the 
one I began with. Instead of simply locating the slave’s right to freedom in 
his humanness, the passage ultimately suggests that this right is universal— 
that freedom is synonymous with the instinct for self- preservation com-
mon to all autopoetic life.
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   49 11/1/17   11:57 AM
50 Racial Science and the Prob lem of  Human Equality
Douglass’s rebellious animals thus conjure a rather dif fer ent conception 
of freedom than the one that has typically circulated in discussions of Dou-
glass’s growing militancy in the 1850s. Readers ranging from Martin Lu-
ther King and Malcom X to Eric Sund quist and Russ Castronovo have 
noted how passages like  these strategically invoke the found ers’ appeals to 
natu ral law in justifying the vio lence of the American Revolution in order 
to preemptively justify the armed uprising against slavery that Douglass 
now anticipates.81  These citational echoes have prompted heated debate 
about  whether deploying the found ers’ idiom signals Douglass’s coopta-
tion by Amer i ca’s patriarchal and white supremacist national legacy, or 
 whether this is instead an example of subversive appropriation, an act of 
what Castronovo terms “discursive passing.”82 While I’m sensitive to  these 
concerns, I think this debate fails to account for Douglass’s revolutionary 
animals. Through  these nonhuman figures, Douglass conjures scenes of 
violent re sis tance in which the question of that vio lence’s justifiability is 
superseded by its naturalness, or biological inevitability. For Madison 
Washington to learn of his natu ral right to liberty from a snake, or for the 
young Douglass to recognize the necessity of violently resisting Covey 
from the oxen who resist his own whip, suggests that Douglass might not, 
 after all, have much at stake in  whether Black revolutionary vio lence  will 
be deemed rational rather than animalistic. In place of the higher moral 
law that documents such as the Declaration assert, Douglass’s rearing 
snake, stampeding oxen, and kicking  horse refer to a dif fer ent kind of 
natu ral law— a material force that is prior to moral calculation, an embod-
ied imperative for self- preservation in the face of which questions of justice 
and  legal pre ce dent wither away.
Put differently, Douglass’s writings in the 1850s endeavor to naturalize 
natu ral law, locating moral rights not in humankind’s transcendental rea-
son or immortal soul, but in the instincts and energetic economy of the 
material body ( human or nonhuman). Thus, although he invokes the 
American Revolution as his pre ce dent, in Douglass’s hands natu ral law is 
not simply a para legalistic justification for violent re sis tance (as Amer i ca’s 
found ers and Garrisonian abolitionists deployed it), but moreover func-
tions as a mechanistic explanation of that vio lence’s material necessity. This 
conflation of moral law with physical laws makes freedom curiously hard 
to distinguish from automaticity— hence the tortured ambivalence of the 
Christiana Riot editorial, which cannot decide  whether self- defense is a 
moral action or an instinctive reflex. This ambivalence is even more ap-
parent in another of Douglass’s editorials on the aftermath of the fugitive 
slave law, provocatively entitled, “Is It Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnap-
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per?” (1854).  Here Douglass defends the killing of U.S. Marshal James 
Batchelder at the Boston court house during the failed attempt to rescue 
Anthony Burns by arguing that Burns’s right to freedom was upheld by a 
moral law that is as inexorable as the physical law of gravity. As Douglass 
asserts, by defying this moral law Batchelder therefore forfeited his right 
to life in the same way that a man who “flings himself from the top of some 
lofty monument, against a granite pavement . . .  forfeits his right to live 
[and] dies according to law.” In other words, Douglass reasons, “As  human 
life is not superior to the laws for the preservation of the physical universe, 
so, too, it is not superior to the eternal law of justice.”83  Here again we can 
see how Douglass’s conflation of moral and physical law throws the con-
cepts of justice and freedom, as we know them, into turmoil. For if the 
“eternal law of justice” is understood to operate as mechanically as the 
physical law of gravity—if, that is, the act of shooting Batchelder is no 
more voluntary than the pavement’s “act” of crushing a suicidal jumper— 
then undertaking to justify Batchelder’s murder seems as irrelevant, in the 
first place, as attempting to defend the moral legitimacy of falling down-
ward. If justice and gravity act upon us as natu ral necessities, their moral 
virtue is superfluous.
This is, again, an ideologically risky move for Douglass to make at this 
moment. For although his materialized account of rights allows him to 
frame his case for racial equality and justified vio lence within the empiri-
cal idiom of “the  human” that racial science makes authoritative, it also 
breaks down the moral distinctions (between humanity and animality, and 
between moral and amoral actions) that might other wise seem to form the 
crux of that case. But herein, I think, lies the force of his naturalization of 
natu ral rights, for it suggests that however the “question” of Black human-
ity is deci ded, a violent racial uprising against slavery is nevertheless not 
only pos si ble but in time guaranteed by the mechanisms of physical 
law. That even the simplest nonhuman organisms resist harm by fight or 
flight— that nature itself hates oppression in the same lawful way that it 
abhors a vacuum— means that slavery is materially unsustainable in time, 
attempting as it does to pervert and repress the liberty- loving physics of 
the natu ral world.84 Thus Douglass concludes, in an 1857 editorial an-
nouncing that “Peaceful Annihilation of Slavery Is Hopeless,” that “the 
recoil, when it comes,  will be in exact proportion to the wrongs inflicted.”85 
If the equitable proportionality of this projected racial vio lence (in “exact 
proportion to the wrongs inflicted”) would seem to be an argument for its 
justice (echoing Robert Levine’s sense of the self- restraint implicit in what 
he dubs Douglass’s “temperate revolutionism”), that word “recoil”— drawn 
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as it is from the mechanical physics of springs stretched too far and guns 
that go off— si mul ta neously works to move the vio lence it conjures into the 
amoral realm of automatic and compulsory action.86 As such, antislavery 
vio lence comes to look as unstoppable as it is unavoidable.
As we saw at the end of “Claims,” in the face of the per sis tent denial of 
his race’s humanity, Douglass begins to supplement his critique of slavery’s 
injustice with warnings about its risk: slavery, he argues, is “dangerous as 
well as wrong.”87 As he suggests, even  those listeners who refute his hu-
manity and deny that his race is endowed with inalienable rights  will none-
theless soon find themselves obliged by sheer necessity to accommodate 
his claims or  else brace for a kick to the head. Thus he proposes that “what-
ever character or capacity you ascribe to” his race, and however the ques-
tions of slavery’s moral,  legal, and theological justifiability are popularly 
deci ded, slavery is structurally unsustainable. It has, he writes, “no means 
within itself of perpetuation or permanence,” and must therefore  either be 
abolished or implode.88  There is no appeal to humanity or morality in this 
new argument’s reasoning; instead, in line with the biological dispensa-
tion that racial science augurs, Douglass attributes antislavery vio lence to 
an instinctive demand for self- determination that is inherent in all organic 
being, and in so  doing appeals to the no less compulsory and unreflective 
instinct for self- preservation among his white audiences.
But if this new strain of argumentation sidelines appeals to white sym-
pathies, it does not dismiss the po liti cal importance of sentiment. On the 
contrary, it doubles down on it by suggesting that a knowledge of rights 
manifests in embodied instincts, affects, appetites, and desires, rather than 
through the transcendental operation of reason. Thus, for instance, in the 
same scene of The Heroic Slave in which Madison Washington learns to 
imitate the instinctive self- assertion of wild animals, George Listwell, a 
white man eavesdropping on Madison’s soliloquy, is instantaneously con-
verted to abolitionism, finding that Washington’s speech “rung through 
the chambers of his soul, and vibrated through his entire frame.”89 As a 
number of critics have noted, the sonic imagery  here emphasizes the em-
bodied and even erotic nature of Listwell’s reaction, underscoring the cor-
poreality of this moral conviction.90 Conversely, Douglass represents moral 
oppression as an experience that is as much an affront to the body as it is 
to reason. In My Bondage and My Freedom, he amends his memorable de-
scription of slave songs by noting that he once “heard the same wailing 
notes, and was much affected by them. . . .  during the famine of 1845–6” in 
Ireland.91 Of course, Douglass’s comparison  here works on many fronts at 
once:  there is po liti cal strategy in linking slavery to injustices in Eu rope 
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so as to align American abolitionism with a transnational revolutionary 
movement, and  there may also be financial interest in it, since Douglass 
raised significant funds for his newspaper abroad.92 However, this compari-
son between the slaves’ “melancholy” songs and the sounds of  people lit-
erally starving also lends the slave’s “grief and sorrow” all the existential 
urgency— all the physiological desperation—of the Irishman’s  dying com-
plaint. On this view, moral wrongs register as corporealized burdens in the 
body— forming what Douglass elsewhere describes as “pent up energies of 
 human rights and sympathies.”93 Like any other compiled physical stress, 
 these pent-up energies may be absorbed by the body only up to a point.
In this regard, my analy sis of Douglass’s abolitionist animality diverges 
from recent critical readings of Douglass’s response to the prob lem of 
 human difference in the racial scientific 1850s. In her astute reading of ani-
mality and biopolitics in Douglass’s work, Colleen Glenney Boggs also 
argues that Douglass does not outright denounce but rather recodes the 
bestialization of Blackness in racial science in ways that show him to have 
been willing to abandon the discourse of rationality (a move that, as Boggs 
points out, “flies in the face of roughly thirty years of commentary on Af-
rican American writing that has emphasized the acquisition of language 
and literacy as a key liberatory tool”).94 On Boggs’s reading, Douglass turns 
away from the language of rationality (as the distinguishing mark of the 
 human) in order to make the body ( human or nonhuman) “the basis for a 
relational subjectivity” premised upon the shared language of suffering. 
Thus she argues that Douglass “treats the pained body as the locus of an 
embodied language that bespeaks the cruelty endemic to slavery’s symbolic 
order,” challenging audiences to reimagine subjectivity as something that 
extends to all beings who are subject to suffering, regardless of racial or 
speciological difference (including the capacity to cognize a “symbolic or-
der”).95 Along related lines, Brigitte Fielder demonstrates how frequently 
abolitionist texts deploy “domesticated animals to mediate their readers’ 
sympathy for enslaved  people,” a substitution that allows them to frame 
an “alternative model of sympathy that deprioritizes notions of sameness, 
acknowledging that even humanist sympathy can function across relations 
of alterity.”96
Like Boggs and Fielder, I find that Douglass’s animals respond to the 
prob lem that racial (or, as polygenism codifies it, speciological) difference 
seems to pose to interracial sympathy and recognition. But if, like Boggs, 
I find that Douglass’s defiant animals draw our attention to the shared 
vulnerability of all embodied beings, unlike Boggs I am particularly inter-
ested in how Douglass invokes that vulnerability not in order to engender 
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a sympathetic connection across speciological differences but to convey a 
timely reminder of the vio lence that suffering unleashes, lighting up the 
precariousness of proximity and the necessity of mutual accommodation 
with or without intersubjective sympathy or recognition.  Whether or not 
Madison Washington feels an affinity with “that accursed and crawling 
snake,” he acknowledges the force of its bodily threat to him and there-
fore accedes to its demand to be left alone. In this way, proximity consti-
tutes a community around the material interrelations of diverse bodies that 
is not contingent upon kinship or affects of solidarity. In keeping with 
Lloyd Pratt’s reading of “strangerhood” in Douglass’s late antebellum writ-
ings, then, I suggest that Douglass’s animals identify “an ineluctable bar-
rier to mutual intelligibility that also functions as a kind of hinge point 
for mutuality.”97 In his turn to the animal body, Douglass develops a new 
strain of antislavery rhe toric in which relations of sympathy and intersub-
jective recognition take a backseat to material relations of proximity, 
embodied necessity, and mutual exposure.
But this new argument also creates difficulties for Douglass since, 
unlike his appeals to sympathy and moral conversion, his invocations of 
slavery’s systemic risk can seem to leave audiences with very  little to do. 
By the lights of his new, materialist antislavery logic, slavery not only 
 ought to be abolished, but it inevitably  will be, with or without white 
Amer i ca’s consent, lending this argument a fatalistic providentialism un-
characteristic of Douglass’s earlier work. Thus, for instance, in his power-
ful Fourth of July address, Douglass boldly asserts that “the doom of 
slavery is certain”— vouchsafed not by a preponderance of antislavery 
votes or by the sure vengeance of an angry god, but by the much more 
diffuse and not- quite- human agency of what he describes as “the obvious 
tendencies of the age”  toward globalization and (which turns out to be the 
same  thing) freedom.98 As he tells us, “No nation can now shut itself up 
from the surrounding world and trot round in the same old path of its 
 fathers without interference,” for “intelligence is penetrating the darkest 
corners of the globe. It makes its pathway over and  under the sea, as 
well as on the earth. Wind, steam, and lightning are its chartered agents. 
Oceans no longer divide,  but link nations together.”99 Although the 
nation- dissolving  “intelligence” Douglass alludes to  here is clearly com-
municated by  human technologies— “wind, steam, and lightning” met-
onymically referencing oceanic navigation, railroads, and telegraphs— his 
heavi ly allegorized prose distances  these circulations and the “intelligence” 
they spread from  human action and intentions. Instead, the globalizing 
“tendencies of the age” he describes  here take on the impersonal dimen-
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sions of a world spirit or hidden hand—an emergent systemic rather than 
strictly  human force whose fugitive and deterritorializing freedom of cir-
culation Douglass most directly identifies with “agents” of  matter itself.
Thus this essay’s famously fiery denunciation of American hy poc risy 
ends on a paradoxically quietist note. Bracketing the issue of racial differ-
ence (“Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man?,” Douglass sighs; 
“The time for such argument is passed”) and likewise waiving its earlier 
call for a recommitment to American Revolutionary ideals, Douglass’s jer-
emiad concludes by heralding emancipation’s inescapability: in this essay, 
abolition is both the means of national repentance and the globally wrought 
apocalypse that awaits an unregenerate nation.100 And thus instead of 
reaffirming American self- determination, Douglass’s natu ral law rhe-
toric ends by challenging the very notion of individual and national sover-
eignty that the found ers had originally used that rhe toric to defend. In 
Douglass’s empiricized version, the nation’s naturalness indicates its in-
ability to “shut itself up from the surrounding world,” highlighting its 
exposure to and imbrication within a global community of  human and 
nonhuman beings interrelated through biological, geophysical, ideologi-
cal, and economic systems whose multiplied complexity no individual nor 
nation could hope to fi nally control. It is, consequently, unclear what role is 
left in this climatological drama for Douglass’s audiences to play. As Carrie 
Hyde argues in her brilliant reading of weather in The Heroic Slave, by 
“depicting nature as the princi ple agent” of antislavery re sis tance, “Doug-
lass is able to suggest that opposition to slavery is more fundamental than 
the actions of any one individual or group.”101 Indeed, he suggests that 
opposition to slavery may originate in forces that are not  human at all.
In this re spect, Douglass’s Fourth of July prophecy is not only antira-
cist and transnationalist but also posthumanist. Resurrecting the discourse 
of natu ral rights as a self- executing modality of natu ral laws, Douglass turns 
the found ers’ liberal humanistic logic on its ear by making freedom an 
involuntary instinct of the body and an inexorable tendency of  matter 
itself. Far from marking a uniquely  human autonomy from natu ral laws, 
this empirical freedom is all but indistinguishable from physical necessity. 
Moreover, it conjures an empirical public that likewise breaks from the 
found ers’ nationalistic vision. For whereas Amer i ca’s liberal institutions 
convoke a public constituted by formally equal and enfranchised indi-
viduals conjoined by contract and brought together by rational, delibera-
tive debate, Douglass’s revolutionary animals and abolitionist oceans 
point to a public that comprises all earthly beings whatsoever, conjoined 
by material interrelations and brought together by the ongoing strug gle to 
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satisfy their basic “wants”— including, most basically, the freedom to 
pursue  those interests. Access to this embodied public is not restricted 
by qualifications— one need not be accredited as “rational,” or “ human,” 
or “morally  free” to participate in it. On the contrary, the polemical force 
of this embodied public is that participation in it— and thus exposure to 
it—is strictly unavoidable, a condition of being. In his invocations of an 
empiricized natu ral law, then, Douglass makes an end run around the ef-
forts of some racial scholars to definitively exclude his race from the ranks 
of the  human by dismantling the humanistic logic that makes humanity a 
criteria for po liti cal participation in the first place. As Bruno Latour might 
describe this, Douglass renounces the arbitrary distinction between “natu-
ral” (passive, animalistic) and “po liti cal” ( free,  human) action, challenging 
us “to redefine politics as the entire set of tasks that allow the progressive 
composition of a common world.”102 If racial science should succeed in dis-
proving our “common nature,” it cannot deny this common world: with 
this insight, voiced in “Claims” and developed across Douglass’s images of 
natu ral vio lence in the 1850s, Douglass twists racial science’s empiricism 
to his advantage, demonstrating how its embodied and hierarchical ac-
count of the  human might in fact sponsor a more capacious and inclusive 
postnationalist and nonhumanist vision of worldly community.
From our con temporary standpoint, this may seem like a power ful (or 
at least fash ion able) move. Douglass’s insistence upon the way in which 
proximate bodies impinge on each other regardless of their po liti cal sta-
tus boldly renounces what Mel Chen describes as humanism’s “animacy 
hierarchy”— the systematic denial of nonhuman agency by which humanism 
licenses the po liti cal exclusion of, and moral indifference to, racialized, 
animalized, and objectified bodies.103 However, this liberatory renuncia-
tion also comes with steep costs to Douglass’s politics, for, as we have just 
seen, it erodes the liberal politics he is other wise inclined to champion. 
Thus if Douglass’s antislavery materialism defuses the force of denials of 
Black humanity, it does so by giving up on the unique moral and po liti cal 
value of  human belonging and mooting the question of racial equality— 
both of which (unique moral value and racial equality) he was understand-
ably keen to claim for Black humanity. While his insurgent bodies clearly 
resist objectification, their agency cannot serve Douglass as proof of their 
liberal personhood. Instead, his embodied public is full of unowned agency, 
agency that (like freedom, on his redescription) is not a property of persons 
but rather percolates up from materiality itself. Although antislavery, this 
materialist riposte to racial science leads Douglass a long way off from the 
liberalism he might like to inhabit.
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To be sure, Douglass never explic itly formulates the challenges his ma-
terialism poses to the liberal princi ples he champions. However, his sense 
of their contradiction may be registered in the reluctance with which he 
turns to this argument. As it appears in his late antebellum writings, this 
antislavery materialism functions (like the antislavery vio lence that he usu-
ally summons it to justify) as a kind of position of last resort. Indeed, in 
“Claims” his appeal to our materially “united destiny” explic itly appears 
as the essay’s last line of defense against polygenist racial theory, and in 
his Fourth of July address it again emerges only  after his appeal to Amer-
i ca’s liberal princi ples is exhausted. Such reluctance suggests, as I have al-
ready speculated, that Douglass was a liberal driven to develop a materialist 
argument against slavery by the popu lar ascendance of racial science and 
empiricism’s cultural authority, more broadly. But if, on this view, Doug-
lass’s embrace of embodiment is a local strategy and not the po liti cal end-
game, the same cannot be said of posthumanist materialisms  today, raising 
the question of  whether the illiberalism of materialism’s politics is fully reg-
istered in  these theories. I  will return to this in Chapter 4, where I  will 
suggest that the question of the contradictions between materialism and 
liberalism is one whose absence has  shaped posthumanism’s failure to rig-
orously theorize its relation to racial and social justice traditions.
By way of conclusion, I would like to look at one final example of Dou-
glass’s antislavery materialism that lights up its illiberal and nonhumanis-
tic tendencies. I have argued elsewhere for the burgeoning materialism and 
“amoral abolitionism” of My Bondage and My Freedom; rather than reca-
pitulate that argument  here I would like to return to The Heroic Slave which, 
as Douglass’s only foray into fiction, allowed him to distill his ideas with 
vivid concision.104 We have already seen how the novella’s opening scene 
naturalizes natu ral law by identifying Madison Washington’s natu ral right 
to freedom with the instinctive self- assertion of animals in the forest. At 
the end of the novella, in the climactic scene of Washington’s successful 
mutiny aboard the Creole, Douglass again rewrites the rational vio lence of 
American Revolutionary liberalism as natu ral, inhuman, and involuntary 
vio lence— a demand for freedom that is systemic to the material order of 
being.
Like the prior three episodes of the story, which are narrated by 
Mr. Listwell, this pivotal episode is also narrated by a white character, Tom 
Grant. Grant survived the mutiny aboard the Creole and now, two months 
 later, relates the story to an audience of dubious fellow sailors at a Richmond 
coffee house. He is goaded into the retelling by a sailor named Williams 
who blames the affair on mismanagement: “All that is needed in dealing 
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with a set of rebellious darkies, is to show that ye’re not afraid of ’em,” 
Williams scoffs. “A drop of blood from one on ’em  will skeer a hundred.”105 
Routing the narrative of the mutiny through Grant’s defense of his defeat 
thus allows Douglass to specify precisely what, in the eyes of this unsympa-
thetic white Southerner, overmastered him. And as Grant tells it, the lesson 
of the mutiny is a curiously blended one. For on the one hand, contrary to 
Williams, Grant insists that Washington is proof that “ there are exceptions 
to this general rule” that “[Negroes] are ignorant,” and Grant leaves the 
Creole affair convinced that “this  whole slave- trading business is a disgrace 
and scandal to Old  Virginia.”106 However, when pressed, Grant does not 
ascribe the mutiny’s success to Washington’s exceptional intelligence and 
bravery. Instead, he compares the mutiny to a hurricane or maelstrom, a 
natu ral disaster in the face of which “we lose our indignation and disgust in 
lamentation of the disaster, and in awe of the Power which controls the 
ele ments.”107
In Grant’s eyes, then, Washington’s agency dis appears into the imper-
sonal forces of nature, and this eclipse is borne out by the account he gives 
of the role of the weather in the mutiny’s events. Grant was knocked un-
conscious early in the fighting and, upon waking, attempts to rally the crew, 
who have retreated to the ship’s rigging. But Washington interrupts Grant’s 
efforts with an eloquent defense of the justice of his cause, invoking his 
namesake’s example: “God is my witness that LIBERTY, not malice, is the 
motive for this night’s work. . . .  We have done that which you applaud your 
 fathers for  doing, and if we are murderers, so  were they.”108 If The Heroic 
Slave  were a conventionally liberal story, this speech should have been the 
end of it. But in fact it makes  little impression on Grant. For although he 
“forgot [Washington’s] blackness in the dignity of his manner, and the el-
oquence of his speech,”  these evidences of Washington’s equal humanity 
are nevertheless not enough to overcome Grant’s racial prejudice: “It was 
not that his princi ples  were wrong in the abstract; for they are the princi-
ples of 1776,” Grant confesses. “But I could not bring myself to recognize 
their application to one whom I deemed my inferior.”109 Thus rational dis-
course and appeals to shared princi ple fail to end Grant’s standoff with 
Washington; instead, it is finished by force. First,  there is the sheer force 
of Washington’s desire for freedom: Washington tells Grant that if they 
come near “a slave- cursed shore” he  will set fire to the ship’s magazine and 
blow them all “into a thousand fragments,” an oath that convinces Grant 
“that re sis tance was out of the question.” Next, as if to underscore Wash-
ington’s threat of fragmentation by fire, a storm suddenly blows up, howl-
ing with sublime fury and threatening to splinter the ship. If Washington’s 
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threat convinced Grant to defer his re sis tance, the ocean’s threat momen-
tarily convinces him to forget his objection altogether: “For awhile we had 
dearer interests to look  after than slave property.” It is thus not Washing-
ton’s idealistic rhe toric but the storm’s existential threat that ultimately 
engenders cross- racial cooperation  here, activating every one’s “dearer in-
terests” in survival than in preserving “slave property.” Looking grimly 
out upon the spectacle of “the dreadful hurricane,” Washington calmly 
proclaims, “Mr. Mate, you cannot write the bloody laws of slavery on  those 
restless billows. The ocean, if not the land, is  free.” With this, his last re-
ported line in the novella, Washington identifies his freedom with the exi-
gencies of a “restless” nature that has compelled Grant to acquiesce to 
Washington’s demand for freedom despite his continued denial of Wash-
ington’s equal humanity. The Heroic Slave thus frames emancipation as a 
 matter of self- preservation, as Grant finds his imminent death far more 
persuasive than any of Washington’s rhetorical appeals on behalf of his own 
 human rights.
But the point  here is not simply that Douglass allows Washington’s ra-
tional agency— his heroic re sis tance and the humanness it evinces—to be 
eclipsed by the ocean’s sublime and irrational power. Rather, the point is 
that by the naturalistic logic with which the story begins— the logic that 
identifies the right to freedom in “animal” instincts— Washington’s vio-
lence is of the same order as the ocean’s: both are construed as elemental 
forces impersonally inscribed in the “restless” or freedom- loving order of 
 matter. One mea sure of the radicalism of this conceptual move is that, in 
modeling Washington’s uprising on the unruly ocean, Douglass in fact em-
braces the argument that Daniel Webster had advanced in 1842 in an at-
tempt to re- enslave the  people of the  actual Creole, who had been officially 
liberated when the mutineers landed at Nassau. As Carrie Hyde reminds 
us, on the day of the historical mutiny  there had been no storm; instead, 
Douglass’s in ven ted storm seems to derive from Daniel Webster’s subse-
quent effort to establish that the British lacked jurisdiction when they freed 
the Creole by arguing that the mutineer’s “unlawful force”  ought to be re-
garded like the “stresses of weather” (according to maritime law, when 
foul weather drives a vessel into port, it is exempted from becoming sub-
ject to the laws of that country).110 Hyde suggests that Douglass’s squall 
“strategically reappropriates natu ral meta phors as a figure for natu ral 
rights,” converting Webster’s conflation of violent mutinies and violent 
weather into a “universalizing rhe toric of natu ral law as a model for po liti-
cal reform in the United States.”111 I concur with Hyde’s analy sis but wish 
to add that the natu ral law Douglass hereby invokes is conceptually alien 
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to the one to which Madison Washington’s forebears appealed, and that 
the mechanisms of po liti cal change this naturalized natu ral law envisions 
likewise exceed the deliberative rationality and national self- constitution 
the found ers’ liberal institutions enshrined. This is what Douglass means 
by taking seriously Webster’s de- animating conflation of slave uprisings 
with bad weather: his naturalization of natu ral rights drains the rational 
agency out of Washington’s revolutionary action, transforming freedom 
from a  human prerogative into an ontological imperative. As Douglass’s 
1850s writings suggest, far from distinguishing the  free ( human beings) 
from the materially determined (nonhuman beings), this natu ral freedom 
percolates throughout the world, finding expression in snakes and birds no 
less than in transatlantic commerce and violent weather. And where this 
irrepressible urge breaks out—in stampedes, uprisings, and cyclones—it 
confronts  those in its way with their own freedom: fight, fly, accommo-
date, or die.
Douglass’s depictions of freedom’s empirical imperative in the 1850s 
thus bracket the question of racial difference and  human equality that both 
liberal and racialist discourses had made to seem paramount to the ques-
tion of slavery and the prospect of a multiracial national community. And 
yet by making freedom an instinct of  matter, his antislavery materialism 
creates prob lems for the notion of rational agency and  human autonomy 
that ground liberal humanist doctrine. My next chapter  will further ex-
plore this erosion of agency in antislavery materialism by turning to the 
late work of Henry David Thoreau. Like Douglass, Thoreau also followed 
the rise of racial science closely, adopting and adapting its empiricism in 
ways that indelibly reshaped his antislavery politics in the 1850s.
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What does it mean for Thoreau to compare society’s workings to the op-
erations of “machinery”? According to what logic could he suggest that 
debate in a deliberative democracy obeys something like the dynamics of 
resource competition that govern forest succession? What does it do to our 
conception of belief to say that moral convictions are inscribed in our “na-
tures” in the way that dif fer ent habits of growth are inscribed in the na-
tures of oaks and chestnuts? What prompted Emerson to suspect Thoreau 
had an animal body but no “ human soul”?
As we have seen, the idea that moral and biological identity are ineluc-
tably linked— that the  human mind is not autonomous of the body—is cen-
tral to biologism’s challenge to the humanist episteme, and a key premise 
of antebellum racial discourse. “The intellectual man is inseparable from 
the physical man,” write the authors of Types of Mankind, “and the nature 
of the one cannot be altered without a corresponding change in the other.”2 
In the previous chapter we saw how this embodied episteme created a cri-
sis for the ideal of liberal equality at midcentury. The pres ent chapter  will 
examine a dif fer ent aspect of the crisis that biologism’s embodied account 
of the  human created for liberal doctrine, a prob lem symptomatized in 
c h a p t e r   2
Thoreau’s Seeds: Evolution and the  
Prob lem of  Human Agency
Henry often reminded me of an animal in  human form. He had the 
eye of a bird, the scent of a dog, the most acute, delicate 
intelligence— but no soul. No . . .  Henry could not have  
had a  human soul.
— ralph waldo emerson1
I am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of 
society. I am not the son of the engineer. I perceive that, when an 
acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does not remain inert 
to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws, and spring 
and grow and flourish as best they can, till one, perchance, 
overshadows and destroys the other. If a plant cannot live according 
to its nature, it dies; and so a man.
— henry david thoreau, “Re sis tance to Civil Government” (1849)
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Thoreau’s comparison of moral to speciological succession, above. As Tho-
reau suggests, since he is simply obeying the law of his embodied “nature” 
when he stands up against slavery, he cannot be held responsible for the 
actions he takes or their effect on “the machinery of society.” If moral char-
acter is indeed inseparable from physical character, then  human agency is 
merely an expression of biological forces that are beyond our design or con-
trol. Already in Douglass’s appeal to instinctive vio lence we can discern 
the horizon of this reconceptualization of conscientious action: the biolo-
gization of belief transforms rational debate into a scene of existential 
strug gle, in which men (like oxen,  horses, snakes, and, Thoreau adds, trees 
and plants) must “live according to [their] nature” or die.
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which Thoreau’s increasingly em-
pirical understanding of nature in the 1850s reshaped his late antislavery 
thought. Reexamining the shift in Thoreau’s style in the 1850s, a shift 
 often described as lurching from the lyricism of his early Journal to the 
ostensibly “dry” objectivity of his late naturalistic writings, I highlight the 
continuousness of Thoreau’s commitment to an embodied conception of 
the  human across this de cade, and examine the difficulties this commit-
ment created for his faith in the freedom of moral conscience, the found-
ing princi ple of his natu ral law doctrine. The line I  will be charting from 
the early to late Journal, and culminating in his essays for John Brown and 
unfinished manuscripts on seeds and fruits at the end of the de cade, tells 
the story of Thoreau’s sustained investigation of the phenomenon of envi-
ronmental influence—of the plastic responsivity of the  human body and 
mind to their physical surroundings. As I  will argue, if Thoreau’s concep-
tion of nature’s moral influence is at first nearly indistinguishable from Em-
erson’s depiction of nature as a moral text written in physical ciphers, it 
nonetheless progressively evolved into something markedly dif fer ent: an 
idiosyncratic theory of environmental adaptation and speciological devel-
opment that put Thoreau in conversation with the most controversial 
debate within antebellum racial science in his final years.
At its broadest, then, my claim is that we have not yet fully reckoned 
with Thoreau’s embodied conception of the  human and the effects that his 
late ecologism had on the liberal antislavery politics we habitually ascribe 
to him. Critical interest in Thoreau’s empiricism has blossomed in the last 
three de cades in the wake of groundbreaking studies by Sharon Cameron, 
Lawrence Buell, and Laura Dassow Walls, who taught us to recognize the 
philosophical import of Thoreau’s long- disregarded late naturalistic writ-
ings.3 Dispelling the notion that Thoreau’s “dry” empiricism signaled his 
declining artistic powers and withdrawal from social activism,  these crit-
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   62 11/1/17   11:57 AM
Evolution and the  Prob lem of  Human Agency 63
ics, and  those who have followed them, celebrate the late work as evidence 
of Thoreau’s intellectual maturation from Transcendental idealist to eco-
logical materialist.4 Lawrence Buell memorably charts this as a progres-
sion “from homocentrism to biocentrism,” arguing that Thoreau gradually 
learned to prioritize “nature’s interest over the  human interest” in his study 
of natu ral phenomena.5 On this revised view, the increasing facticity of 
Thoreau’s writing in the late 1850s no longer appears as a renunciation of 
social activism but instead indicates the redirection of his concerns from 
the “homocentrism” of self- culture and antislavery reform to the “biocen-
trism” of environmentalist advocacy.6
Below I retrace Thoreau’s intellectual development in the 1850s in or-
der to highlight an aspect of his thought overlooked in this account of his 
environmentalist politics: the consanguinity, in antebellum science, of eco-
logical and racial theory. As Richard Schneider observes, in the mid– 
nineteenth  century the study of what we now call ecol ogy was synonymous 
with the study of  human ecology—of  human origins, racial difference, and 
what was then widely assumed to be the teleological pro gress of civiliza-
tion.7 Indeed, readers of the last chapter  will recall that in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth- century natu ral history, “environmentalism” refers to the idea, 
central to monogenist racial theory, that  human and other species change 
in response to physical and cultural agents in their environments— a key 
premise of monogenist racial theory. In this first heyday of racial scientific 
controversy, even the driest ecological research— a study, for instance, on 
the varying girth of Galapagos finch beaks or on the mechanisms of seed 
dispersal— was rife with consequences for the racial politics by proxy 
unfolding in the pages of midcentury science.
The close affiliation of ecological and racial theory suggests that our 
accounts of Thoreau’s late politics may need to be readjusted. For not only 
does it indicate that we may be overlooking the racialist implications of 
Thoreau’s ecological vision, but moreover it suggests that our repre sen ta-
tions of ecologism as a correction to homocentrism may be misleading. The 
conjunction of ecol ogy and racial science renders the epistemological dis-
tinction between nature’s interest and  human interest untenable: it 
collapses what Dipesh Chakrabarty has dubbed the “age- old humanist 
distinction between  human history and natu ral history.”8 And therefore 
when we describe Thoreau’s late naturalism as an implicit renunciation of 
his earlier anthropological concerns— expressing “a passion for nature di-
vorced from social meaning” or illustrating his mature interest in “much 
vaster cycles of time than  those generated by the American po liti cal sys-
tem”—we risk reasserting a distinction between natu ral and po liti cal life 
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that Thoreau’s ecological outlook, as I  shall be reading it, energetically 
works to dismantle.9
In addition to providing a more complete picture of Thoreau’s late an-
tislavery politics, acknowledging the racial implications of his ecologism 
also amends this picture by underscoring the proto- posthumanism of his 
late politics. In The Politics of Nature, Bruno Latour spells out the distinc-
tion between an environmentalist politics that aims to renaturalize  human 
life and preserve nature from  human encroachment, and an outlook (what 
I am calling posthumanism, and Latour calls “po liti cal ecol ogy”) that be-
gins from the nonhumanist assumption of humanity’s naturalness.10  There 
is nothing intrinsically redemptive in this latter synthesis: by contrast to 
what is sometimes presented as environmentalism’s romantic aspiration to 
overcome  human alienation and re unite with nature, posthumanism’s sense 
of the always- already imbrication of social and natu ral pro cesses is not eth-
ical but ontological. Bearing this distinction in mind, I explore how, in 
addition to his environmentalist appeals to preserve wildness in both our 
exterior and interior landscapes, Thoreau’s late work also elaborates a spec-
ulative theory of embodiment that attenuates his po liti cal commitments 
to liberal individualism and conscientious action. If Thoreau’s late natu-
ralistic research lent support to monogenist theory and thus bolstered his 
longstanding antislavery views, it also profoundly reor ga nized his theory 
of antislavery activism by remapping po liti cal reform onto the vast and 
diffuse populational, multigenerational, and not- quite- voluntary mecha-
nisms of evolutionary change.
Against Agassiz: Thoreau’s Development in Context
The story of Thoreau’s evolution from social to environmental activist 
hinges upon the Journal, and the transformation it rec ords as Thoreau’s 
observational methods grew progressively less Transcendentalist and more 
empiricist over the course of the 1850s. The story I have to tell about Tho-
reau’s development from individualism to posthumanism via environ-
mental racial theory also begins with the renovation of his observational 
practice in the Journal, which I propose to characterize somewhat differ-
ently. For while I am fully persuaded that the Journal demonstrates Tho-
reau’s gradual renunciation of Emerson’s mode of reading nature as a 
symbolic text, I would like to suggest that it should also be read as regis-
tering his increasing re sis tance to another towering figure of antebellum 
natu ral philosophy, Louis Agassiz. Readers of the prior chapter  will recall 
that Agassiz was a featured contributor to Types of Mankind; he was also, in 
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the late 1840s and 1850s, a looming presence in Thoreau’s larger social 
circle: the celebrated head of Harvard’s brand- new Lawrence Scientific 
School, a driving force  behind the professionalization of American science 
and the chief architect of the theory of “special creation,” which upholds 
the immutability of species and rejects the notion that races develop in re-
sponse to their environments. When read in light of Thoreau’s opposition 
to Agassizian science, the Journal begins to appear as a more consistently 
empirical proj ect. As I  shall argue below, even in its “poetic” mode of the 
early 1850s, the Journal demonstrates Thoreau’s deliberate investigation, 
pace Agassiz, into nature’s power to materially influence and thereby plas-
tically transform life.
Louis Agassiz arrived in Boston in 1846 during the second year of 
Thoreau’s residence at Walden Pond. He had been invited to give the 
prestigious Lowell Institute lectures in Boston and planned to spend two 
years touring the New World; as it happens, he never left. The buoyant 
Swiss naturalist so impressed American audiences with his encyclopedic 
knowledge and dynamic showmanship that his celebrity was soon being 
 compared to Jenny Lind’s, and by the end of 1846 Agassiz was offered a 
professorship at the head of Harvard’s brand- new Lawrence Scientific 
School, slated to open in 1847.11 The creation of the Lawrence School 
 indexes the rising prominence of natu ral science in antebellum Amer i ca. 
When Thoreau had attended Harvard in the mid-1830s, scientific study, 
such as it was, was an afterthought to the classical education on offer.12 But 
the appointment of Agassiz to helm this new school is also telling in its 
own right. For as it was initially conceived, the Lawrence School was de-
signed to offer instruction in practical sciences that would directly sup-
port “the pursuit of commerce, manufactures, and the mechanic arts.”13 
 After Agassiz’s spectacular popu lar success in 1846, however, the Lawrence 
School’s major donor, cotton manufacturer Abbot Lawrence, was so cap-
tivated that he deci ded to pursue Agassiz, a theoretical scientist, for the 
school’s top post. Agassiz’s appointment thus gave the Lawrence School a 
newly theoretical mandate, attesting to the rising cachet of science not just 
as an applied practice but also as an episteme.
At Harvard, Agassiz consolidated this cultural shift by tirelessly work-
ing to institutionalize and professionalize American science. In 1847, he 
founded the American Association for the Advancement of Science (of 
which Thoreau soon became a member), and in 1853 he began to lay plans 
for opening the nation’s first museum of natu ral history. That same year 
he announced his intention to bring out the first comprehensive survey 
of North American natu ral history, soliciting subscriptions among his 
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influential friends, who by this point included Senator Charles Sumner, 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Sr., and James Russell Lowell. But perhaps Agassiz’s most profound 
influence on American science consists of his teaching: Agassiz trained the 
first generation of professional scientists in Amer i ca. When he arrived in 
the United States,  there was not a single domestic institution equipped to 
educate natu ral historians; by the end of the  century, Agassiz’s former 
student William James would observe, “ there is hardly one now of the 
American naturalists of my generation whom Agassiz did not train.”14
From his im mensely influential position, Agassiz propagated a version 
of natu ral history or ga nized on the theory of special creation.15 His re-
search on glaciers in the 1830s, before his emigration to the United States, 
yielded the breakthrough hypothesis that the earth has under gone a number 
of ice ages, each of which caused a mass extinction event. From this in-
sight, Agassiz developed his theory of special creation, arguing that God 
serially scrubs the earth clean with glaciers in order to repopulate the earth 
with more advanced and complex versions of the prior world’s species. This 
theory of speciological change allowed Agassiz to account for a fossil rec-
ord that kept turning up extinct species that nonetheless bore striking re-
semblances to extant species without requiring him to conclude that such 
fossils indicate that species are inherently changeful. Instead, the theory 
of special creation holds that only God has the power to change nature: in 
his apparently growing wisdom, God periodically revises species, but spe-
cies themselves are static, undergoing no physical change between ice ages 
and remaining fixed in the geo graph i cal place to which God assigned them. 
On this theory, then, the resemblance between fossil species and present- day 
species is strictly typological:  these species are not materially related, Agassiz 
asserted, but rather represent sequential iterations—an early and a  later, 
superior draft—of a single divine thought. Agassiz thus roundly rejected 
the “developmental hypothesis” advanced by men like Jean- Baptiste 
 Lamarck, Étienne Geoffroy Saint- Hilaire, and Robert Chambers. To the 
contrary, he argued that “ there is nothing in [or ga nized beings] which 
depends in the slightest degree upon the nature or the influence of the 
physical conditions in which they live.”16 Such physical “agents have never 
been observed to produce anything new, or to call into existence anything 
that did not exist before,” he maintains, concluding (in a line that might 
have made the early Emerson proud) that “the  whole Creation is the expres-
sion of a thought, and not the product of physical agents.”17 Like stop- motion 
animation, Agassiz’s world only appears to move. God, and not change, is 
the author of the world that we see, and this syntactical world pres ents us 
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with a “vast picture in which each animal, each plant, each group, each 
class, has its place, and from which nothing could be removed without 
destroying the proper meaning of the  whole.”18
From their first contact, it was clear that Agassiz’s scientific premises 
and methods  were not Thoreau’s. In 1847, while he was still living at 
Walden Pond, Thoreau received an invitation to contribute birds to Agas-
siz’s North American collection. Collecting and classifying specimens was 
a cornerstone of Agassiz’s scientific method. Since he did not believe that 
species are influenced by their environments, he saw no value in studying 
species in situ; instead, he sought to comprehend the divine “thought” of 
creation by collecting as many extant species as pos si ble and organ izing 
 these specimens into typological groupings— dividing them into the “four 
 great branches of the animal kingdom” (Radiata, Mollusks, Articulata, Ver-
tebrata), and then ordering them within  these branches according to 
“their superiority or inferiority in regard to  others.”19 In 1847, Thoreau had 
not yet begun to study natu ral history in earnest; however, he was already 
convinced of the importance of studying life in context. In response to 
Agassiz’s request for bird specimens, he wrote of his “squeamishness on 
the score of robbing [bird] nests” and suggested that  there was, in any case, 
a wider variety of birds to be found near Harvard, since he had “noticed 
that in an open country where  there are but few trees,  there are more 
 attractions for many species of birds than in a wooded one.”20 Thoreau’s 
distaste for killing life in the name of studying it (he signs off, “Trusting 
that you  will feather your own nest comfortably without stripping  those of 
the birds quite bare”) was thus not only an ethical position. For Thoreau, 
any worthwhile study of North American birds must not only be able to 
identify dif fer ent species but must, more importantly, be able to describe 
their distinctive ways of being—to understand how birds interact with their 
habitats and how habitat change (for instance, Cambridge’s deforestation) 
might induce populational migration (attracting more birds to Agassiz’s 
suburban campus than to Thoreau’s woods). It is,  after all, not the shape 
but the life of the body that intrigues us.
Already in this brief first encounter, it’s clear that Thoreau’s interest in 
the lived interaction between organisms and their environments sets his 
approach to the study of nature apart from Agassiz’s. Laura Dassow Walls 
describes this difference as a fault line that divides the field of romantic 
science more broadly. As she argues, early nineteenth- century science was 
dominated by two competing attitudes  toward local particularity. On one 
side  were the “rational holists” (including Emerson and Agassiz) who 
viewed nature’s diversity as the expression of an anterior ordering princi ple 
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that is itself immaterial— law, spirit, thought, God, the One. Alternatively, 
“empirical holists” (including naturalists like Thoreau and Alexander von 
Humboldt) held that nature’s diversity is “moved and animated by internal 
forces,” that nature unfolds itself through the dynamic interaction of its 
myriad parts.  These differing premises led romantic era science in two 
dif fer ent directions: rational holists identified patterns in nature in an 
effort to elucidate the under lying and eternal ordering princi ple or moral 
law manifested therein; empirical holists endeavored to discern nature’s 
interconnectivity—to observe the “infinity of mechanical forces and 
chemical attractions” through which climate, topography, and vegetation, 
as well as  human economies, languages, and cultures, variously combine 
and impinge on one another to create the forms of life distinctive to that 
place.21 The result of this latter epistemology, Walls suggests, “could be 
called a kind of situated knowledge,” a mapping of local complexity that 
also traces this local assemblage’s connections to natu ral phenomena far-
ther flung in space and time.22
In the late 1840s and early 1850s, Thoreau’s pursuit of “situated knowl-
edge” was chiefly driven by his interest in something that Agassiz’s science 
strictly prohibited— the possibility of  human development. Agassiz believed 
that  humans demonstrated development in the sense that, for instance, 
the “white race” characterized “man in his highest development,” whereas 
other races embodied vari ous aspects of humankind’s “early stages of de-
velopment.”23 Nonetheless for Agassiz,  humans did not possess an intrinsic 
capacity for development; only an act of God—an exterminating ice age 
and total new creation— could change the nature of the races and advance 
humankind  toward moral and physiological perfection. By his own ac-
count, Thoreau came to understand his sojourn at Walden Pond as an 
effort to prove the opposite hypothesis: that  humans are indeed impress-
ible, that “physical agents” in our environments can so alter our moral 
natures that we might come to “live with the license of a higher order of 
beings.”24 Thus though he may have originally conceived of his move to 
Walden as an experiment in removal— a demonstration of the freedom af-
forded by renouncing one’s social environment—by the end of revising 
Walden in 1854, Thoreau had come to frame it as an experiment in self- 
transformation, embracing (as William Rossi persuasively documents) a 
transmutationist theory of evolution that allows him to conclude that “ there 
is an incessant influx of novelty into the world.”25 If we would only go out 
into nature and open ourselves up to its creative force, we might find that 
 these are “but the spring months in the life of the race,” he warrants.26 In 
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“Walking,” an essay he first delivered in 1851, while he was still revising 
Walden, Thoreau formulates this thought in the form of an overtly anti- 
Agassizian credo: “I believe that climate does thus react on man—as  there 
is something in the mountain air that feeds the spirit and inspires.  Will 
not man grow to greater perfection intellectually as well as physically  under 
 these influences?”27
But the site of Thoreau’s most rigorous and sustained experiment in en-
vironmental self- cultivation is the journal that he turned into a laboratory 
of situated empiricism in 1850. In November, Thoreau began to write in 
his journal  every day. From that point forward the Journal became the in-
strument of a practice— what Walls describes as “a tool for seeing.”28 
Thoreau’s entries in this period demonstrate his ambition not only to rec-
ord observations of flora and fauna around Concord but, moreover, to re-
fine his capacity for perception—to discover how his own life is environed 
and, through this effort of attention, to thereby make himself more recep-
tive to the influence of this environment. “Why should just  these sights and 
sounds accompany our life?” he won ders in an entry for April 18, 1852, 
which serves as a kind of mission statement for this new Journal proj ect:
Why should I hear the chattering of blackbirds, why smell the skunk 
each year? I would fain explore the mysterious relation between myself 
and  these  things. I would at least know what  these  things unavoidably 
are— make a chart of our life— know how its shores trend— that butter-
flies reappear & when— know why just this circle of creatures com-
pletes the world. Can I not by expectation affect the revolutions of 
nature, make a day to bring forth something new?
As Cawley loved a garden, so I a forest. Observe all kinds of 
coincidences—as what kinds of birds come with what flowers.
Fascinated by nature’s “coincidences” (such as “what kinds of birds come 
with what flowers”), Thoreau frames his Journal proj ect as an effort to 
map the vari ous ele ments of his environment so that he might “explore the 
mysterious relation between myself and  these  things.” What he wants to 
assem ble, then, is not simply an Agassizian survey that  will index all of the 
species that appear in Concord through the cycle of a year. For in addition 
to being able to list “what  these  things unavoidably are,” Thoreau hopes to 
make “a chart of our life”—to identify the material relations between  these 
myriad phenomena and his lived experience so as to understand how “just 
 these sights and sounds” produce just this kind of life. Moreover, Thoreau 
hopes that by studying this interrelation he can transform it— can “make a 
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day to bring forth something new.” His proj ect is thus not simply documen-
tary but creative: it is not only knowledge but also development he is  after.
In her still peerless analy sis of the Journal, Sharon Cameron highlights 
how this passage signals Thoreau’s break from the symbolic analytic of na-
ture he had learned from Emerson, and which he employs so frequently in 
Walden. In his Emersonian mode, Thoreau “reads” natu ral phenomena 
as parables that are morally edifying, but  here, Cameron argues, Thoreau’s 
natu ral phenomena “evade morals or interpretations.” For, as she explains, 
“morals are fixed” and universal whereas the natu ral phenomena Thoreau 
mentions  here are “fugitive” and particular— historical rather than exem-
plary, desultory instants and not instantiations of a transcendent moral or-
der. Indeed, Thoreau even suggests that this nature is unfinished, that it is 
still capable of bringing forth “something new.” Accordingly, Cameron 
concludes that “the sustained documentation of the Journal [is] the strat-
egy for writing about nature that resists being symbolic”: convinced that 
this world is still in the making, the Journal sets out to rec ord natu ral phe-
nomena without mining them for timeless moral truths.29
While I share Cameron’s sense that this passage indicates Thoreau’s 
conversion to an analytic of “nature that resists being symbolic,” I want to 
suggest that this change nonetheless did not put an end to his conviction 
that nature is morally edifying. When Cameron writes that the Journal is 
satisfied “by the very act of observing contrasts, disassociated from story, 
progression, from anything at all”—or again, when Buell suggests that the 
Journal tracks Thoreau’s pro gress “from homocentrism to biocentrism”—
we are tempted to conclude that nature, in the Journal, is wholly indiffer-
ent to  human meaning.30 But if nature is not a divine text— a message for 
 humans ciphered in bark and feathers— this need not mean that it therefore 
bears no relation to  human thought. Throwing aside hermeneutics, 
Thoreau’s Journal proceeds on the understanding that the material envi-
ronment conditions Thoreau’s perception of it. In other words, I suggest that 
the admittedly desultory notes that  these entries collect— their apparently 
haphazard shifts between observations on the weather, flora and fauna, and 
the thoughts or reflections that  these spring in Thoreau— will only seem 
to be a rec ord of “relentless discontinuousness” if we discount what I take to 
be the Journal’s founding premise: that the vari ous natu ral and  mental 
phenomena it registers are materially interconnected.31
On my reading, Thoreau’s early Journal sets out to study the sensuous 
relations between his mind and nature, determined to identify the as- yet 
“mysterious” mutuality through which “just this circle of creatures com-
pletes” or convokes his thought of the world. The contours of this argu-
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ment  will be easier to comprehend by way of example. In his journal entry 
for July 21, 1851, Thoreau reports,
When I am against this bare promontory of a huckleberry hill, then 
forsooth my thoughts  will expand. Is it some influence as a vapor 
which exhales from the ground, or something in the gales which blow 
 there, or in all  things  there brought together agreeably to my spirit? 
The walls must not be too high . . .  the trees must not be too numerous 
nor the hills too near bounding the view.32
 Here Thoreau describes an experience of what we might call inspiration 
atop a huckleberry hill. However, instead of relaying the content of his di-
lated thoughts, as we might expect, Thoreau is strictly interested in the 
physical circumstances surrounding their occurrence. Thus he takes note 
of the precise arrangement of walls (not too high), trees (not too numer-
ous), and hills (not too near) in an effort to account for the fact that just 
this composition of objects has the power to cause his thoughts to sponta-
neously “expand.” This subjective experience is the result of “some influ-
ence,” he proposes, and if the mechanism at work is more complicated than 
the miasmic local vapor he first suspects, it nonetheless retains for him all 
the predictability and reproducibility of a physiological reflex: “When I am 
against this bare promontory . . .  my thoughts  will expand.” However 
ephemeral or ethereal it may seem, this experience of  mental illumination 
is, for Thoreau, a legibly material and embodied phenomenon.
This moment echoes  others in the Journal, which doggedly tracks the 
movements of Thoreau’s thoughts of nature. We can see this, for instance, 
in Thoreau’s fascination with the correlation between the character of his 
thoughts and the seasons in which they arrive. For Thoreau, winter had a 
kind of incubating effect, its emptiness bringing his thoughts to fruition: 
“The winter was made to concentrate and harden and mature the kernel 
of [man’s] brain, to give tone and firmness and consistency to his thought,” 
he writes. “Then is the  great harvest of the year, the harvest of thought.”33 
And if “winter with its inwardness” of blank days  causes thoughts to take 
final shape, spring is, for Thoreau, the season of new freshets of inspira-
tion.34 “When the frost comes out of the ground,  there is a corresponding 
thawing of the man,” he reports.35 It would be easy to  mistake  these ob-
servations for analogies; however, Thoreau repeatedly indicates that the 
relation he means to invoke is not comparative but causal. Thus, for instance, 
when he observes that “the distant view of the open flooded Sudbury mead-
ows, all dark blue, surrounded by a landscape of white snow, gave an impulse 
to the dormant sap in my veins,” we are at first tempted to imagine that his 
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feeling of revival manifests as a kind of mystical sympathy with the re-
awakening earth in this early spring thaw. But the entry goes on to ex-
plain that his quickening pulse is more specifically the result of 
anticipation: offering the first “placid reflecting  water” to be seen since the 
ponds and rivers froze over months earlier, the flooded meadows direct his 
gaze upward to the sky, where he expects, on the “promise of the morrow,” 
to see the arrival of new avian life (birds come to fish  those newly reopened 
 waters). The flooded spring meadows thus produce a stirring in Thoreau 
 because they indicate the return of activity  after a long dull winter. “I must 
be on the lookout now for the gulls and the ducks,” he eagerly concludes; 
“this is the sap of which I make my sugar  after the frosty nights.”36 Reflec-
tions like  these help to bring the Journal into focus as an instrument for 
studying the sensuous and affective relations by which natu ral phenom-
ena incite physiological responses and excite  mental phenomena. By faith-
fully documenting  these coincidences, the Journal enables Thoreau to 
observe himself observing nature. In the retrospect that it provides, he can 
scrutinize his experience for clues to the specific mechanisms by which 
“climate does thus react on man.”
It is therefore not only the mutability of natu ral phenomena that marks 
the Journal’s departure from Emerson’s and Agassiz’s static naturalism; 
Thoreau’s heresy also inheres in his embodied conception of mind. Indeed, 
as Branka Arsić observes, Thoreau’s ambition to think “the origin of 
thought . . .  outside of the self” presumes a recursive relationality between 
mind and world that is at odds with the image of a “self- posited reflexive 
mind representing the external and material world.” The Journal practices 
an empiricism that begins from the assumption that the mind is not au-
tonomous but rather inextricable from the external and material world 
it  perceives— not mystically fused in some “vague and dubious quasi- 
ecological” way but ordinarily and unavoidably immersed by virtue of its 
embodiment and ongoing, sensuous impressibility.37 On this reading, then, 
what changed as Thoreau’s conception of nature became progressively less 
Transcendentalist and more empiricist in the 1850s is not his sense that na-
ture is morally instructive but his sense of how this edification takes place. 
If, for Emerson and Agassiz, nature’s order is symbolic (a catechism of law 
in rocks and stones and trees), in Thoreau’s Journal nature increasingly ap-
pears as a shifting array of physical agents that work us over, impressing 
us sensuously and materially impinging on our minds through mechanisms 
Thoreau was determined to discover.38
This intermediation of mind and environment makes for an unusual sci-
entific practice: Thoreau understands his perceptual experience to be a 
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facet of the material phenomenon he is observing. Thus while Agassiz was 
training up the first generation of American scientists in the methods 
of strict objectivity (a mode of seeing Walls describes as a “crystalline 
purity . . .  emptied of self”), Thoreau was developing an experimentally 
meta- observational practice that would not have passed muster at the Law-
rence Scientific School.39 As he would protest, however, his own method 
was arguably more rigorously empirical than the alternative. Thus, in a 
memorable journal entry for Christmas Day, 1851, he complains:
I witness a beauty in the form or coloring of the clouds which 
 addresses itself to my imagination, for which you account scientifically 
to my understanding, but do not so account to my imagination. . . .  
You tell me it is a mass of vapor which absorbs all other rays and 
reflects the red, but that is nothing to the purpose, for this red vision 
excites me, stirs my blood, makes my thoughts flow, and I have new 
and indescribable fancies, and you have not touched the secret of the 
influence.40
Lamenting the poverty of conventional science, Thoreau calls for an ex-
panded practice that would take into account the  whole phenomenon of 
sunset— both the observable light and the sensuous effects of that light on 
its observer. “This red vision excites me, stirs my blood, makes my thought 
flow,” he insists, pointing to the fact that this light has not only passed 
through the vaporous body of a cloud, but also through the medium of his 
own body, striking his eye and exciting his pulse and mind. Although it 
would be another thirty years before the invention of an instrument to 
mea sure changes in blood pressure, and even longer before the invention of 
a means to mea sure blood flow to the brain, Thoreau knows  these as- yet- 
unmeasurable physiological phenomena to be materially real nevertheless, 
and he insists that they must be counted among the empirical phenomena 
that compose the multidimensional event we call “sunset.”
On this reading, then, when Thoreau suggests that science is in need of 
a poetic supplement, he is not voicing the commonplace romantic asser-
tion that poetry has access to a higher moral truth to which empiricism’s 
prosaically earthbound materialism is blind. For Thoreau, “poetry” refers 
to experience— the same authority to which empiricism is, ostensibly, com-
mitted. Thus when he despairs at the deficiency of an “objective” science 
that purges subjective experience from its frame of reference, he is not ex-
posing the inherent limitation of empirical knowledge so much as he is 
accusing conventional science of failing to live up to its empiricist creed. 
“ There is no such  thing as a pure objective observation,” Thoreau protests, 
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since “the sum of what the writer of what ever class has to report is simply 
some  human experience.”41 A truly materialist empiricism must therefore 
acknowledge the mediating presence of the observer’s subjectivity. Indeed, 
he suggests that insofar as “objective” science fails to incorporate  human 
perception within the frame of the natu ral world it scrutinizes, it not only 
lies about the empirical conditions of its operation but moreover condemns 
its inquiries to inconsequence. For by expunging the observer from the 
scene of observation, science precludes itself from examining what must be, 
tautologically, the most in ter est ing facet of any natu ral phenomenon: its 
 human interest. Thus Thoreau objects, “I think that the man of science 
makes this  mistake . . .  that you should coolly give your chief attention to 
the phenomenon which excites you as something in de pen dent of you, and 
not as something as it is related to you. The impor tant fact is its effect on 
me. . . .  The point of interest is somewhere between me and them (i.e., the 
objects).”42  There is, in other words, no such  thing as intrinsic significance: 
we study that which excites us, and facts are only ever facts for someone.
But if it is thus a phenomenological rather than a poetic correction to 
science that Thoreau envisions, poiesis remains, in a dif fer ent sense, the 
central concern of his alternative empiricism. As he insists, the aim of ob-
servation is not simply to document a fact but to register its effect on us in 
the event of perception. In this subjective science, the “poetry” or inventive-
ness of Thoreau’s descriptions stems from the creativity of the perceptual 
encounter itself— watching a sunset generates a new experience in him. 
Hence he insists, “ After all the truest description & that by which another 
living man can most readily recognize a flower—is the unmea sured [?] & 
elegant one which the sight of it inspires— No scientific description  will 
supply the want of this though you should count & mea sure & analyse 
 every atom that seems to compose it.”43 What may seem like the inven-
tiveness of Thoreau’s “poetic” descriptions of nature— their “unmea sured” 
embellishments, their interest in the effect and inspiration that natu ral 
objects can excite, and not simply in their mea sur able “atoms”—is in fact 
an insistence on the documentary. Our relations themselves are creative, 
sensuously, physiologically, and mentally transformative, and it is this— 
the poiesis of perception— that Thoreau’s prose attempts to get down. 
“A true description growing out of the perception & appreciation of [a 
fact]—is itself a new fact . . .  indicating [its] highest quality . . .  the relation 
to man.”44 The world invents and reinvents Thoreau, and the poetry of 
the Journal is just another kind of geological rec ord the world leaves.
This therefore suggests that if Thoreau’s reflexive science anticipates late 
twentieth- century critiques of scientific positivism—if, like Bruno Latour 
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or Karen Barad, Thoreau insists that scientific knowledge is subjectively 
and culturally mediated— his science also points up a connection between 
positivism and racialist ideology. Thoreau’s situated or relational scientific 
practice stems from his sense that bodies, minds, and even landscapes are 
alive, pro cessual, susceptible to development: perception is an embodied 
event, and the viewer (at least) is altered by  these encounters. His science 
therefore does not propose to tell us what an object is but, rather, how it 
moves us; it is the calculus to positivism’s algebra, a science not of identity 
but of change. As such, Thoreau’s critique of positivism is also a critique 
of racialism’s essentialist view of the body. From the perspective of his lively 
science of a world in flux, the positivism of biological identity is untenable. 
Like Agassiz’s science of still specimens and fixed  orders, racialism’s no-
menclatural grid of  human difference must inexorably be belied by the slow 
flow of embodied change.45
In fact, by the mid-1850s, Thoreau’s accumulating Journal rec ord had 
led him to expand his intuitions of development into a nascent theory of 
speciological change. In 1856, on a visit to Horace Greeley’s farm in New 
York, Thoreau described to Greeley his hypothesis that plant species do 
in fact migrate and colonize new territories through the agency of seeds, 
which are variously dispersed by wind,  water, and animals.46 Although the 
mobility of plants may be a phenomenon that seems wholly unrelated to 
the question of  human development and racial difference, to midcentury 
naturalists this connection, on the contrary, went without saying. Infor-
mation regarding the (im)mobility or (im)mutability of plant and animal 
species was universally understood “to throw light,” as Agassiz affirms, 
“upon the very origin of the differences existing among men.”47
Thoreau’s effort to substantiate his theory of speciological development 
presented him, however, with a new prob lem of scale. For whereas he could 
hope to observe his own experiences of natu ral transformation, the pro-
cesses of seed dissemination and populational succession that now occupy 
him are phenomena that unfold at temporal and geo graph i cal scales not 
directly available to  human experience. The mechanisms by which this 
kind of natu ral change is accomplished are at once too small— too dispersed 
and incremental— and too large— too attenuated in space and time—to reg-
ister in our attention without the aid of careful, longitudinal rec ords. It is 
therefore not coincidentally around the time of Thoreau’s disclosure to 
Greeley that his Journal starts to become less consistently self- reflexive, fo-
cusing less and less on his perceptual experience as he becomes progressively 
more intent on systematically documenting the incremental mechanisms of 
populational change.
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I am therefore suggesting what we have taken to be the newly “empiri-
cal” or “scientific” nature of Thoreau’s late Journal might also, and maybe 
even more accurately, be described as its newly racialist imaginary. The 
early Journal was already empirical— indeed, William James might say, 
“radically” so— and its idiosyncratic empiricism grew out of Thoreau’s 
desire to investigate the pos si ble natu ral mechanisms of individual devel-
opment. What changes in Thoreau’s final years is his determination to 
investigate the mechanisms of natu ral development at the level of biologi-
cal populations— a scalar shift that turns his attention from the drama of 
personal reform to the epic sweep of speciological change. But if this means 
that his subjective experience now takes a backseat to more “objective” 
methods, it should be clear that Thoreau’s late science remained ripe with 
 human interest and even po liti cal controversy.
On the Dispersion of Species: Race in Thoreau’s Population Studies
In 1853, Thoreau grieved privately to his Journal that he might never find 
an audience for his natu ral historical research. He had recently received a 
survey from Agassiz’s American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence, to which he felt unable to respond frankly: “I felt that it would be to 
make myself the laughing stock of the scientific community to describe or 
attempt to describe to them that branch of science which specially inter-
ests me, inasmuch as they do not believe in a science which deals with the 
higher law. . . .  How absurd that, though I prob ably stand as near to na-
ture as any of them, and am by constitution as good an observer as most, 
yet a true account of my relation to nature should excite their ridicule 
only.”48 If Thoreau’s Journal remained a largely private enterprise in the 
early 1850s, this may be  because his proj ect presumed what Agassiz’s in-
fluential science strictly precluded: that environmental agents impinge on 
the body, and that individuals, races, and species are susceptible to change. 
This theory of natu ral development at the heart of the Journal and the 
unorthodox observational methods Thoreau developed to test it put Tho-
reau so far outside of the scientific mainstream Agassiz was then consoli-
dating around himself that Thoreau did not dare to share it. A few years 
 later, however, as he began to pursue  these mechanisms at scale— tracking 
not his own personal development but the mechanisms of dispersion, suc-
cession, and adaptation in plant populations over time— Thoreau’s research 
became more legible (if still unpalatable to Agassizians) as a direct contri-
bution to mainstream monogenist science.
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In this section I suggest that two events in the latter half of the 1850s 
 were instrumental in spurring Thoreau to brave ridicule by preparing his 
naturalistic research for publication. The first of  these was the publica-
tion, in 1857, of the long- anticipated first volume of Agassiz’s projected 
masterwork, Contributions to the Natu ral History of the United States of 
Amer i ca, which contains Agassiz’s definitive statement of the theory of 
special creation, “An Essay on Classification.” The second event was the 
publication, in late 1859, of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, which sparked 
a long season of controversy in Boston scientific circles and marked the 
beginning of the end of Agassiz’s preeminence. As I  shall argue, reading 
Thoreau’s late naturalistic writings in light of  these catalytic events draws 
out their polemical investment not only in ecological systematicity and 
the politics of environmental protection, but in  human ecol ogy and the 
politics of  human difference on the eve of the Civil War.
Despite dining with Agassiz at Emerson’s in 1857, the year Contribu-
tions came out, Thoreau did not get around to reading Agassiz’s book  until 
the following year. But if Thoreau was not overly  eager to read the long- 
anticipated volume, it nonetheless seems to have had a major effect on 
him. As Robert Richardson reports, upon finishing Contributions Thoreau 
commenced a “major reading campaign in zoology,” for which “Agassiz’s 
volume seems to have been the initiating impulse.”49 At the same time, 
Thoreau’s antagonism  toward Agassiz’s theory of special creation becomes 
more palpable in his Journal. In March, he objects that “No science does 
more than arrange what knowledge we have of any class of objects” (a jibe 
particularly aimed at the typological emphasis of Agassiz’s static science).50 
 Later that summer, observing toad spawn in a small pool atop Mount Mo-
nadnock, Thoreau dryly quips that “Agassiz might say that they originated 
on the top.”51 Thoreau’s account of a trip that Emerson took with Agassiz 
to the Adirondacks is likewise laced with condescension for both men: ap-
parently Emerson bought a gun, shot a bird for Agassiz’s collection, and 
then proceeded to shoot at  bottles for fun. “It sounds rather Cockneyish,” 
Thoreau sniffs. “Think of Emerson shooting a peetweet (with shot) for 
Agassiz— & cracking an ale  bottle ( after emptying it) with his  rifle at six 
rods!”52 Ultimately, however, Thoreau’s dissent is most forcefully expressed 
in the form of counterevidence: as Richardson notes, in the spring of 1859, 
the Journal is particularly “filled with observations on the interconnect-
edness and interdependence of  things in nature.”53 In the fall of that 
year, Thoreau began the major undertaking of culling his Journal notes in 
order to compose the manuscript that would become Wild Fruits.
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Wild Fruits can be read as a tacit riposte to Agassiz’s Contributions. A 
regionally specific guide to the identification and, above all, appreciation of 
New  England plants, Wild Fruits is the situated antithesis to Agassiz’s  grand 
national typology. Thus whereas Agassiz promises to “[bring] together an 
extensive museum of purely American specimens,” magisterially parading 
the nation’s radically diverse fauna before us, Thoreau begins by suggest-
ing that his purpose is to drive us out into nature, to bring us into closer 
contact with the vegetation immediately surrounding us.54 “Most of us are 
still related to our native fields as the navigator to undiscovered islands in 
the sea,” Thoreau observes. “We can any after noon discover a new fruit 
 there which  will surprise us by its beauty or sweetness.”55 Most impor tant, 
for Thoreau the value of this local knowledge has to do with the transfor-
mative moral effect it can have on us. “The value of  these wild fruits is not 
in the mere possession or eating of them, but in the sight and enjoyment 
of them,” he tells us. The child who goes huckleberrying “is introduced 
into a new world, experiences a new development, though it brings home 
only a gill of berries in its basket.” Thus whereas Agassiz’s volume is 
founded on the understanding that the value of comprehensively studying 
the immutable order of species is to decipher the vast “thoughts of God” 
encoded therein, Thoreau’s guide is premised on his conviction that it is 
impor tant to observe  these local fruits  because “the fruits of New 
 England . . .  educate us and fit us to live  here.” Thoreau promises us not 
an image of eternal order but an opening onto change: “The value of any 
experience is mea sured, of course . . .  by the amount of development we 
get out of it.” The chief interest of the species he  will proceed to list is not 
the “finite” place they occupy in an orderly cosmos unmoved by physical 
forces, but the dynamic “part they play in our education.”56
But it is not only  humans who develop in Thoreau’s manuscript. In Wild 
Fruits’s standout essay, “Wild Apples,” which Thoreau first delivered as a 
lecture in February 1860 (a month  after perusing Darwin), Thoreau de-
scribes the development of a new variety of apple, explaining how an im-
ported varietal near him has, through generations of migration and 
environmental adaptation, become feral and self- propagating, its flesh 
transformed into “the choicest of all its kind.”57 The striking  thing about 
this  little fable of re- wilding is just how mechanically specific it is. This is, as 
David Robinson notes, “a very Darwinian narrative” of speciation, high-
lighting how this new variety has arisen through the agencies of dissemi-
nation (its seed has strayed the orchard into unprotected new fields) and 
local pressure (aggressive browsing by its “bovine foes” has forced it to 
adapt new “tactics” for survival).58 Thus if Thoreau’s prefatory promise of 
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“development” to the reader who would stray into her “native fields” seems 
hazily unspecific, the development this apple undergoes by its wandering 
(or what Walden might call its “extravagance”) is unmistakably evolution-
ary, involving a physiological and characterological transformation. Indeed, 
it is no accident that Thoreau’s word for this fruit’s peculiar flavor is 
“racy,” an adjective he uses three times in this essay but apparently nowhere 
 else in his corpus.59 While ostensibly highlighting the fruit’s piquant taste, 
he clearly  favors “racy” for its ability to underscore the fruit’s distinction 
as a new breed. For Thoreau, the bracing flavor of this apple’s flesh is a 
speciological trait that is also a kind of moral virtue, expressive of what he 
 will ultimately describe as its uniquely American character. This is, he sug-
gests, “our wild apple”: a transplanted and once- colonized fruit that “strayed 
into the woods from the cultivated stock” to assert its in de pen dence, annex 
new territories, and gradually become a “superior” new type. With “Wild 
Apples,” Thoreau brings his critique of Agassiz’s science into high relief, 
underscoring the raciological implications of his theory of environmen-
tal adaptation and development.
The other catalytic event that seems to have emboldened Thoreau to 
publish his naturalistic research was the publication of Origin of Species. 
Thoreau first read Origin in January 1860, just five weeks  after its publica-
tion and one month before he first delivered “Wild Apples” as a lecture. 
In the ensuing months, Darwin’s book became a flashpoint of controversy 
in Boston scientific circles, particularly between Agassiz and his Harvard 
colleague Asa Gray. Gray had shared research with Darwin as Darwin was 
composing Origins, and he had even begun to introduce Darwin’s ideas on 
evolution to Boston audiences (possibly including Thoreau) as early as 
1858.60 Between February and April 1860, Agassiz, Gray, and other prom-
inent men of science debated evolution in a series of meetings before the 
Boston Society of Natu ral History, the American Acad emy of Arts and Sci-
ences, and in the pages of the popu lar and scientific press. Thoreau may 
have attended one or more of  these debates— his Journal indicates that he 
traveled to Boston on the day that at least one of them took place (Febru-
ary 6, 1860). But of course, as we have seen, unlike many in  those Boston 
circles, Thoreau had not been persuaded by Agassiz’s speciological theory 
to begin with; whereas Darwin’s thesis struck other midcentury readers 
with the force of a detonation, Thoreau was already sympathetic to the idea 
that populations adapt and develop  under the influence of their local 
environments.
What was new to Thoreau, in Darwin’s book, was the theory of natu-
ral se lection. According to this theory, speciation occurs when the natu ral 
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variation within a species produces an anomalous trait that affords its car-
rier a competitive advantage, allowing that trait to proliferate down through 
ensuing generations. As Gray notes in his review of Origin, what made 
Darwin’s theory worrisome was its ambivalence on the score of natu ral se-
lection’s progressivism (“Only let us hope that it always works for good,” 
Gray writes). Moreover, Gray anticipated that this theory might be greeted 
with popu lar resistance— not only  because it rules “the Negro and the Hot-
tentot our blood- relations,” but moreover  because it puts the  human race 
in “a closer relation” with the “quadrumanous  family” (primates), and even 
ultimately traces “the evolution of the  human no less than the lower ani-
mal races out of some  simple primordial animal.”61 In short, Darwinian 
monogenism upheld the common origin not just of all humanity but, more-
over, of all life.
However, as Darwin himself acknowledged, his theory still suffered 
from blind spots, and it is  here that reading Origin may have been par-
ticularly productive for Thoreau by helping him to recognize the vital 
and timely importance of his own seed studies. In his concluding chap-
ter, Darwin observes that “the chief cause of our natu ral unwillingness 
to admit that one species has given birth to other and distinct species, 
is that we are always slow in admitting any  great change of which we do 
not see the intermediate steps.”62 In par tic u lar, he confessed, he was as 
yet unable to demonstrate the “intermediate steps” by which species 
migrate (as his theory required him to hypothesize) from one region to 
another:
Turning to geo graph i cal distribution, the difficulties encountered on 
the theory of descent with modification are grave enough. All the 
individuals of the same species, and all the species of the same genus, 
or even higher group, must have descended from common parents; 
and therefore, in however distant and isolated parts of the world 
they are now found, they must in the course of successive generations 
have passed from some one part to the  others. We are often wholly 
unable even to conjecture how this could have been effected. . . .  We 
are as yet profoundly ignorant of the many occasional means of 
transport.63
Thus, as Michael Berger has demonstrated, Thoreau’s studies of seed dis-
persal are not just related to Darwin’s work but “directly support one of 
the weakest links in Darwin’s argument for evolution.”64 Whereas Darwin 
was forced to simply assert that populations have gradually migrated to the 
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“distant and isolated parts of the world [where] they are now found,” 
Thoreau had laboriously observed the “infinitely . . .  extensive and regular” 
system by which plants— which are the most emphatically rooted and thus 
apparently immobile of all the species— are broadly disseminated by wind, 
 water, and animals.65 His seed studies  were thus poised, as Berger argues, 
to provide crucial support for Darwin’s embattled thesis.
In the fall of 1860, on the heels of a long summer of evolutionary de-
bates, Thoreau delivered his lecture on “The Succession of Forest Trees.” 
Modestly addressing the enigmatic yet common occurrence that when a 
pine forest is cut down, an oak stand may spring up in the clearing, “Suc-
cession” sets out to demonstrate that this phenomenon is the result of the 
movement of seeds. Thanks to a vast and somewhat haphazard network 
of environmental mechanisms, Thoreau argues, even the heaviest seeds 
“ will be found to be winged or legged,” able to wend their way across vast 
distances and even seemingly insurmountable topographical barriers 
without the aid of divine intervention.66 In the weeks  after delivering “Suc-
cession,” Thoreau threw himself into the task of elaborating this account 
by beginning work on a book- length manuscript, The Dispersion of Seeds, 
which compiled years of his naturalistic research to offer an even more 
comprehensive inventory of the mechanisms of seed migration and pop-
ulational succession.
Thoreau’s impressively detailed grasp of interspecies mutualism and en-
vironmental dynamism in “Succession” has led con temporary critics to 
praise this essay’s proto- ecological understanding of nature. The essay is 
much less often read as an argument for racial unity and yet, coming as it 
did on the heels of months of evolutionary controversy, it would have been 
clear to Thoreau’s audience that his argument for speciological mobility 
bore directly upon the question of environmental adaptation at the center 
of the debate between Darwin and Agassiz. Indeed, the fact that “Succes-
sion” was the most widely reprinted of all of Thoreau’s essays— excerpted 
in several publications and republished verbatim in three, including Horace 
Greeley’s New- York Weekly Tribune— suggests that editors and readers ap-
preciated its germaneness to the headlining questions of evolution and 
racial difference.67
As if to ensure that we recognize the anthropological dimensions of his 
botanical thesis, Thoreau prefaces his essay with a humorous sketch of the 
ecol ogy of racial migrations. “ Every man is entitled to come to a Cattle- 
Show, even a transcendentalist,” he quips to his audience at the Middlesex 
Agricultural Fair; “and for my part I am more interested in the men than 
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in the  cattle.”68 In the paragraph that follows he describes the plea sure he 
takes in people- watching:
I wish to see once more  those old familiar  faces, whose names I do not 
know, which for me represent the Middlesex country, and come as 
near being indigenous to the soil as a white man can. . . .  It is true, 
 there are some queer specimens of humanity attracted to our festival, 
but all are welcome. I am pretty sure to meet once more that fellow . . .  
who prefers a crooked stick for a cane; perfectly useless, you would say, 
only bizarre. . . .  He brings that much indulged bit of the country with 
him, from some town’s end or other, and introduces it to Concord 
groves.
As Walls notes, readers  today tend to take  these prefatory remarks on the 
fair as “witticisms” and “throwaway literary asides.”69 Against that assump-
tion, Walls observes that they also situate Thoreau as a speaker, exploding 
“the illusion of an invisible omniscient ‘I.’ ”70 But in addition to resisting 
the pretense of objectivity,  these humorous remarks also cagily point to the 
connection between nonhuman and  human ecologies. Reminding us that 
humanity is also a subject of the naturalist’s scrutiny, Thoreau anticipates 
the essay’s analy sis of populational mobility and secondary growth among 
tree species by noting that the typologically “familiar” population of Mid-
dlesex County is nonetheless not original to this place but rather has mi-
grated and adapted to this “country,” becoming “as near being indigenous to 
the soil as a white man can.” He further suggests that the features of this 
local race are not fixed, taking note of how one or two “queer specimens of 
humanity,” recently arrived from elsewhere, are even now introducing “bi-
zarre” new variations “to the Concord groves.”  Here again, Thoreau’s horti-
cultural pun (“bizarre” being a term for splashy, variegated varietals of 
flower) and his meta phorical substitution of Concord’s “groves” for its soci-
ety both insist that the ecol ogy he is about to describe applies interchange-
ably to oak stands, cattlekind, and the  human race.71
When read in the context of Agassiz’s and Darwin’s landmark midcen-
tury publications, the racial import of Thoreau’s late naturalistic writings 
is more vis i ble. But if  there is still any question about the racialism implicit 
in Thoreau’s studies of dissemination, Thoreau’s “Indian Notebooks” help 
us to see that Thoreau explic itly understood the migration of seeds and 
migration of races to be conceptually of a piece. Thoreau’s second- largest 
undertaking in this de cade,  after the Journal, the “Indian Notebooks” con-
sist of twelve commonplace books that together comprise what Richard 
Fleck calls “the largest body of knowledge on American Indian cultures 
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in the nineteenth  century.”72 In  these books, Thoreau transcribed passages 
from his wide- ranging reading of travelogues, missionary reports, land sur-
veys, and ethnologies relating to the indigenous  peoples of North Amer-
i ca, and their rec ord indicates that in the late 1850s he also began to compile 
research on the question of Native American racial origins.73 Although 
Thoreau’s bibliography on this subject was catholic (he read works of both 
polygenist and monogenist science), evidence suggests that he was most 
persuaded by the theory that indigenous Americans did not originate in 
North Amer i ca (as polygenists argued) but, rather, migrated to this conti-
nent from Asia. Indeed, his transcriptions from polygenist works betray 
an impish instinct to catch them in moments of conceptual impasse.74 By 
contrast, in 1856 Thoreau approvingly transcribed Benjamin Smith Bar-
ton’s thesis “that the Americans are not, as some writers have supposed, 
specifically dif fer ent from the Persians, and other improved nations of 
Asia,” affirming the likelihood of Smith’s thesis in his Journal the follow-
ing year, where he observes that “It is most . . .  in accordance with the natu-
ral phenomena, to suppose that North Amer i ca was discovered from the 
northern part of the Eastern Continent, for a study of the range of plants, 
birds, and quadrupeds points to a connection on that side. . . .  Men in their 
migrations obey in the main the same law.”75 In keeping with this thesis, 
in the late “Indian Notebooks” Thoreau pursues cross- racial commonali-
ties by reading travelogues not only of North Amer i ca but also of the 
 Middle East, Greenland, Australia, the East Indies, the Arctic, and sev-
eral regions of Africa. As he confessed to the Journal in 1859, “It is the spirit 
of humanity— that which animates both so- called savages & civilized na-
tions, working through a man, and not the man expressing himself, that 
interests us most.”76  Here again, Thoreau’s interest in animation—in the 
migratory and mutational dynamism of life— leads him to reject the typo-
logical episteme embraced by Agassiz’s science and by racialism’s ideology 
of identity and difference.
Thoreau was thus well aware that his own research on speciological mi-
gration and development, published in “Succession” and “Wild Apples,” 
was proposing to contribute to an ecological science that was inseparable 
from racial theory in his antebellum moment. But if we can therefore dis-
cern this work’s connection to racial theory, defining their racial politics 
remains a dif fer ent and far more speculative task. As readers of the prior 
chapter  will remember, monogenist racial theory was deployed in both pro- 
and antislavery arguments, and in support of both racist and egalitarian 
views. In analyzing Thoreau’s writings, a number of scholars highlight the 
racial chauvinism and settler colonialism implicit in  these (and other) 
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essays’ visions of a new “racy” flavor of white transplants who are, like the 
wild apple or Middlesex farmer, becoming “near indigenous to the soil” of 
their appropriated home. As  these critics note, such a vision effects a dou-
ble displacement of Native Americans, anticipating their geo graph i cal ex-
pulsion and cultural appropriation by a “superior” new race of nativized 
white Americans.77 On the other hand, critics who have focused on Tho-
reau’s studies of Native Americans— including his anthropological and eth-
nographic research in the “Indian Notebooks” and his accounts of 
traveling with Penobscot guides in The Maine Woods— suggest that by the 
late 1850s Thoreau had developed a far more nuanced admiration for Na-
tive American cultures, expressing a desire to learn from them that did not 
amount to a desire to impersonate or displace them.78
While holding this line of inquiry open, I would like to propose that 
Thoreau’s engagement with racial science may also have  shaped his poli-
tics in a very dif fer ent way. I have been arguing that Thoreau’s interest in 
ecological change is inseparable from his interest in  human development 
and the question of racial history more broadly. I would now suggest that 
the theory of speciological development— its biologism, contextual mech-
anisms, and the vastly expanded scale at which it operates— reinflects Tho-
reau’s theory of social reform, as evidenced in the last antislavery essays of 
his  career, written in defense of John Brown. As I  shall discuss in the next 
section, the naturalization of Thoreau’s late antislavery thought registers 
in the way he accounts for conscientious disagreement (which now appears 
to be a  matter of embodied differences) and in his abandonment of imme-
diatism (Thoreau now suggests that moral reform requires generations to 
unfold). In par tic u lar, I suggest that this alteration in Thoreau’s thought 
registers as a prob lem of attenuated  human agency that his late essays in-
troduce. In this regard, Thoreau’s late antislavery essays encapsulate both 
the power and the limitations of the po liti cal ecol ogy that emerge out of 
his final writings.
Weird John Brown: The Revolutionary as Racial Anomaly
Thoreau’s last antislavery essays are coeval with his late natu ral historical 
manuscripts; between 1859 and 1860 he moved back and forth between his 
po liti cal and ecological writings. In October 1859 Thoreau had just be-
gun to draft Wild Fruits when news of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry 
reached Concord.79 Eleven days  later, on October 30, he delivered “A Plea 
for Captain John Brown” at the Concord Town Hall, reprising his speech 
twice more that week (once in Boston as a stand-in for Frederick Doug-
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lass, who had sailed to  England to avoid being arrested in connection with 
Brown). On December 2, Thoreau delivered a short eulogy for Brown at a 
memorial ser vice he had or ga nized at Concord. In early January 1860, 
Thoreau was reading Darwin, and in early February he drew up final proofs 
of “A Plea” as he prepared to deliver “Wild Apples” for the first time. In 
the ensuing spring and summer months, as the Darwin- Agassiz debate 
played out, he chiefly worked on the manuscript of Wild Fruits, but he also 
wrote a substantial second essay, “The Last Days of John Brown,” which 
he sent to be read at a July Fourth memorial ser vice for Brown in North 
Elba and which was subsequently republished in the Liberator. Two months 
 later he delivered “Succession” at the Middlesex County Fair and began to 
compose The Dispersion of Seeds, his most comprehensive case for specio-
logical migration and adaptation.
As a rule, critics have tended to describe  these months of Thoreau’s 
life as a time of intellectual bifurcation, characterizing his essays for Brown 
as a temporary distraction from his main task of composing his late natu-
ral historical manuscripts.80 My claim  here is that his thoughts on Brown 
are better understood as extensions and translations of his naturalistic 
research, for the theory of change he formulates in Wild Fruits and The 
Dispersion of Seeds is the same one that animates the account of po liti cal 
reform he sketches out in his essays on Brown, which envision social change 
as a pro cess of intergenerational succession that is no less operational and 
inexorable for being difficult to discern in the moment.
Thoreau’s essays in praise of Brown entered a public sphere in which 
even abolitionists denounced Brown’s violent methods and popu lar consen-
sus held that he was insane. Against the tide of this public opinion, Thore-
au’s essays not only seek to justify Brown’s cause but advance the strikingly 
counterfactual claim that this would-be revolutionary— thwarted, arrested, 
and slated to die— has succeeded. To the neighbors who tell him Brown 
“threw his life away,” Thoreau responds: “Such do not know that like the 
seed is the fruit, and that, in the moral world, when good seed is planted, 
good fruit is inevitable, and does not depend on our watering and cultivat-
ing; that when you plant, or bury, a hero in his field, a crop of heroes is sure 
to spring up. This is a seed of such force and vitality, that it does not ask our 
leave to germinate.”81 To justify his faith in Brown’s ultimate success, Tho-
reau leans on the logic of natu ral succession that he was just then working 
out in his other manuscripts. His meta phor  here frames po liti cal change—in 
this case the proliferation of abolitionist sentiment—as a pro cess that oper-
ates through mechanisms akin to  those by which the wild apple’s new race 
came about. As he tells us in “Wild Apples,” the remarkable  thing about 
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that “chance wild fruit” is that its seeds are “hardier” than  those of the 
cultivated stocks from which this apple diverged, able to “plant themselves 
in distant fields and forests” without the assistance of  human tending.82 
That this fruit can germinate “in woods and swamps and by the sides of 
roads,” and even survive the grazing herds of “bovine foes,” is evidence 
of what Darwin would term its natu ral advantage.83 This apple is, as Tho-
reau more colloquially puts it, “good seed”— a natu ral variant whose 
anomalousness affords it a higher rate of survival and thereby allows it to 
propagate a new breed. And this is how Thoreau now proposes to explain 
why Brown’s words and deeds need not fall on sympathetic ground for his 
beliefs to “germinate”: some beliefs have “such force and vitality” that they 
can withstand our indifference and proliferate among us without our 
“leave.”
According to the more standard view, which holds that morality is a set 
of positions we consciously assent to,  there is something unsettling in this 
notion that a belief might propagate itself without the aid of our consent. 
And of course, one might also note that this disconcerting idea that moral 
truth has its own kind of endemic force is an article of Transcendentalist 
faith that recurs throughout Thoreau’s po liti cal writings. “What force has 
a multitude?,” he observes in his 1849 essay, “Re sis tance to Civil Govern-
ment. “They only can force me who obey a higher law than I.”84 But if 
moral truth emboldens  those who choose to become its champions, what 
seems to have changed in this late essay is that  here moral truth appar-
ently has the power to move through populations of its own accord. Looked 
at differently, then, we can see that Thoreau’s vision of Brown’s propaga-
tive power marks a profound shift from an individualistic to a populational 
conception of morality. That is, whereas in 1849 Thoreau’s rhetorical ques-
tion “What force has a multitude?” was meant to contrast the multitude’s 
physical force with the superior moral power of the conscientious individ-
ual, Thoreau’s late writings now conflate moral and physical compulsion. 
Brown’s moral force is the same as his propagative capacity; moral force 
can now be mea sured by demographic success—by the multitudes that it 
produces with or without “our leave.” Brown has not simply done some-
thing heroic; he embodies a superior, heroic race.
And hence, although Thoreau takes comfort in projecting a  future race 
of John Browns, his conflation of moral and raciological identity might well 
give us pause. The essentialism it implies results in an attenuation of moral 
agency. This prob lem becomes clearer in “Wild Apples” when Thoreau re-
verses his meta phor: if Brown was “good seed,”  here he suggests that good 
seeds are heroic individuals. Turning the emergence of the variant wild 
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apple into a parable of  human pro gress, Thoreau writes that among men, 
too, “only the most per sis tent and strongest genius defends itself and pre-
vails, sends a tender scion upward at last, and drops its perfect fruit on the 
ungrateful earth. Poets and phi los o phers and statesmen thus spring up in 
the country pastures, and outlast the hosts of unoriginal men.”85 Beyond 
illustrating how topologically entwined Thoreau’s late naturalist and po-
liti cal writings are (they use the same meta phors), we can also notice that 
in both proj ects Thoreau is working through the same philosophical prob-
lem: how to understand agency within a materialist system. One can, for 
instance, read this passage as a lesson about the singular importance of the 
exceptional individual. According to both the “ great man” theory of his-
tory and the evolutionary theory of development, one heroic specimen— 
one anomalous individual, one unusually bovine- resistant seedling— has 
the power to change the course of history ( human or natu ral)  going for-
ward. On the other hand, this parable also works to naturalize—to render 
embodied and involuntary— the heroic individual’s contribution.  Here 
greatness is not an accomplishment so much as it is an identity—an em-
bodied “genius” for per sis tence that allows him to “outlast” his “unorigi-
nal” peers. Indeed, that word “genius,” etymologically related as it is to 
“genus” and “gene” via their shared root in the Latin word for the male 
spirit of a familial or tribal line, conjures an exceptional character that is 
specifically raciological— inborn like the wild apple’s distinctive hardi-
ness.86 To praise the virtue of such a man—as, indeed, Thoreau praises 
the character of the wild apple—is to congratulate the beneficiary of 
biological luck.
Of course, as the second epigraph to this chapter attests, this is not the 
first time that Thoreau has suggested that moral character might be de-
termined by one’s embodied “nature.” However, in the context of his late 
empirical research, and in this case arriving in the midst of a story about 
the wild apple’s racial speciation, his invocations of natu ral succession carry 
a new kind of weight. At this point in Thoreau’s  career as a naturalist, we 
can no longer dismiss the biologism of his meta phors as purely rhetorical. 
Taking  these figures seriously therefore also entails acknowledging that 
the prob lems of  human agency that they introduce are very real. The pos-
sibility that we are not responsible for the beliefs that we hold pervades 
Thoreau’s defense of Brown in “A Plea.” It lingers, for instance, around 
Thoreau’s suggestion that Brown is a new breed of American: “the most 
American of us all,” he does not typify Americans (“He was too fair a spec-
imen to represent the like of us”) but rather instantiates its new type. 
Thus Thoreau insists that “Brown could not have been tried by a jury of 
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his peers,  because his peers do not exist.” Instead, he rises “above [his ac-
cusers] literally by a  whole body”— a grim visual pun which transforms 
Brown’s hanging corpse into the mea sure of not just his moral but also his 
corporeal superiority (a distinction Thoreau underlines in italics and by 
his insistence that he is speaking “literally”). And by this same embodied 
logic, in “A Plea” Thoreau argues that Brown’s detractors are “half- 
brutish,” suffering from “a difference of constitution, of intelligence, and 
faith.” “They pronounce this man insane, for they know that they could 
never act as he does, as long as they are themselves,” he complains, under-
scoring the existential nature of this disagreement— they are constitution-
ally incapable of sympathizing with him; they could not think or act as 
he does and be “themselves.”87
This essentialism becomes loudest in Thoreau’s second essay for Brown. 
Written in the spring or summer of 1860, in the midst of the public de-
bate over Darwin’s challenge to Agassiz, “The Last Days of John Brown” 
is even more insistent that Brown’s critics are not just morally but physi-
ologically inferior to him. “The man who does not recognize in Brown’s 
words a wisdom and nobleness,” Thoreau submits, is “not willfully but con-
stitutionally blind.” As he continues,
I was not surprised that certain of my neighbors spoke of John Brown 
as an ordinary felon, for who are they? They  either have much flesh, or 
much office, or much coarseness of some kind. . . .  Several of them are 
decidedly pachydermatous. I say it in sorrow, not in anger. How can a 
man behold the light who has no answering inward light? They are 
true to their sight, but when they look this way they see nothing, they 
are blind. For the  children of the light to contend with them is as if 
 there should be a contest between ea gles and owls. . . .  It is not  every 
man who can be a Christian, even in a very moderate sense, what ever 
education you give him. It is a  matter of constitution and tempera-
ment,  after all. He may have to be born again many times. . . .  It is not 
 every man who can be a freeman, even.88
In deeming his neighbors “pachydermatous,” Thoreau recasts the racist 
trope that Black bodies are insensitive— naturally impervious to heat, over-
work, and emotional hardship.89 Simulating the essentialism, biological 
chauvinism, and even the dermatological fixation of racist science, Tho-
reau finds his neighbors condemned to moral blindness by an insensibility 
that is congenital (“not willfully but constitutionally” acquired) and phys-
iological (“a  matter of constitution and temperament,  after all”). He even 
indicates that Homo pachydermatous may be another species— benighted 
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“owls” to the diurnal “ea gles” who sympathize with Brown— and in  doing so 
he affects the same condescending regret (“I say it in sorrow, not anger”) 
that Nott and Agassiz express when they come to similarly heretical conclu-
sions. At once echoing and indicting Agassiz’s patronizing proposition that 
“the best education to be imparted to the dif fer ent races”  must account for 
“their primitive difference” by not attempting “to force the peculiarities of 
our white civilization . . .  upon all nations of the world,” Thoreau suggests 
that re sis tance to the truth of  human equality proves that not  every white 
man “can be a Christian . . .  what ever education you give him.”90
But as gratifying as this satirical skewering of polygenism is, its biolo-
gism also injects Thoreau’s last antislavery essay with a fatalism uncharac-
teristic of his prior politics. In earlier essays like “Re sis tance to Civil 
Government” (1849) and “Slavery in Mas sa chu setts” (1854), Thoreau rails 
against what he describes as our conscientious enslavement to the slave-
holding power, and urges us to “for once and at last serve God . . .  by obey-
ing that eternal and only just CONSTITUTION which He, and not any 
Jefferson or Adams, has written in your being.”91 In  these earlier essays, 
moral redemption is within every one’s reach: their own quaking resolve is 
the only obstacle standing between them and moral perfection. But by the 
John Brown essays, the moral “constitution” Thoreau invokes has taken 
on a fleshy materiality and embodied diversity that makes it operate very 
differently, so that now moral reform may be beyond my power: “It is not 
 every man who can be a freeman, even.” Of course, it is clear that Tho-
reau does not intend to wholly limit the scope of our moral agency.  These 
essays still press us to overcome our torpidity and live up to the promise 
of our natures: “If this man’s acts and words do not create a revival, it  will 
be the severest pos si ble satire on the acts and words that do. . . .  [Brown] 
has already quickened the feeble pulse of the North, and infused more 
and more generous blood into her veins and heart.”92 But dif fer ent,  here, 
is  these essays’ new sense that we may be working within organic limits, that 
the “constitution and temperament” that dictate our conscience, though 
technically still given us by God, may afford us greater or lesser moral in-
sight depending upon the luck of our birth.
But if Thoreau therefore seems to accede to a kind of moral fatalism, 
his resignation is leavened by his correspondingly redoubled faith that 
moral pro gress is nevertheless on its way. Both “A Plea” and “Last Days” 
conclude by affirming Brown’s  future redemption, expressing a degree of 
optimism that is unusual in Thoreau’s po liti cal writings. In professing this 
faith, Thoreau invokes a newly capacious sense of po liti cal time. When in 
“Slavery in Mas sa chu setts” his choice was between Jefferson’s Constitution 
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or God’s, his options  were to live within the fallen time of  human history 
or to immediately assent to the timeless order of higher law inscribed in 
his conscience. Now, however, Thoreau seems to imagine moral reform as 
a gradual rather than millennial pro cess. Brown himself is a product of 
history  here: “such a man as it takes ages to make, and ages to understand.”93 
Likewise, Thoreau now figures Brown’s vindication as an outcome that  will 
arise not through our instantaneous moral conversion but by the intergen-
erational march of succession: as we have seen, Thoreau expects “a new 
crop of heroes” to spring from Brown’s fecund “good seed” and dissemi-
nate his legacy to the  future. It is thus by turning to the timeline of spe-
ciological change that Thoreau can conclude that even though Brown’s raid 
did not incite the hoped- for slave insurrection, it nevertheless engendered 
“the possibility, in the course of ages, of a revolution.”94 “I foresee a time 
when the painter  will paint [the] scene” of Brown’s martyrdom, Thoreau 
confidently closes “A Plea.” “The poet  will sing it; the historian rec ord it; 
and . . .  it  will be the ornament of some  future national gallery, when at 
least the pres ent form of Slavery  shall be no more  here.”95
One pos si ble name for this optimistic patience is passive re sis tance. 
This, at least, is the term Wai Chee Dimock invokes to describe what she 
calls the logic of “slow translation” subtending Thoreau’s faith in Brown’s 
eventual success. “Is an action still meaningful if the outcome transpires 
far beyond the life span of the actor?” she hears Thoreau’s essays for Brown 
asking. “Just how far can deed and consequence be strung out?” As Di-
mock argues, Thoreau’s answer— really far— works to expose the fact that 
our tendency to judge po liti cal actions by their immediate results puts a 
premium on violent acts, whose consequences are “instantly adducible and 
demonstrable.” Against that bias, Thoreau’s philosophy of passive re sis-
tance challenges us to expand our sense of the scale at which politics 
happen. In contrast to war’s “bluntly truncated” temporal timeframe, the 
enlarged horizon of passive re sis tance allows us to discern the operation 
of far more subtle methods and pro cesses of po liti cal change.96 From this 
perspective, Dimock suggests, Brown’s posthumous agency now becomes 
vis i ble in the legacy he has “given over to the care of  others . . .  who  will 
go on to write” about him and catalyze new activism.97  Under the sign of 
passive re sis tance, we may begin to trace the “luxuriance of outcome” that 
exfoliates from more indirect and minimal po liti cal actions like antislav-
ery essays, withheld consent, the “ will to disarm,” and other acts of non-
violent civil disobedience.98
But what led Thoreau to adopt this vastly expanded view of po liti cal 
change? The cascading ramification of minimal events that Dimock 
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observes  here describes the thesis of The Dispersion of Seeds, which sets out 
to demonstrate that natu ral change occurs not by spontaneous generation 
or the vio lence of divine apocalypse but by the ongoing operation of myr-
iad minor agencies. This gradualism describes Thoreau’s “faith in a seed”:
For many years the daily traveler along  these roads— nay, the proprietor 
himself— does not notice that  there are any pines coming up  there . . .  
but at last his heir knows himself to be the possessor of a handsome 
white- pine lot, long  after the wood from which the seed came has 
dis appeared.
We need not be surprised at  these results when we consider how 
persevering Nature is and how much time she has to work in. . . .  A 
 great pine wood may drop many millions of seeds in one year, but if 
only half a dozen of them are conveyed a quarter of a mile and lodge 
against some fence, and only one of  these comes up and grows  there, 
in the course of fifteen or twenty years  there  will be fifteen or twenty 
young trees  there, and they  will begin to make a show and betray their 
origin.
In this haphazard manner Nature surely creates you a forest at last, 
though as if it  were the last  thing she  were thinking of. By seemingly 
feeble and stealthy steps—by a geologic pace— she gets over the greatest 
distances and accomplishes her greatest results.
Like Dimock, Thoreau suggests that by dilating the scale of our vision we 
may begin to perceive the “slow translation” of a world that other wise ap-
pears, to our immediate senses, as a fixed order that can only be changed 
by violent catastrophe. Thus Thoreau explains how the “seemingly feeble” 
and “haphazard” agency of seeds, breezes, and felicitous fence posts are 
sufficient to move  whole forests, albeit at a “geological pace.” Though this 
pro cess may be too gradual and protracted to witness personally, he in-
sists that it should give us faith that ours is a mutable world: “We find 
ourselves in a world that is already planted, but is also still being planted 
as at first.”99
By calling the philosophy of minor agencies she finds in the Brown es-
says “passive re sis tance,” Dimock suggests that the theory of change  these 
essays introduce is of a piece with Thoreau’s earlier po liti cal writings (the 
term “passive re sis tance” is,  after all, most closely identified with “Re sis-
tance to Civil Government”). On my reading, however, his thinking in the 
John Brown essays derives more immediately from his late naturalistic 
studies, and in fact marks a significant departure from his earlier antislav-
ery thought. What Thoreau discovered as his early naturalistic interest in 
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personal moral growth became an interest in speciological succession and 
development is that, from the perspective of ecological systems, the agency 
of any given individual is singularly hard to parse. A lone pine seed may 
be decisive or expendable to the generation of a new pine stand, and al-
though Thoreau describes the results of this pro cess as intentional (the 
coyly realized plan of a personified “Nature”), up close, he confesses, its 
indirect and dilatory operation looks anything but purposive. The trans-
ference of this ecological model of change into his antislavery writings in-
spires his expanded conception of po liti cal action, and the result seems 
less an elaboration than a displacement of his earlier politics’ emphasis on 
the revolutionary power of individual moral agency and the possibility of 
immediate po liti cal conversion. Resituating Brown’s action at Harpers 
Ferry within the much larger history of this raid’s diffuse  future legacy 
allows Thoreau to assert Brown’s eventual success, but it does so by mini-
mizing the scope of Brown’s intentional agency. The actions Brown con-
scientiously took— his raid and speeches— are dwarfed by comparison to 
the posthumous cascade of consequences his life has triggered and which 
are, Thoreau attests, what  will ultimately bring his revolution to fruition.
This subsumption of individual agency into systemic complexity drives 
Thoreau’s final conclusion, at the end of “Last Days,” that Brown’s death 
is nothing, his execution inconsequential: “He is more alive than he ever 
was.” Having compared Brown’s martyrdom to Christ’s, Thoreau now 
punningly naturalizes that meta phor by comparing Brown to the sun, pro-
claiming that  today Brown “works in public, and in the clearest light that 
shines on this land.”100 His unconcern for Brown’s death underscores that 
it is not Brown’s actions but his influence, the series of aftereffects his life 
 will have touched off, that are poised to transform us. At the same time, 
the image of Brown’s influence as a kind of sunlight conjures Thoreau’s 
early Journal studies of the mechanisms of light’s influence, the way it im-
pinges on us and subtly transforms our thoughts. “I have new and inde-
scribable fancies, and you have not touched the secret of the influence,” he 
wrote of that sunset on Christmas Day.101 Thus though Brown’s legacy  will 
no doubt, as Dimock argues, carry forward via the discursive mechanisms 
of cultural transmission, in this case, Thoreau’s rhe toric refuses to care 
about the distinction between cultural influence of the sort Dimock cites 
(whose mechanisms require voluntary  human action and consent) and en-
vironmental influence (whose mechanisms do not). Brown is now an ele-
ment of our environment like the light, and that environment has the power 
to gradually yet radically transform  whole populations,  whether they wish 
to be changed or not.
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Thoreau’s antislavery materialism is thus surprising for two reasons. 
First, in this racial scientific moment, the predictable antislavery move 
would have been for Thoreau to deploy his monogenist theory of specio-
logical development to defend  human equality and uphold the brotherhood 
of all races. But though he voices this thesis elsewhere in his work, Tho-
reau’s essays for John Brown spurn the discourse on racial origins and in-
stead draw upon his empirical studies to frame a profoundly expanded 
theory of po liti cal change. In  doing so, they move away from the individ-
ualism and immediatism of his earlier politics, and hence the second sur-
prise  here is that in amending his sense of the timeline and mechanisms of 
social reform, Thoreau’s ecologism leads him to take a deeply qualified 
view of  human agency. Where his earlier writings spoke to our  will and 
resolve,  these late writings speak of our condition. Thoreau imagines us 
as embodied beings who are not fully in control of our moral identities: 
we are sometimes “willfully” but other times “constitutionally” immoral, 
and if we are individually and collectively evolving this change seems to 
occur less by choice than by adaptation, as we affectively and physiologi-
cally respond to natu ral and social environments that work us over.
In this sense, Thoreau’s antislavery materialism divorces his late poli-
tics from a Western humanist tradition that defines  human nature by its 
moral autonomy and sovereign agency (the freedom of conscience and 
freedom to enact it that are so crucial to Thoreau’s early antislavery work). 
Thoreau’s empirical studies led him to reimagine all of nature as an imbri-
cated and generative pro cess: “The development theory,” he observes in 
Dispersion, renders nature “equivalent to a sort of constant new creation.”102 
In place of racism’s static hierarchy of biological life, Thoreau’s ecological 
politics emphasize life’s mutability, a view he came to from his early faith 
in the  human mind’s susceptibility to environmental influences.
In theorizing the intermediation of social and biological life, and refus-
ing any final distinction between politics and nature, Thoreau’s antislav-
ery materialism anticipates key aspects of con temporary posthumanist 
theory. Like many posthumanist theorists, Thoreau offers his vision of 
worldly pro cessualism as a response to the prob lem of po liti cal oppression: 
the changefulness he uncovers bespeaks a worldly susceptibility to “con-
stant new creation” which promises that the  future need not reproduce the 
wrongs of the pres ent (such as slavery). More specifically, the scope and 
complexity of this pro cessualism makes his view newly empowering to mi-
nor agencies in ways reminiscent of recent posthumanist theories of po-
liti cal affect. Promising that even apparently inconsequential actors (a gust 
of wind, a peckish cow, a failed revolutionary) can unleash effects that 
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snowball into significance— that just one splinter can derail vast trains of 
power— Thoreau evinces an optimistic faith in the transformative power 
of minor agencies that resonates, for instance, with William Connolly’s 
account of the vulnerability of neoliberal order to grassroots activism. Con-
nolly insists on the volatility of even the most hegemonic- seeming insti-
tutions in the face of the sheer complexity, and hence unpredictability, of 
the diverse forces that shape our lives. “Creative pro cesses flow through 
and over us, and reflexivity doubles the creative adventure,” he observes, 
arguing, “If you join attention to differing degrees of creativity in the 
domains of  human culture, nonhuman force fields, and culture- nature 
imbrications to a critical account of the expansion, intensification, and 
acceleration of neoliberal capitalism, you may be brought face- to- face with 
the fragility of  things  today.”103 With Connolly, as with theorists like Brian 
Massumi and John Protevi, we can see how assemblage theories of po liti cal 
affect shift our attention from the question of what’s right to the question 
of how (rather than should) a given set of affects, dispositions, beliefs, 
and, ultimately, institutions may come to be supplanted by another.104
Like Thoreau’s essays for Brown, then, posthumanist theories of po-
liti cal affect and assemblages offer something like an ecological model of 
moral change that challenges us to acknowledge the distinctly nondelib-
erative, subhuman, nonhuman, and suprahuman forces that shape our po-
liti cal landscapes. Unlike Thoreau, however,  these con temporary theories 
do not tend to flag the ways in which the unmanned “creative pro cesses” 
they describe threaten to relegate us to po liti cal passivity by contracting 
the scope of individual action and intentionality. As we have seen, in re-
laxing the distinction between  human intentionality and involuntary 
change, Thoreau’s late ecological vision rescales our sense of po liti cal time 
from the tight rhythms of electoral cycles to the slow roll of geophysical 
change. One effect of this scalar shift is that it makes the role of conscien-
tious action seem comparatively slight, so that Thoreau’s late po liti cal the-
ory seems at once optimistic that slavery  will be abolished and pessimistic 
about the prospect that abolition  will be the result of principled and 
concerted  human effort. By contrast, as Mark McGurl observes, posthu-
manist discourse often chooses not to emphasize the dispossession of 
 human agency that is implicit in its scaled-up view of systemic complexity. 
In posthumanist work, “even in its gloomier modes,  there is a widespread 
sense, if not of hope, then at least of an opening, a breach” that is born of 
its certainty that “to see just how much of the total energy in the universe 
lies beyond the grasp of  human beings . . .  is also to witness the profound 
contingency and frailty of con temporary social and economic institu-
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   94 11/1/17   11:57 AM
Evolution and the  Prob lem of  Human Agency 95
tions.” Nonetheless, McGurl asserts,  whether or not posthumanists ac-
knowledge it, in making  human agency “vis i ble as something nested in 
forces beyond its control,” posthumanism confronts us with “the terrify-
ing nature of our ethically unconscious selves.”105 In this regard, the un-
settling fatalism that tinges Thoreau’s late ecological politics may yet have 
something to teach posthumanism about the po liti cal stakes of its materi-
alist ontology.
Thus both Douglass’s and Thoreau’s antislavery materialisms bring 
moralism and materialism together in ways that unsettle the rational, agen-
tial, and self- determining moral subject of Western humanism. In  doing 
so, they also redefine the politics of embodiment framed by midcentury 
racialist thought. In place of a biological hierarchy  running from “fully” 
 human to nonhuman life,  these authors’ materialisms point to the imbrica-
tion of  human and nonhuman agencies and the co- constitution of po liti cal 
and ecological pro cesses. If Douglass’s antislavery materialism thereby 
confronts us with our “animal” automaticity, and Thoreau’s discloses the 
chasteningly attenuated nature of our agency— underscoring the radical 
passivity of passive re sis tance, its paradoxically posthumous life— Whitman, 
as the next chapter  shall explore, exposes the unintentionality of our words 
and, indeed, the illegibility of the identity that utters them.
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The preceding chapters have suggested the need to expand our familiar 
understanding of the debate over slavery and racial equality in the run up 
to the Civil War. Stepping back from the confrontation between racist sci-
ence and antislavery liberalism, we can discern the emergence of a some-
what dif fer ent disagreement. My readings of Douglass and Thoreau have 
thus aimed to show that the antebellum debate over racial equality was not 
solely a conflict between racist materialism and antislavery universalism, 
but it also involved a strug gle within materialism itself over biologism’s 
politi cal entailments. If the po liti cal clout of racist science rested at least 
in part on the growing authority of biological conceptions of the  human, 
Douglass’s antislavery appeal to the autonomic instinct for self- preservation 
and Thoreau’s antislavery faith in the morally progressive tendencies of 
speciological change both point out that biological conceptions of the 
 human do not necessarily support proslavery or racist views. At the same 
time, as we have seen, their antislavery materialisms also create prob lems 
for longstanding humanistic assumptions about  human autonomy and in-
dividual agency that  were structurally central to the liberal mainstream of 
antebellum antislavery thought.
c h a p t e r   3
Whitman’s Cosmic Body: Bioelectricity  
and the Prob lem of  Human Meaning
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If nothing  else, then, the preceding chapters have offered a lesson in 
the difficulty of mapping the antebellum moment according to our well- 
worn opposition between materialism- racism- slavery and idealism- 
liberalism- antislavery. Arguments that we have thought of as liberal 
( because antislavery), like Thoreau’s and Douglass’s, can turn out to be ma-
terialist in ways that complicate or even undermine the very possibility of 
liberalism. Inversely, arguments we have understood as materialist ( because 
racist) can prove deeply invested in defending the premises of liberalism. 
 After all, the animalized and hyper- embodied Black body of mid- 
nineteenth- century racist doctrine was designed to throw the inherent 
autonomy of the “fully”  human (white, male) liberal subject into sharper 
relief. We have a working version of this thought in the now common ob-
servation that the primary function of Blackness in Western culture has 
been to consolidate and purify the concept of whiteness. In the context of 
racist science more specifically, embodying or racializing Blackness allowed 
for the comparative disembodiment of whiteness. When racial scientists 
cast the white race as the original and standard  human form, or the most 
intellectually and morally advanced  human form, they rendered the white 
body neutral or negligible to white humanity, thereby working to preserve 
the white subject’s bona fides as a transcendently autonomous liberal 
subject.
As part of my effort to show that antebellum debates over slavery and 
racial difference thus became a front (indeed, arguably one of the most his-
torically impor tant fronts) in a broader and still ongoing cultural negotia-
tion of the po liti cal entailments of materialism, I turn now to a set of 
questions that, at least at first, may seem far removed from  these antebel-
lum debates. This chapter explores Whitman’s relation to two strains 
of antebellum embodied thought— one liberal and one more radically 
materialist— both of which  were unstably conjoined within the American 
Spiritualist movement. Born in 1848, the Spiritualist movement rapidly 
gained popularity in the 1850s by propounding what it described as the 
first empirically grounded “religion of proof.” Drawing upon research into 
the role of electricity in the body, Spiritualist doctrine held that the  human 
soul is materially real— that it exists as a bioelectrical phenomenon— and 
that this material soul persists beyond the dissolution of the corporeal body, 
guaranteeing the immortality of the discrete, individual self. Thus though 
Spiritualism was not chiefly concerned with questions of racial difference, 
Spiritualist orthodoxy was like racist science in this limited sense: it, too, 
articulates a materialism that  labors to preserve the integrity— that is, the 
boundedness and self- possession—of the liberal subject. As this chapter 
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 will argue, however, the bioelectrical self that Spiritualism constructed was 
theoretically unstable. At odds with Spiritualist orthodoxy, Spiritualist 
practices of mediumship highlighted the bioelectrical self’s physiological 
receptivity— its vulnerability to ambient material influences including 
communications from other material spirits. The porous communicativ-
ity of the bioelectrical self thus threatened to belie rather than to immor-
talize the boundedness of the Spiritualist subject. As I  shall argue, this 
alternative, monistic, and open- ended bioelectrical self was an impor tant 
inspiration for Leaves of Grass.
Whitman’s relation to Spiritualism allows us to track the ways that bi-
ologism circulated through the antebellum cultural imagination beyond 
discourses explic itly associated with racial science. Panning out from the 
immediate fray of the debate over slavery and equality, this chapter focuses 
on the difficulties that the antebellum embodied subject posed to the fig-
ure of the liberal subject more generally, and to the demo cratic politics that 
subject sustains. As we  shall see,  these difficulties  were in some cases fi-
nessed or simply repressed whilst elsewhere they rise more immediately 
to the surface— perhaps nowhere more insistently, as I  shall suggest, than 
in Whitman’s groundbreaking antebellum poetry. The reading to follow 
begins by tracing Whitman’s inheritance from Spiritualism’s bioelectrical 
theology. I argue that the “body electric” that pulses at the center of his 
early poetry departs from Spiritualist orthodoxy, which distinguished the 
vulnerable earthly body from the indestructibly material soul, by instead 
conjuring a bioelectrical subject who is originally relational, granted iden-
tity not despite but  because of the body’s ner vous entanglement with the 
world. Whereas Spiritualism promised to square the messy dependencies 
of  human materiality with the transcendental integrity of the liberal indi-
vidual, on my reading Whitman’s poetry lays bare contradictions that are 
inherent to that proj ect.
Indeed, I argue that Whitman’s theory of ner vous entanglement not 
only informs his poetic topoi but moreover structures his theory of poetic 
communication. That is, I propose that in addition to its thematic promi-
nence in the early Leaves, the body electric furthermore provides the phil-
osophical ground from which Whitman developed what I describe as the 
uniquely “embodied poetics” of his highly experimental first volumes. This 
novel poetics emphasizes the physiology of poetic communication over and 
against poetry’s propositional content, challenging some of our most ba-
sic assumptions about what poems do and how they mean, as well as about 
the nature of the subjects between whom  those poems and meanings pass. 
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As we  shall see, Whitman’s embodied poetics ultimately stress the consti-
tutive indeterminacy of both the propositional poetic subject and the em-
bodied  human subject. Touting the body’s entanglement in a procreant 
“real ity . . . .  materialism first and last imbueing,” Whitman attempts to 
engender a wholly new poetry adequate to a cosmos thus monistically and 
pro cessually re imagined.1
In our pres ent critical moment, it is tempting to read Whitman’s po-
rous and pro cessual self through the lens of posthumanist and specifically 
new materialist models of the  human. Like Whitman’s,  these latter- day 
materialisms position the material body as a correction to the idealism of 
the liberal subject. But while this chapter  will acknowledge intriguing par-
allels where they arise, I  will ultimately suggest that Whitman’s material-
ism remains something distinct. On my reading, Whitman’s bioelectrical 
subject confronts us with the failure of attempts— both by antebellum era 
movements like Spiritualism and by posthumanist theory  today—to rec-
oncile the pro cessual materialist body with a legibly liberal politics of 
demo cratic pluralism. For Whitman’s bioelectrical self is fi nally so spec-
tacularly indistinguishable from the cosmos that flows through his ner vous 
body (plastically “quivering [him] to a new identity”) that it is impossible 
to assign content— that is, anything like a stable meaning or essential 
identity—to this subject. To be sure, Whitman does not always acknowl-
edge, let alone embrace, the effacement of identity that his poetry enacts. 
Nonetheless, as I hope to demonstrate, the erosion of personal particularity 
in his work is inescapable, at once glaring and programmatic, arising at the 
level of both form and content in the early Leaves.
In its final movement, then, this chapter turns from the poetics of Whit-
manian embodiment to consider the racial politics that this unidentifiable 
bioelectrical body encodes. Returning to the infamous slave auction scene 
in “I Sing the Body Electric,” I show how Whitman’s bioelectrical ontol-
ogy gives rise to a highly idiosyncratic defense of racial equality that leaves 
the basic premises of liberal individuality and equality  behind. If Whitman’s 
materialism generates a power ful vision of racial unity  here, its egalitarian-
ism nonetheless bears  little resemblance to the individualistic and pluralistic 
demo cratic politics that we conventionally attribute to his work— and that 
Whitman, himself, claimed to celebrate. As I argue, the tension between 
Whitman’s pro cessual bodies and the more conventionally liberal politics of 
mainstream antislavery discourse resurfaces in con temporary calls for a 
more radically pluralistic posthumanist democracy  today, raising questions 
about the racial politics implicit in the posthumanist proj ect. I  will turn to 
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 those questions, investigating the friction between posthumanism’s fluid 
ontology and its recognizably liberal politics, in Chapter 4.
God Vibrations: The Bioelectrical Soul in Theory and Practice
In his 1860 review of On the Origin of the Species, Asa Gray confesses that 
the unraveling of liberal selfhood haunts midcentury science. Anticipat-
ing that many readers  will find Darwin’s theory objectionable  because it 
conjoins  human races and ultimately “makes the  whole world kin,” Gray 
points out that this unifying vision nonetheless harmonizes with the pre-
vailing currents of modern scientific thought.  After all, he observes, the 
“princi ple triumphs” of modern science “have consisted in tracing connec-
tions where none  were known before, in reducing heterogeneous phenom-
ena to a common cause or origin, in a manner quite analogous to that of 
the reduction of supposed in de pen dently originated species to a common 
ultimate origin.” Indeed, Gray continues, the “scientific mind” now “con-
templates the solar system as evolved from a common, revolving fluid 
mass . . .  has come to regard light, heat, electricity, magnetism, chemi-
cal affinity, and mechanical power as va ri e ties or derivative and convert-
ible forms of one force . . .  and . . .  speculates steadily in the  direction 
of the ultimate unity of  matter.”2 However much Darwin’s vision of spe-
ciological unity “discomposes us,” then, Gray warns that our preference 
for separateness, difference, and hierarchy voices a doomed re sis tance 
to the model of physical real ity that nineteenth- century science was 
progressively unveiling: that of a monistic cosmos unified by a fretwork 
of past and ongoing material interrelations that belie categorical dis-
tinctions between races, species, and ultimately even between physical 
bodies.
If it was obvious to Gray that modern scientific materialism was poised 
to engulf white racial— and ultimately  human— exceptionalism in one vast, 
monistic soup, not all antebellum materialists concurred with this projec-
tion. Darwin’s polygenist and monogenist detractors obviously understood 
themselves to be giving an empirical account of real ity and so, too, did 
antebellum Spiritualism, the movement to which I turn in this chapter. As 
I  shall argue, Spiritualism’s distinctive brand of materialism forms an 
impor tant cultural context for Leaves of Grass: in addition to popularizing 
the divinized “body electric” that would prove so powerfully inspiring to 
Whitman, Spiritualist discourse  housed two contradictory views of mate-
rialism whose tensions help to illuminate the complex role of embodiment 
in Whitman’s work.
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Officially, Spiritualist doctrine espoused a kind of onto- theology that 
held that spirits are empirically real (comprised of bioelectricity) and that 
promised that we persist as materially embodied and autonomously indi-
vidual spirits beyond the grave. In practice, as we  shall see, the communi-
cative per for mances associated with Spiritualism—in which mediums 
claimed to channel spirits and speak in the voices of the dead— point to a 
very dif fer ent conception of the bioelectrical self, flaunting its suscepti-
bility to external forces and the porosity of the border between one self 
and another. The vulnerability and fungibility of the bioelectrical self 
in Spiritualist mediumship was thus at odds with the discretely bounded 
individualism of the bioelectrical soul espoused in Spiritualist doctrine. 
In this opposition, Spiritualist doctrine bears a structural resemblance 
to antebellum racist science’s re sis tance to Darwinian monogenism 
in that it, too, framed a materialist account of the  human that worked 
to defend the figure of the liberal subject against encroachment from 
more radically conjunctive materialisms. Ultimately, Spiritualism’s in-
ternal contradictions make it a particularly vivid example of just how 
uncertain materialism’s relation to liberal individualism was in this 
moment.
Unfolding in proximate relation to “professional” science (the prior 
chapter should give some indication of how tenuous such borders  were in 
this era), the American Spiritualist movement  rose to popularity in the 
1850s promulgating what it described as a rigorously scientific “religion 
of proof.” Its ostensibly empirical theology centered on the uniquely 
ambivalent substance of electricity, that invisible yet material stuff that 
“sparks” the body into life. Indeed, despite de cades of empirical investiga-
tion, electricity remained at midcentury a phenomenon stubbornly resis-
tant to scientific disenchantment.3 Stymied by its oscillation between object 
and event, materiality and impalpability, chemists dubbed it an “imponder-
able fluid,” and since the late eigh teenth  century, when its role in galvaniz-
ing the ner vous system was first experimentally established, bioelectricity 
had inspired a series of popu lar therapeutic movements, including mesmer-
ism and phrenology. When it first arose in 1848, then, Spiritualism was the 
latest face of what was already a vibrant constellation of bohemian bioelec-
trical movements.4 Drawing upon both scientific and peri- scientific dis-
courses, Spiritualism proclaimed electricity the missing link between the 
ineffable  human spirit and its effable body. As one phrenologist put it, bio-
electricity revealed the “godlike department of our nature reduced to 
DEMONSTRABLE CERTAINTY”: it furnished, in short, the perceptible 
 matter of the soul.5
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Spiritualists stressed the scientism of their faith, confident that the mea-
sur able materiality of bioelectricity would soon lead scientists to verify 
the empirical real ity of the spiritual world. Arguing that mind “is a sub-
stance—an ele ment—as  really so as air or  water,” they insisted that the 
body’s electrical mechanisms furnish “sensuous evidence” of the soul.6 In-
deed, the soul was so utterly substantial in Spiritualist discourse that 
questions like “how much does a soul weigh?”  were seriously entertained 
while traditional theological teachings about the “immateriality of the 
spirit”  were roundly dismissed as “the most consummate nonsense.”7 Spir-
itualists thus took pains to distinguish their own rationalist theology 
from what they saw as the baseless mysticism of other religions. As the 
movement’s first major codifier, Andrew Jackson Davis, protested, “If men 
do not consult Nature and Reason, and ‘try the spirits’ by the rigid righ-
teousness of  those immutable princi ples . . .  there can not be any limits set 
to the wild fanat i cism and superstitious absurdities into which the honest 
seekers  after truth and spirituality  will not as suredly plunge themselves.”8 
What ever  else Spiritualism may have been— a theatrical entertainment, 
profitable quackery, a program for consoling the bereaved—it was also a 
site of metaphysical speculation, propounding the materiality of the spirit 
and, conversely, the intrinsic spirituality of  matter.
One of the specific attractions of Spiritualism’s fusion of science and reli-
gion was its claim to have reconciled the dispiriting facts of  human material-
ity with continued faith in the individual’s transcendent autonomy. Whereas 
other biologisms seemed to sentence the self to contingency by suggesting 
that our minds and moral characters are merely by- products of the bodies 
we are born with, the bioelectrical soul allowed Spiritualism to conceive 
of identity as the expression of a spirit that is in de pen dent of the corporeal 
body (just like the classically Christian soul) and yet demonstrably mate-
rial nonetheless. This compromise funded Spiritualism’s chief consola-
tory promise: that heaven and the afterlife are just as real and materially 
substantial as our spirits. Thus Andrew Jackson Davis taught that death 
does not spell the end of the body nor of individual subjectivity but rather 
works as a kind of “cleansing pro cess” that purifies our earthly bodies of 
“their transient imperfections.” On this embodied account, death looks 
less like a miraculous translation from one ontological state (flesh) into 
one wholly other (spirit) and more like an accelerated form of evolution 
that instantaneously perfects each individual body according to what 
Jackson characterized as a “beautiful . . .  law of pro gress.”9
In her best- selling Spiritualist novel, The Gates Ajar (1868), Elizabeth 
Stuart Phelps paints a vivid picture of this embodied heaven populated by 
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immortal yet fully material individuals. Bereaved by the death of her  brother, 
the novel’s heroine, Mary Cabot, finds no solace in her minister’s account of 
the afterlife as a state in which all individuality melts away, bearing off with 
it all “selfish affections” such as love for one’s  family to leave only a bliss that 
“glow[s] with holy love alike to all other holy hearts.”10 Mary’s Spiritualist 
preceptor, Aunt Winifred Forceythe, shudders at this vision of spiritual 
communion, objecting that it “would destroy individuality at one fell 
swoop. We should be like a man walking down a room lined with mirrors, 
who sees himself reflected in all sizes, colors, shades, at all  angles and in all 
proportions . . .  til he seems no longer to belong to himself.”11 “The truth 
is,” she concludes, “the ordinary idea [of heaven], if sifted accurately, re-
duces our eternal personality to— gas.”12 What Phelps’s characters find un-
acceptable in orthodox Christian doctrine, then, is the prospect of a spiritual 
existence that annihilates the liberal self, dissolving her into a “ great blank 
ocean” of celestial community “which  shall swallow up, in a pitiless, glorified 
way, all the  little brooks of our delight.”13 By contrast, the  great appeal of 
Spiritualist theology for  these characters is its promise that, since “the spiri-
tual body is real, is tangible, is vis i ble, is  human,” we  shall therefore still very 
much “be ourselves in heaven,” retaining all of our personal affections ( those 
“ little brooks of our delight”) and our private possessions— including, most 
importantly, the par tic u lar and particularizing bodily “sizes, colors, shades” 
that encode our (gendered and racial) identities and that allow us, Aunt 
Forceythe suggests, to belong to ourselves.14 Indeed, Aunt Winifred trium-
phantly insists that we  shall even continue to live in private  houses with our 
nuclear families— both of which, she confesses,  will undergo “many differ-
ences and  great ones” in the pro cess of purification, yet ultimately  will re-
main recognizably “mine just the same.”15 In place of a gaseous oneness with 
God, Aunt Forceythe’s Spiritualist afterlife looks more like the idealized 
brochure for a new suburban community, promising every thing the liberal 
individual’s possessive heart had ever desired in life.16
Spiritualism’s materialist reconceptualization of the soul thus allowed 
it to guarantee the integrity of liberal personhood even  after the decom-
position of the mortal body. In this specific sense, Spiritualist materialism 
echoes racist science in that both offer their adherents an embodied ac-
count of the  human that si mul ta neously works to preserve the singularity 
and autonomy of the liberal subject. For the many Spiritualists who also 
identified as abolitionists, as well as for Spiritualist prac ti tion ers of color, 
the similarity likely stopped  there: unlike racist materialism, Spiritualist 
materialism did not propose that only some (white, male) persons qualify 
as truly ensouled or autonomous.
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But if it was not systematically racist, neither was Spiritualism program-
matically antiracist. Indeed, despite deep cultural connections to the 
abolitionist and feminist movements, many prominent Spiritualists did 
suggest that the bioelectrical soul was most fully developed in the white 
race. Thus, for instance, Andrew Jackson Davis asserted that the phe-
nomenon of Spiritual communication (the practice in which a Spiritualist 
medium, endowed with exceptionally refined powers of ner vous “receptiv-
ity,” channels electromagnetic transmissions from the spirit realm, speak-
ing for the dead) first emerged in the mid– nineteenth  century  because it 
was only just then enabled by the evolutionary advancement of the white 
race. As Davis argued, the “miracles and spiritual disclosures of this era 
flow naturally and consequently from the state of  mental and moral develop-
ment to which the Anglo- Saxon portion of the  human race has generally 
attained.”17 In light of a statement like this, Spiritualism’s individualistic 
afterlife (complete with gendered and raced bodies, domestic spaces, and 
nuclear  family units), stands out more clearly as a markedly conservative 
vision— a rejection of the undifferentiated communalism of the “gaseous” 
afterlife Phelps’s characters deplore. Indeed, Davis proclaimed that heaven 
is in fact partitioned into six hierarchical socie ties, “each being character-
ized by a dif fer ent race of spirits . . .  in dif fer ent stages of moral culture,” 
and by the late 1860s Spiritualist cartographies uniformly mapped 
heaven as a racially partitioned space in which “ every race and nation . . . 
enjoyed its own unique heaven peculiarly suited to its individual needs 
and desires.”18 If Phelps’s heaven seems like a suburban paradise, Davis’s 
shared the dream of segregation that would fund the suburbanization of 
Amer i ca a  century  later.
As individualistic as this doctrine seems, however, Spiritualism’s bio-
electrical self was also a philosophically unstable entity. Much like the par-
adoxically insubstantial electrical substance that inspires it, the Spiritualist 
subject oscillates between singularity and diffusion thanks to the inher-
ently communicative function of bioelectricity. This instability was spec-
tacularly on display in the practice of Spiritualist mediumship, which was 
the movement’s main means of demonstrating its bioelectrical faith and 
recruiting converts from audiences who arrived by turns skeptical and 
curious. As Davis explains, spirit communications are made pos si ble by the 
fact that we exude a “general electric atmosphere,” breathing our spiritual 
electricity into the space around us like a cloud of perfume. When the mind 
is properly relaxed, “ these electrical ele ments flow down from the brain 
into the nerves, and into all the infinite ramifications of the nerves, and 
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thence into the atmosphere which we breathe,” generating a uniquely re-
fined electrical field “through which communications [between souls] can 
be made.”19 In the event of communication, the medium conducts the elec-
trical emanations of another soul into his or her own body, allowing that 
soul to speak and even act through the medium’s ner vous cir cuits.
The Spiritualist medium, then, conjures a very dif fer ent view of the bio-
electrical self. Unlike the corporeally defined and possessive Spiritualist 
subject whom Davis and Phelps proj ect into heaven, the Spiritualist me-
dium is chiefly distinguished by her capacity for ner vous receptivity and 
sympathetic affinity: porous and possessed, she is a conduit of sympathetic 
connection with souls not her own. The fluidity of identity modeled by 
Spiritualist mediums injected the movement with radical tendencies not 
legible within its conservative account of a bounded and individualistic af-
terlife. Thus, for instance, in what Molly McGarry describes as the 
“amorphous sexual matrix” opened up by the practice of mediumship, Spir-
itualist men and  women  were  free to perform other genders in ways cor-
rosive to the strictures of mid- century gender ideology. Spiritualist séances 
and demonstrations provided a sanctioned space in which Spiritualist prac-
ti tion ers could “reimagine their gender through practices ranging from 
cross- dressing to defying the vocal ranges equated with sexual differ-
ence.”20 For female mediums in particular— often young and poor— this 
license to command an audience and speak in the tongue and tones of dead 
presidents afforded unpre ce dented access to a public authority other wise 
forbidden to them in both church and state. Indeed, Spiritualism was 
closely associated with the feminist movement: as Anne Braude notes, 
“While not all feminists  were Spiritualists, all Spiritualists advocated 
 women’s rights.”21
But if mediumship allowed  women to performatively lay claim to the 
“masculine” virtues of liberal agency and autonomy, the impor tant point 
 here is that it did so by spotlighting the fictionality of that liberal self. In 
this sense, Spiritualist feminism is a curiously double- edged sword, inso-
far as mediumship enabled female prac ti tion ers to assert a liberal auton-
omy via a practice that tacitly gainsaid it. Beyond sanctioning trans- gender 
and cross- class per for mances, then, the larger unorthodoxy of Spiritual 
mediumship inheres in its public demonstration of a bioelectrical self whose 
borders are permeable and whose subjectivity is curiously multiple— 
sympathetic, affiliative, and uncannily networked with other minds. Instead 
of conferring individual identity (as Phelps imagines that our distinctive 
bodily “sizes, colors, shades . . .  and proportions” do), the medium’s 
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nerve- riddled body is the site of bioelectrical exchanges that attenuate in-
dividual identity, capitulate autonomy, and blur the boundary between 
subjects. Along  these lines, John Lardas Modern describes the Spiritualist 
subject as someone who is alternately “in control yet susceptible to  human 
influences, both past and pres ent,” and in this way uncertainly poised be-
tween contingency and autonomy, “docility and freedom.”22 Similarly, 
Stephanie LeMenager has shown how the bioelectrical body’s susceptibility 
was also understood to extend to climatic influences, which Spiritualists 
believed could variously enhance or hinder conductivity between spirits, 
vitalizing or vitiating the bioelectrical self. As LeMenager notes, this cli-
mactically tuned Spiritualist subject seems perpetually at risk of dissolving 
“within a network of energetic actors” in the “atmospheric soup” of the 
environment.23
Thus, while Spiritualism’s main selling point was its claim to have suc-
cessfully fused corporeal materiality, liberal individuality, and Christian 
immortality, the bioelectrical subject who effected this  grand détente si-
mul ta neously seemed to belie the model of selfhood it stood for. As the 
critics above suggest, the sympathetic susceptibility and communicative-
ness that characterize the bioelectrical self light up an invisible dimension 
of embodied being, extending selfhood beyond the border of our electri-
cally conductive skin. In this way, Spiritualist discourse generated two con-
tradictory visions of self and world: a recognizably liberal- individualist 
one, in which the bioelectrical soul guarantees the per sis tence of individ-
ual identity  after death and heaven is a segregated space; and a monistic 
one, in which the bioelectrical soul blurs the bounds of identity and the 
universe is materially interconnected.
That this internal contradiction does not seem to have troubled Spiri-
tualist discourse may be attributable to the fact that both versions of the 
bioelectrical self seem to agree upon its central revelation of humanity’s 
empirically super natural nature. And yet the logics of transcendence un-
derpinning  these two visions are philosophically quite distinct. For Spiri-
tualist expositors like Davis and Phelps, the supernaturalism of bioelectricity 
derives from the occult nature of electricity itself, poised as it was between 
thingy materiality and celestial imponderability. Thus, glossing Saint Paul’s 
assertion that “ There is a natu ral body, and  there is a spiritual body,” Da-
vis explains that, indeed, “the spiritual body is a substance” that is moved 
by “a fine force” or spirit that “flows through [the] nerve- sensations.” In 
short, for Davis, the ethereality of bioelectricity (the rarified fineness of 
its “force”) allows it to occupy two ontological statuses (material and spir-
itual) at once, thereby manifesting the  human body’s inherently other-
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   106 11/1/17   11:57 AM
Bioelectricity and the Prob lem of  Human Meaning 107
worldly endowment: “the invisible presence of the Divine in the vis i ble 
 human.”24
By contrast, as I have suggested, the practice of spiritual mediumship 
foregrounds a rather dif fer ent conception of bioelectricity’s transcenden-
talism. (Ostensibly) demonstrating the bioelectrical subject’s suscepti-
bility to external forces—to “ human influences, both past and pres ent” as 
well as to atmospheric influences in the nonhuman environment— the 
spectacle of spiritual communication highlights both the ner vous self’s 
permeability and its extension beyond the bounds of its skin. But though 
the latter version of bioelectrical transcendentalism therefore contends 
that our beings are not wholly contained in our bodies, it does not 
explic itly insist upon being’s supernaturalism. Charles Taylor’s distinc-
tion between “enchanted” (ensouled) and “buffered” (secular) selves is 
helpful for drawing out this discrepancy. On Taylor’s description, the 
peculiar quality of “enchantment” that the concept of the soul has tradi-
tionally named refers to the idea that  there is some aspect of  human 
being that transcends the body and renders it susceptible to super natural 
forces beyond  human ken or command.25 Clearly, the Spiritualist me-
dium’s bioelectrical porosity bears a structural resemblance to Taylor’s 
enchanted self. This similarity, however, depends upon a conceptual 
sleight of hand, for the medium is susceptible to forces that are repre-
sented as material rather than super natural—he is affected by electrical 
emanations and climactic influences, manifesting the body’s porosity to 
a physical world that impinges on his senses at  every instant. Although 
 these material forces may be so vari ous and complex as to be practically 
incalculable, they are not, like super natural forces, essentially incalcula-
ble. This is, in other words, a transcendentalism that does not leave the 
realm of the natu ral world— bringing it closer to Asa Gray’s empirical 
vision of “the ultimate unity of  matter” than to Phelps’s and Davis’s 
Spiritualist accounts of an individualistic afterlife. Indeed, in stark con-
trast to Phelps’s disdain for “gaseous” communion, this monistic ten-
dency within Spiritualist practice ultimately envisions us as part of a 
vast embodied commons, or what Robert Cox calls a “social physiology,” 
in which all bodies are woven “into the fiber of a sympathetically united 
nation in precisely the same way that the nerves, organs, and tissues 
 were integrated within the organic body.”26 At odds with Spiritualism’s 
doctrinal commitments to the possessive and autonomous liberal self, 
then, the bioelectrical physics of mediumship threatened to explode this 
integral subject by rendering it fi nally indistinguishable from a larger 
and fluidly networked material world.
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The Poet as Ner vous Medium
Spiritualism’s transcendental materialism and adhesive individualism  were 
attractive to Whitman and are impor tant contexts for his thinking about 
embodiment and sexuality.27 The movement’s influence on the early Leaves 
of Grass is particularly unmistakable in Whitman’s unorthodox assertions 
of the body’s divinity. “If the body  were not the soul, what is the soul?” he 
demands. Although he treats this as a rhetorical question, the burden of 
explanation is obviously Whitman’s. In prefatory notes for the first edi-
tion of Leaves, he offers an initial defense of this statement, writing:
We hear of miracles, but . . .  tell me then, if you can, what is  there in 
the immortality of the soul more than this spiritual and beautiful 
miracle of sight? . . . .  I open two pairs of lids, only as big as peach pits, 
when lo! the unnamable variety and whelming splendor of the world 
come to me . . .  though rocks are dense and hills are ponderous, and 
the stars are away off sextillions of miles.28
This note can read as a familiar enough defense of the won ders of the 
 human body: sight instantaneously ferries “ponderous” objects across even 
cosmic distances in order to reveal mountains and starlight to us. In his 
1802 Natu ral Theology (required reading when Thoreau was at Harvard), 
William Paley famously points to the intricacy of the eye as evidence that 
it, along with the rest of nature, must have been purposively designed, thus 
proving the existence of God. (Indeed, the intuitive force of Paley’s argu-
ment was such that in, 1860,  after publishing the treatise that would ring 
natu ral theology’s death knell, Darwin confessed to Asa Gray, “The eye 
to this day gives me a cold shudder.”)29 In drawing our attention to the mar-
vel of eyesight, then, Whitman might be making a Paleyan claim, point-
ing to the phenomenon of sight as empirical proof of the body’s divine 
origin.
By the time this note made its way into the preface to the first edition 
of Leaves of Grass (1855), however, Whitman had refined his characteriza-
tion of sight’s miraculous nature. In the preface, he observes,
What is marvelous? what is unlikely? what is impossible or baseless or 
vague?  after you have once just opened the space of a peachpit . . .  and 
had all  things enter with electric swiftness softly and duly and without 
confusion or jostling or jam.30
Whitman’s restatement clarifies that it is not the fact of sight that impresses 
him ( isn’t it amazing that we can see?) but more specifically sight’s bioelec-
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trical physiology that he finds so improbable: in the moment of percep-
tion, “ things enter” the eye “with electric swiftness,” inscribing impressions 
on the ner vously receptive body. For Whitman, then,  there is something 
distinctly miraculous— “marvelous,” “unlikely,” “baseless or vague”— about 
the way the body’s bioelectrical mechanisms render us permeable, reveal-
ing our physiological porosity to “all  things.”
As we have seen, Whitman was hardly alone at midcentury in discern-
ing something tantalizingly like “the immortality of the soul” vouchsafed 
by ner vous electricity. More specifically, we are now in a position to note 
how Whitman’s account of the bioelectrical soul echoes the earth- bound 
transcendentalism implicit in the Spiritualist practice of mediumship, and 
at odds with Spiritualist orthodoxy. It is,  after all, not the inherent divin-
ity of electricity but the bioelectrical body’s permeability— its ability to 
reach beyond itself and to be, in turn, suffused by  things not itself— that 
elicits Whitman’s won der and prompts his conclusion that the body is en-
chanted, itself a soul. Again, as I have argued, this gloss of transcendental-
ism involves an elision or misdirection insofar as it asks us to substitute 
the body’s ner vous porosity to material forces for the susceptibility to 
super natural forces that has historically distinguished the enchanted self. 
Insofar as the former state can be called transcendental, the susceptibility 
it names delivers us not into an electro- spiritual afterlife but rather into a 
physiologically conjoined cosmos, disclosing a self suffused not by the im-
manent presence of the divine so much as by the immanent presence of 
the world— a vast yet mundane communion.
To be sure, Whitman  will also inherit Spiritualism’s contradictions, 
most spectacularly displayed in the way his speaking persona veers between 
egotistical particularity and impersonal collectivity— occasionally in the 
same breath (“Walt Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, a kosmos”). 
The reading I  will be offering  here, however, proposes that Leaves of Grass 
programmatically foregrounds the latter. That is, despite Whitman’s claim 
to have been “the poet of the self,” I submit that his poetry consistently 
foregrounds the self’s dispossession and identity’s constant dissolution, cel-
ebrating the ways in which the ner vous system’s sensuous receptivity 
interpellates us within a vast network of earthly communication and 
embodied sociality. In this section I  will examine key moments in which 
the early Leaves thematizes bodily porosity and the dissolution of individ-
ual identity, and I  will suggest how reading  these moments in light of 
midcentury bioelectrical discourse can usefully expand and reinflect our 
discussions of sexuality in Whitman’s work. In the following section, I ex-
plore how Whitman’s interest in bioelectricity shows up not only at the 
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   109 11/1/17   11:57 AM
110 Bioelectricity and the Prob lem of  Human Meaning
level of content but moreover in his signature poetic forms, and in what I 
describe as the embodied poetics that give rise to  those forms. Across both 
sections I  shall argue that if Spiritualism’s popularity in the early 1850s sup-
plied Whitman with the trope of the body electric and of the sanctified 
physical body, its shadowy strain of monistic materialism was decisive for 
Whitman’s thinking about both the ontology of the self and the ontology 
of poetry.
Just as Spiritualism’s bioelectrical body wavered between autonomy and 
dispossession, transcendence and susceptibility, so too does Whitman’s 
bioelectrical self pulse in and out of formlessness. This oscillation forms 
the crux of one of the most haunting passages of “Song of Myself.” The 
uncharacteristic brutality of this passage accentuates the threat that bio-
electrical embodiment poses to liberal personhood. “Mine is no callous 
shell,” it begins:
I have instant conductors all over me  whether I pass or stop,
They seize  every object and lead it harmlessly through me. . . .  
Is this then a touch? . . . .  quivering me to a new identity
Flames and ether making a rush for my veins,
Treacherous tip of me reaching and crowding to help them,
My flesh and blood playing out lightning, to strike what is hardly
dif fer ent from myself 
On all sides prurient provokers stiffening my limbs. . . .  
The sentries desert  every other part of me,
They have left me helpless to a red marauder,
They all come to the headland to witness and assist against me.
I am given up by traitors;
I talk wildly . . . .  I have lost my wits . . . .  I and nobody  else am the
greatest traitor, 
I went myself first to the headland . . . .  my own hands carried me  there.
This violent scene is generally read as depicting a sexual encounter, and crit-
ics have been divided as to  whether that encounter is homoerotic or auto-
erotic. In his masterful reading of this passage, Mark Maslan argues for 
their indifference. As he points out, mid- nineteenth- century sexual hygiene 
lit er a ture routinely figured sexual desire as an external force that invades 
and overmasters unwary men. On Maslan’s reading, this passage draws out a 
conclusion implicit but unacknowledged in that lit er a ture: namely, that 
“when men’s masturbatory and heterosexual urges are defined as forms of 
surrender to an invading force, all male desire begins to look homoerotic.”31
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Without detracting from this account of Whitman’s “audacious mold-
ing” of hygienic theory into queer desire, we might nonetheless consider 
what happens to this passage when we take its accusation against “villain 
touch” more literally. That is, if we read this passage as a complaint not 
against sexual desire specifically so much as against the fact of sensuous-
ness more generally, its narrative of incursion and ravishment begins to 
read differently. Spotlighting how our ner vous physiology renders all sensa-
tion a form of penetration—as nerves “seize  every object” they encounter, 
shepherding them into our bodies via storms of bioelectrical “lighting”— 
the passage draws our attention to the impossibility of self- sovereignty in 
light of the manifest un- callousness of our shells. The speaker’s panic in the 
face of this incursion is that of a liberal subject who has presumed the integ-
rity of his physiological borders and his absolute possession of the body 
they delimit. Hence he experiences the mundane physiology of touch as a 
radical betrayal— not only is he susceptible to this “red marauder” of sen-
sation but worse, it is aided and abetted by the “treacherous tip” of his 
own sensuously receptive skin— which he now finds does not act as a border 
or islanding “headland” at all, but rather as an  eager network of “instant 
conductors.”
On this reading, onanism would be exactly the wrong way to think of 
this scene, since its larger point is that self- stimulation is structurally un-
avoidable given our ner vous architecture: in  every waking moment, our 
senses are working to arouse and provoke us. Indeed, more broadly, I worry 
that to gloss the invading force  here as specifically sexual, as distinct from 
sensual, in nature risks minimizing or missing entirely the polemic against 
the liberal self this passage other wise encodes. For whereas the discourse 
on sexuality stresses object choice and is directed  toward typological iden-
tification, sensuality is indiscriminate and (as this passage luridly illus-
trates) belies our individuation. Thus though we might be tempted (as the 
speaker initially was) to view this scene of overmastery as a threat to be 
resisted, the passage ultimately instructs us to accept that dispossession is 
a feature inherent to bioelectrical subjectivity  because the body is a sensi-
tive medium of communication and change. “I and nobody  else am the 
greatest traitor”: for Whitman, to be a ner vously embodied self is to tes-
tify, involuntarily (of course) and at all times, against the doctrine of indi-
vidual autonomy and identity.
But while this passage exposes the fiction of autonomy, unlike more recent 
denunciations of the liberal subject (such as  those coming out of decon-
struction, posthumanism, and affect theory), its mood is not strictly cel-
ebratory. Instead, the vio lence of Whitman’s imagery and anxiety of his 
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speaker task us to acknowledge the sacrifice this shift in outlook entails. 
To be sure, as we have also seen with Spiritualist mediumship, the porosity 
of bioelectrical embodiment works to re unite self and world in a single 
system of continuous mutual exchange (hence our speaker  here finds that 
his senses “strike what is hardly dif fer ent from myself”). But if the bioelec-
trical body therefore stands to release us from the burden of singularity, 
relieving our sense of alienation from the world, by the same token it also 
threatens to do away with our sense of being anyone in par tic u lar at all. 
For although Whitman admires that sensations move through us “harm-
lessly,” he also makes clear that they are not without consequence. To the 
contrary, sensuous perception materially alters this speaker, “quivering 
[him] to a new identity.” Indeed, since  there is no disembodied soul to serve 
as a separate locus of identity in the version of bioelectrical embodiment 
Whitman invokes, all material alterations to the body therefore constitute 
changes at the level of being.32 More pointedly, then, if  every sensuous per-
ception is a touch, and  every touch quivers us to a new identity, then in 
what sense can we— inscribed and revised by each passing experience— 
still lay claim to something like an identity at all? If this scene feels like a 
rape, it is  because of its attention to the vio lence its monistic ontology does 
to the speaker’s sense of selfhood. Brought face to face with his suscepti-
bility to the world and the continuous existential renovation embodied ex-
perience wreaks, this speaker becomes, like his identity, incoherent: “I 
talk wildly . . . .  I have lost my wits . . . .” Indeed it would seem that talking 
wildly is inevitable now since the no longer tenable fiction of a self- 
representing “I” has been displaced by a babbling bioelectrical “we”— I, 
my hands, their nerves, villain touch, and the “red marauder” of sensation 
that tethers me to other bodies “hardly dif fer ent from myself.” If the po-
rosity of embodiment gains us the world, this passage observes that it also 
costs us that  thing we have heretofore known as the self.
Indeed, across the pages of Leaves, embodied selves and other objects 
freely dissolve and coalesce again in Whitman’s intermittently liquefying 
gaze, enumerated in one moment and in the next proving composite or 
dispersed beyond recognition. Individual bodies are ramified by all that 
exists around them: you are “your person and  every particle that relates to 
your person.”33 And  these horizontal relations of association and interac-
tion also extend longitudinally across time, as Whitman indicates when 
he describes himself as an index of the earth’s entire history: “Before I was 
born out of my  mother generations guided me, / My embryo has never been 
torpid. . . .  For it the nebula cohered to an orb. . . .  Monstrous sauroids 
transported it in their mouths and deposited it with care.”34 Moreover, he 
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also understands each  thing to be an index of every thing that  will unfold 
from its body  after its death: “I effuse my flesh in eddies and drift it in lacy 
jags / I bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love, / If you 
want me again look for me  under your bootsoles.”35 Despite the presence 
of nouns and proper names, then, Whitman’s bodies are perpetually in 
transit— processual, ongoing— and thus belie any name we would give 
them. In Michael Warner’s acutely succinct words, Whitman “makes the 
phenomenology of selfing a mess.”36
Despite the continuous transformations implicit in its pro cessual on-
tology, however, Leaves  will not sustain the elegiac awareness of self- loss it 
registers in the vio lence of the foregoing long passage. More commonly 
Whitman is, like his posthumanist counter parts, optimistic that the body’s 
integration with the world does not entail the dispossession of the self so 
much as its heroic dilation. Perhaps Whitman’s most ecstatic articulation 
of this thought comes at the very outset of Leaves, in the poetics he lays 
out in the 1855 preface.  Here Whitman defines the poet as a particularly 
talented medium, someone who can make himself a channel of the  whole 
nation, conducting the panoply of its influences into his receptive and 
plastic body:
The American poets are to enclose old and new for Amer i ca is the race 
of races. . . .  he gives them reception . . .  he incarnates [his nation’s] 
geography and natu ral life and rivers and lakes. Mississippi with 
annual freshets and changing chutes, Missouri and Columbia and 
Ohio and St. Lawrence with the falls and the beautiful masculine 
Hudson, do not embouchure where they spend themselves more than 
they embouchure into him. . . .  When the long Atlantic coast stretches 
longer and the Pacific coast stretches longer he easily stretches with 
them north or south. . . .  On him rise solid growths that offset the 
growths of pine and cedar and hemlock and liveoak and locust and 
chestnut . . .  with flights and songs and screams that answer  those 
of the wildpigeon and highhold and orchard oriole and coot and 
surf- duck. . . .  To him the hereditary countenance descends both 
 mother’s and  father’s. To him enter the essences of the real  things and 
past and pres ent events—of the enormous diversity of temperature 
and agriculture and mines— the tribes of red aborigines . . .  the first 
settlements north or south— the rapid stature and muscle— the 
haughty defiance of ’76 . . .  the wharf hem’d cities and superior 
marine . . .  the  free commerce— the fisheries and whaling and 
 gold- digging— the endless gestation of new states. . . .  For such the 
expression of the American poet is to be transcendent and new. . . .  
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[He] sees the solid and beautiful forms of the  future where  there are 
now no solid forms.37
No ordinary pa norama, this cata log collects sights that ostensibly enter the 
poet’s body and transform him, so that it is the poet, not his poem, that 
ultimately “incarnates” this landscape.38 Whitman’s preface thus breaks 
with the oracular tradition of Romantic poetics that preceded him, and that 
cast the poet as a visionary who prophetically sees through the material 
world to lay bare “the soul of the  thing” (Emerson), unveiling the “spirit 
of its form” (Shelley).39 Leaning on the bioelectrical body, Whitman reimag-
ines poetic perception as an event in which the poet does not see penetra-
tively through objects but is himself penetrated and inscribed by them. He 
does not write a  great poem; he is one.
And thus in the climax to his discourse on “the curious mystery of the 
eyesight” in the 1855 preface, Whitman promises that by reading his po-
etry we, too, can become embodied poems. “Read  these leaves in the open 
air  every season of  every year of your life,” he instructs, “and your very flesh 
 shall be a  great poem and have the richest fluency not only in its words but 
in the  silent lines of its lips and face and between the lashes of your eyes and 
in the very movement and joint of your body.”40 The fungibility of bodies 
and poems in Whitman’s thinking points to a broader translation between 
the poetics of embodiment I have been examining  here and what I  will call, 
in the next section, his embodied poetics. Although his suggestions that 
poetry impinges on a reader’s body directly have alternately been de-
nounced and embraced as pure “mysticism,” in the next section I  will ex-
plain why Whitman’s embodied poetics— with its per sis tent conflation of 
bodies and poems, and perversely counterfactual claims to be able to touch 
the bodies of its readers— must be understood in relation to the historically 
specific form of materialism propagated by midcentury bioelectrical dis-
course.41 Via the ner vous impressionability of the bioelectrical body, Whit-
man came to rethink poetry as a site, first and foremost, of haptic 
communication— a means of transferring not meanings but transformative 
physical effects via an intimate sensuous encounter called reading.
Causal Encounters: The Meaningless Intimacies  
of Embodied Poetics
Inspired by bioelectrical physiology, in the 1855 Leaves Whitman con-
structs a novel poetics— a new semiotic theory about what poetry is, how 
it communicates, and by extension, what kinds of  things subjects (as in per-
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sons and as in poetic propositions) are. As I  shall argue, this new poetics 
abjures poetry’s propositional subject in order to foreground its material-
ity as a medium of communication, and this inversion generates many of 
the idiosyncrasies typical of Whitman’s early style, including his penchant 
for deictics and second- person address, his strangely diffuse yet resolutely 
embodied persona, and his signature early form, the cata log. But more dis-
concertingly, I suggest, Whitman’s bioelectrical media theory also engen-
ders the eccentricity of his overt disdain for hermeneutics (“ these leaves 
conning you con at peril”) and his audacious renunciations of authorial in-
tent (“you  will hardly know who I am or what I mean”). Put simply then, 
I  will be tracing  here how the dissolution of the liberal subject we have just 
observed also entails, on Whitman’s bioelectrical theory, the dissolution 
of the subject— the meaning—of poetry.
To understand how bioelectrical discourse might have influenced Whit-
man’s sense of what poetry is and does, it  will first help to understand how 
Spiritualism’s onto- theology also functioned as a media theory. Through 
their popu lar (if perhaps spurious) demonstrations of bioelectrical commu-
nication (sometimes described as “spiritual telegraphy”), Spiritualist me-
diums drew attention to the material mechanisms by which thought is 
transmitted from one mind or soul to another. This aspect of Spiritualist 
theory is spelled out for us in the following excerpt from an editorial pub-
lished in Harper’s in April 1852, which, if skeptical about Spiritualism’s 
claim to communicate with the dead, is nonetheless persuaded by its bio-
electrical account of communication. As this editor explains,
Is not the communication from soul to soul literally, as well as 
figuratively, tele- graphic, that is, far- writing, or writing from afar? 
An identity might, perhaps, be shown in the very medium of 
 communication, so far as the pro cess has a material medium.  There is 
no difficulty, and no danger, in admitting that the electric fluid may be 
the agent in the ce re bral and organic transmission, as well as in the 
galvanic battery. . . .  The soul, by its own spiritual energy, first turns 
the emotion or feeling into a thought. It translates the thought from 
the abstract to the concrete, from the intuitional to the conceptive. It 
brings it down into the soul’s chamber of imagery, and imprints it on 
the brain. In other words, the message is reduced to writing and given 
to the clerk at the station- house, who translates it into telegraphic 
signals. The more immediate transmitting power is now set in 
operation. An influence is imparted from the brain to the nerves (or 
wires) of the vocal organs. It is continued to the lungs, and sets in 
motion a current of air. This impinges on the outward atmosphere, 
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and is carried on through successive undulations  until it reaches the 
other station for which it was designed. It enters the office- chamber of 
the ear, communicates with the other ce re bral battery, and then writes 
off from the auditory nerve or wire, the signals which, by the other 
logical and linguistic faculty, or the clerk at the second station, are 
translated into the pictorial symbols understood by all, and thus 
written on the second brain.42
According to this bioelectrical model of communication, thought is always 
materially instantiated. Originating when the “spiritual energy” of the soul 
converts a “feeling” or “intuitional” impulse (what we might now term an 
affect) into a “conceptive” piece of  mental “imagery,” thought is serially 
transposed: first it is “reduced to writing;” then it is “translate[d] into tele-
graphic signals” that shoot through the nerves; next it is translated by the 
vocal chords into “a current of air” (or, spoken language) and ferried 
through “the outward atmosphere,” at which point it begins the pro cess of 
reverse- translation into ner vous “signals” and thence into “pictorial sym-
bols” in the listener’s brain.
Two  things are particularly worth noting about the account of commu-
nication this editorial describes. The first is how its focus on the physiol-
ogy of transmission shifts our attention from hermeneutics to the haptics 
of language.  There is  little interest in anything like meaning, repre sen ta-
tion, or interpretation  here, and the serial translations this model entails 
(from “emotion” into “thought;” brain “imagery” into ner vous “writing;” 
and from  these “telegraphic signals” into spoken “currents of air;”  etc.) oc-
casion no concern about the distortion or loss of an original message. What 
counts as “understanding” or the achievement of “meaning”  here therefore 
shows up not as the product of an act of interpretation, but instead simply 
coincides with the closing of the communicative cir cuit: the message is 
successfully received when this series of energetic transfers arrests in the 
brain or soul of the listener.
The second  thing to notice about this account is how its bioelectrical 
model of communication effaces the difference between bodies and texts. 
According to its physics of information, thought is always materially in-
stantiated—as “pictorial symbols” in the brain, electrical “signals” in the 
nerves, “a current of air” on the lips, and rippling “undulations” in the at-
mosphere. And yet, as we have just seen, despite its emphasis on thought’s 
material embodiment, at no point does this account worry that informa-
tion is being lost, added, or simply reshaped by its translation from one 
medium to another. In her landmark study of informatics, N. Katherine 
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Hayles describes this indifference to medium specificity as the symptom 
of an outlook in which information has “lost its body.”43 But a more Whit-
manian way to put this might be to say that, on this account, bodies have 
become information: manifesting electrical “writing” in the states of its 
brain and nerves, this bioelectrical body is readable: a fleshy text.44
In this regard, the bioelectrical account of communication opens up 
fresh perspectives on Whitman’s habitual conflation of poems and persons, 
and on the distinctive (sometimes even aggressively presumptuous) erot-
ics this conflation lends to his theory of poetry. “Come closer to me. . . .  I 
pass so poorly with paper and types . . . .  I must pass with the contact of 
bodies and souls.”45 Through deftly misdirectional deictics and the un-
earned familiarity of second- person address, Leaves doggedly presses its 
body to us, interpellating us into an intimate encounter when we thought 
we  were reading alone. Whitman’s penchant for conflating poems with 
bodies, and reading with caressing, has been critically interpreted in a num-
ber of dif fer ent ways. To poststructuralist critics it has often seemed like 
an infuriating flaw, exposing an “archaic belief in the magical power of 
naming.”46 By contrast, ecocritics have recently embraced this “mysticism” 
as a laudably ecopoetical attempt to communicate the “unsaid and unsay-
able” essence of being without falling back on the anthropocentric biases 
of  human language.47 Alternatively again, queer theoretical readings have 
suggested that Whitman cannily courts the contradiction between lan-
guage and touch in order to generate rhetorical “intimacy- effects” that 
light up queer desire’s “world- making power” to unite “vast networks of 
virtual strangers” into a nation.”48 But even champions of Whitman’s coun-
terfactually embodied poems confess that while he might have wished to 
write poems that touch us, he was perfectly aware of “the impossibility of 
 doing so literally,” and thus they conclude that this gesture is best under-
stood as a kind of rhetorical trick (Michael Moon calls it “planned cata-
chresis”) designed to recruit our complicity in Whitman’s fantasies of 
physical immediacy.49 Along  these lines, Helen Vendler argues that Whit-
man wished to make reading “something closer to a blood transfusion or 
an infusion of semen,” although of course at best this dream could only 
exist as a speculatively “envisioned mutuality” between himself and his au-
dience.50 A poem obviously  can’t actually touch us; Whitman just wants 
us to think about bodies and their exquisite erotics, and in  doing so maybe 
cozen us into feeling aroused by an intimacy he can only pretend to be 
sharing with us.
As  we’ve just seen, however, from a bioelectrical perspective  there is 
nothing inherently mystical or meta phorical about the claim that reading 
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impinges on us physically: bioelectrically speaking, all communication is 
embodied. When Whitman complains that he “must pass with the con-
tact of bodies and souls,” he is therefore stating a bioelectrical truism: even 
our prosaic Harper’s editor agrees that linguistic communication “literally” 
involves physical contact between bodies and (embodied) minds or souls 
(“Is not the communication from soul to soul literally, as well as figura-
tively, tele- graphic, that is, far- writing, or writing from afar?”). By the 
same token, (and as this editor’s ambivalent formulation suggests), bioelec-
trical theory does not imagine that this embodied “communication from 
soul to soul” is the opposite of writing or any other ostensibly more medi-
ated mode of communication. For bioelectricity is itself a medium, and thus 
bioelectrical theory treats all touch as a kind of inscription. By contrast to 
poststructuralist logic, then, according to which the preference for embod-
ied immediacy over linguistic mediation invariably stems from a specious 
metaphysics of presence, Whitman’s impatience with “paper and types” ex-
presses a frustration at distance or attenuation, not absence. From a bioelec-
trical perspective, the difference between textual and bodily inscriptions is 
a  matter of degree and not kind: as compared to writing on paper, the ner-
vous writing that is touch is simply temporally closer to the event— the 
cognitive moment—of meaning. Read this way, Whitman’s conflations of 
body and text no longer appear so deluded or strategically misleading; 
instead they remind us of the material conditions of our reading.
To this end, Whitman’s characteristic use of deictics and second- person 
address could be understood as attempts to direct us not  toward a mystical or 
purely rhetorical intimacy but to a concretely embodied one. Like Magritte’s 
self- denying still life (“ceci n’est pas une pipe”), this line’s reflexive reference 
to itself as “paper and types” drives my attention from the poem’s repre sen-
ta tional register to its materiality, throwing its ontic there- ness into relief. 
Suddenly I am acutely aware of the nap of the paper  under my thumb, or the 
edge of the iPad digging into my palm, and in this way Whitman returns me 
to my body and foregrounds the physical encounter I am at that moment 
having with his text. In this moment we do, indeed, find ourselves rhetori-
cally interpellated into a scene of intimacy, but one that is neither purely 
notional nor quite interpersonal: we are recalled to our immediate sensuous 
encounter with the nonhuman body of the poem itself.
But perhaps even to note the distinction between interpersonal and 
object relations is to miss Whitman’s point. Peter Coviello argues that 
Whitman invokes a more- than- genital sexuality as “the ground note of all 
 human attachment,” forming “the engine that drives the  human capacity 
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for relation to  others.”51 For Coviello, this non- normative sexuality allows 
Whitman to envision “a kind of seriality” embodied in the “queer prog-
eny” of his affectionate  future readers— a vision that replaces “generational 
time, marked by the pairing of  children and futurity,” with a style of “queer 
world- making, and indeed queer future- making.”52 In reading Whitman’s 
solicitations of intimacy as efforts to foreground our haptic encounter with 
the text, I am suggesting that this analy sis might be expanded. Beyond even 
more- than- genital sexuality, sensuality is the embodied phenomenon that, 
for Whitman, grounds our attachment to and generative interaction with 
all the bodies ( human and other wise) around us.53 The good news is that 
literally every thing in the room is flirting with you.
Whitman’s bioelectrical poetics moreover also shed light on his perverse 
yet per sis tent hostility to the idea that the goal of reading is interpreta-
tion. Whitman’s early editions of Leaves are emphatically anti-hermeneutic: 
“Have you practiced so long to learn to read?,” he taunts us right out of the 
gates; “Have you felt so proud to get at the meaning of poems?”54 The 
1860 Leaves doubles down on this rebuke, warning: “ These leaves conning 
you con at peril . . .  for it is not for what I have put into it that I have writ-
ten this book, / Nor is it by reading it you  will acquire it.”55 Instead of “con-
ning” his words, Whitman wants us to be assailed by them, wants them to 
communicate as physical rather than linguistic objects. Thus he consis-
tently figures his work as an involuntary emission— unpremeditated as any 
“ejaculation” or “barbaric yawp,” his words are “belched” sounds, “wafted 
with the odor of his body or breath,” exuding organically from his body 
like that live- oak “uttering joyous leaves all its life” by biological fiat. In 
one magnificent riff in “Song of Myself,” we are serially informed that in-
stead of reading a poem we are in fact being impregnated, jetted with the 
stuff of arrogant republics, dilated with tremendous breath, embraced and 
possessed, fetched flush to Whitman’s body, and thrummed by the oro-
tund sound of his voice. “Behold I do not give lectures or a  little charity,” 
he expounds; “What I give I give out of myself.” And lest we  mistake him 
to simply mean he speaks sincerely (“out of myself” as in “from the heart”), 
he commands us: “open your scarfed chops till I blow grit within you.”56 
Whitman relentlessly insists that his poems are touching us. And in de-
scribing his poems, in his poems, as not- poems, he turns the repre sen ta-
tional register of his poetry against itself. Cross- dressed as nonlinguistic 
objects— performing what Michael Warner terms a kind of “metadiscur-
sive queerness”— these poems verbally profess that they have nothing 
to say.57
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Indeed, for all our hand- wringing over the (apparent) counter- factualism 
of Whitman’s staged intimacies, we have been strangely un perturbed by 
the fact that this rhetorical pose arguably renders poetic communication 
unintelligible. For if, as Vendler argues, Whitman wishes to make poetry 
“closer to a blood transfusion or an infusion of semen,” we might well ask 
how such an intimate physical exchange (counterfactual or not) could be a 
model for something that we would still recognize as poetry. How does 
one “read” a mouthful of grit, an injection of blood, or an “infusion” (in 
Vendler’s delightfully chaste phrase) of semen? And if,  after all, it’s not “the 
meaning of poems” we are meant to “get at” by reading Leaves, then what 
is the point of reading it? Put differently, if object- poems are simply meant 
to affect us physically, the way grit and semen and other nonlinguistic ob-
jects do, then how  will we know a poem from a handsy poet or a mouthful 
of sand when we see one?
At the risk of stating the obvious, most of us operate  under the assump-
tion that all poems are objects but not all objects are poems. We convention-
ally distinguish between the expressly communicative objects that are texts 
(or works of art) and, conversely, nontextual objects (hammers, grit, grass, 
the joints of our bodies) that may in some sense be expressive but that we 
do not take to be expressly trying to tell us something. Perhaps no critic 
writing  today has had more to say about the costliness of ignoring this 
distinction than Walter Benn Michaels, who has extensively critiqued the 
idea that we might “read” nonlinguistic objects, treating objects as if 
they  were signs. According to Michaels, the prob lem with this “fantasy of 
meaning without repre sen ta tion,” this dream of a “text written in blood,” 
is that unlike signs, objects (blood, grass, leaves, bodies) are not intentional 
and hence, although they may communicate effects or experiences (can 
bruise us, excite us, give us a cold), they cannot be said to communicate 
meanings.58 The difference between experience and significance, he ex-
plains, is that experience has to do with the effect the object in fact has on 
us (and this is not a  matter for interpretation, only attestation, the ques-
tion of our individual experiences of the object), whereas significance has 
to do with the effect the object intends to have on us (and this is the object 
of interpretation, the question of the object’s meaning).59 For Michaels, 
then, intention is the additive by which we may distinguish between a text’s 
meaning and its merely incidental effects— between its significance and 
what Derrida might call its “trace,” or what William Wimsatt and Mon-
roe Beardsley describe (in a phrase gratifyingly resonant with my pres ent 
discussion) as our “psycho- galvanic reflex” to the text.60 As Michaels ar-
gues, “Once we turn the meaning of the poem into our experience of it”— 
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that is, once we treat the poem as identical to the event of our reading 
it— “we begin to treat the poem as if it had no meaning.”61
A reader like Michaels must therefore object that Whitman’s embod-
ied poetics is strictly meaningless. For Michaels, it is only insofar as the 
 things Whitman makes are precisely not simply objects that they can qual-
ify as poems in the first place. Leaves’ bioelectric poetics would thus seem 
to lead poetry up a blind alley: its emphasis on the physicality of reading 
empties poetry of anything that would count, for Michaels at least, as 
meaning. By treating poems as material objects that corporeally (or 
“psycho- galvanically”) affect us, Whitman makes poetry indistinguishable 
from any other species of object in the world. I might just as well “read” 
anything at all—by its own lights, “Song of Myself” has no more claim to 
my attention than the surface it’s printed on, the dog snoring at my side, 
or the Mississippi River rolling somewhere out  there in the darkness.62
But as fatal as it may seem to the proj ect of poetry, Whitman is noth-
ing short of explicit (i.e., thoroughly intentional) about his poetry’s lack of 
intention. He scolds us that we are  doing poetry all wrong when we set 
out “to get at the meaning,” and insists that what ever it is that his poetry 
exists to convey “eludes discussion and print, / It is not to be put in a 
book . . . .  it is not in this book.”63 Laying out his program for poetry in 
the 1855 preface, he argues that a poem requires neither interpretation nor 
comprehension to be a success:
To speak in lit er a ture with the perfect rectitude and insousiance of the 
movements of animals and the unimpeachableness of the sentiment of 
trees in the woods and grass by the roadside is the flawless triumph 
of art. . . .  You  shall not contemplate the flight of the graygull over the 
bay or the mettlesome action of the blood  horse or the tall leaning 
of sunflowers on their stalk or the appearance of the sun journeying 
through heaven or the appearance of the moon afterward with any 
more satisfaction than you  shall contemplate [the poet]. The greatest 
poet has less a marked style and is more the channel of thoughts and 
 things without increase or diminution, and is the  free channel of 
himself. . . .  Let who may exalt or startle or fascinate or sooth[e] I  will 
have purposes as health or heat or snow has and be as regardless of 
observation.64
Despite his reference to “speak[ing] in lit er a ture,” the modes of expression 
to which Whitman compares poetic utterance  here— the movements of 
animals, the sentiment of trees— are not only neither literary nor spoken; 
 they’re not  human. The “triumph of art,” he asserts, is to attain an inhuman 
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indifference to  human understanding. “Let who may exalt or startle or 
fascinate or sooth[e],” he sniffs; perlocutionary effects are not the essence 
of poems. Nor are authorial intents: “I  will have purposes as health or 
heat or snow has,” he explains, which is to say that his poetry  will not have 
purposes but rather consequences. For— and this is Michaels’s point— 
health and heat and snow cannot be said to purpose or mean what they do, 
since their effects (invigorating, heating, cooling) are unintended. Neither 
reducible to authorial intent nor to readerly reception, the Whitmanian 
poem aspires to exist among us like graygulls and blood  horses and tall, 
leaning sunflowers— that is, as  things that shape our world without speak-
ing to us,  things that “enter” us and imprint themselves on us but that we 
do not propose to interpretively “understand.” It is in this sense that the 
poem can afford to be “regardless of observation”; freed from the obliga-
tion to successfully convey a specific meaning, the poem becomes, like a 
 horse or snow, something that does not depend upon our comprehension 
to be realized as an effectual or even transformative part of our shared 
world. As he predicts at the close of “Song of Myself,” “You  will hardly know 
who I am or what I mean, /  But I  shall be good health to you neverthe-
less, / And filter and fibre your blood.” Following Whitman’s bioelectric 
logic through, therefore, lands us at the perplexing conclusion that Whit-
man’s interest in embodied poems—in the bioelectrical physiology of read-
ing and the textuality of bodies— stems from a theory of poetic intimacy 
and physicality that is, in the end, indifferent to poetic meaning.
Embodied Poetics and the Prob lem of Recognition
It may be useful at this point to take a moment to distinguish Whitman’s 
anti- intentionalism from other va ri e ties of anti- intentionalism in poetry 
and poetic theory. In the early twentieth  century, for instance, Imagist po-
ets maintained that art’s value is in de pen dent of its capacity to mean. “A 
poem should not mean / But be,” Archibald MacLeish announced in 1926, 
elaborating his “Ars Poetica” in lines evocative of Whitman’s preface: “A 
poem should be wordless / As the flight of birds. . . .  A poem should be equal 
to: / Not true.” Like much of Leaves, MacLeish’s poem has a kind of self- 
canceling didacticism, clearly outlining in verse a program for verse to be 
not only non- didactic but also not meaningful. In the vein of Michaels’s 
critique, Robert Pinsky faults Imagism for conveying “the power ful illu-
sion that a poet pres ents, rather than tells about, a sensory experience.”65 
And yet for Imagism, as MacLeish would  later specify, the point of the 
object- poem is “not to re create the poet’s emotion in some one  else. . . . 
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The poem itself is finality, an end, a creation.”66 If the poetry of meaning 
is valuable insofar as it is instructive to readers (tells them something), the 
poetry of being needs no readers  because being is an end in itself.
Whitman does not share MacLeish’s belief in poetry’s autonomy or in-
trinsic value; on the contrary, for Whitman  every poem is inherently un-
finished. For Whitman, it is neither what poetry is nor what poetry teaches 
us but what (or  really, what ever) it does to us that makes it valuable.67 As 
he  argues, poetry is not self- contained but, rather, lives through its 
readership:
A  great poem is no finish to a man or  woman but rather a beginning. . . .  
The touch of [the poet] tells in action. Whom he takes he takes with 
firm sure grasp into live regions previously unattained . . . .  thenceforward 
is no rest. . . .  They two  shall launch off fearlessly together till the new 
world fits an orbit for itself and looks unabashed on the lesser orbits of 
the stars and sweeps through the ceaseless rings and  shall never be 
quiet again.68
 Here, poetry’s value is not intrinsic but, rather, lies in its catalytic capac-
ity, its power to transform us. Indeed, despite his “firm sure grasp” of the 
reader, the poet is not in control of his poem’s explosive effects. Instead, 
he is merely a co- traveler launched “together” with his reader on a journey 
of “ceaseless” transformations— a pro cess so endless (so hermeneutically 
pointless) that Whitman’s description loses sight of it as it  ripples past the 
known galaxy, “never [to] be quiet again.” This is poetry as black market 
jetpack: it works by quickening readers, although it claims no responsibil-
ity for their resulting trajectories.
For some readers, including Michaels, this euphoric renunciation of au-
thorial control more accurately marks the extinction, as opposed to the 
ideal, of poetic communication. But although Whitman’s anti- intentionalism 
can seem like a promiscuous willingness to mean anything (“an indis-
criminate hurrahing for the Universe” is how William James once char-
acterized Leaves), I think we do better to recognize it as a studied critique 
of the idea of intentionalism, a critique that flows logically from his em-
bodied poetics.69 From a materialist perspective, intentionalism looks 
like a willfully limiting description of poetry’s  actual effects in the world: 
it would limit us to counting only  those effects its author predicted, brack-
eting out a  whole range of real, if merely “accidental” or subjective, effects 
that  ripple out incalculably farther than the horizon of any author’s origi-
nal desire. From this perspective, when Whitman suggests that poetry 
launches “into the unknown,” he is not irresponsibly denying paternity of 
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his work but realistically acknowledging the impossibility of predeter-
mining the shape of its  future offspring.
Thus I suggest that in asking us to recognize that poems are not just 
intentional communications but also radically disseminative events, Whit-
man opens our eyes to the unavoidably indiscreet conditions of poetry’s 
material existence. Like Thoreau with John Brown, Whitman’s sense of 
his poetry’s value asks us to take a broader and much longer view of po-
etry’s action—of the real if diffuse and unpredictably proliferating effects 
it  will have unleashed. In this sense, his embodied poetics frames a theory 
of agential externalities, of the ungovernable aureole about  every action 
( every touch,  every utterance,  every poem) that obscurely, unpredictably, 
and at the same time unarrestably links the pres ent moment to outcomes 
and  others invisible to us. And though we may well wish to codify rules— 
such as intentionalism in hermeneutics, for instance, or tort in the law— 
that carve out zones in which predictability and responsibility might more 
locally hold, Whitman’s embodied poetics challenges us to embrace the 
empirical life of poetry, in all its wanton creativity.
Another way to say this might be to point out that Whitman’s embod-
ied poetics is just that— a poetics rather than a hermeneutics. As Daniel 
Tiffany argues in Infidel Poetics, poetry has always been uniquely concerned 
with language’s sensuous dimensions (its sounds and rhythms), and this 
interest in the “cadaverous materiality” of language’s body drives poetic 
language  toward obscurity.70 Sketching the history of lyric obscurity from 
ancient riddles and charms through the “difficulty” of high modernist 
poetry, Tiffany argues that a principled defiance of transparency or even 
intelligibility lies at the very heart of the poetic proj ect. Indeed, for Tif-
fany, poetry’s obscurity grounds its peculiar sociality: “Obscurity,” he 
writes, “rather than being the princi ple impediment to poetry’s social rel-
evance, would provide the key to models of community derived specifi-
cally from the nature of lyric expression.”71 Thus, what might other wise 
seem like the obstacle to poetry’s ability to communicate— its opacity, its 
elliptical difficulty—is, for Tiffany, the grounds of its uniquely “negative 
sociability.”72 Poetry  under this description does not communicate so 
much as it convenes, gathering speakers and hearers, authors and readers, 
around the incomprehensible lyric object.
Like Imagism’s theory of poetic autonomy, Tiffany’s theory of lyric ob-
scurity bears some illuminating parallels to Whitman’s embodied poetics, 
but in the end remains distinct. For Tiffany, lyric obscurity is best “regarded 
principally as an event or deed” rather than as an encrypted message, and 
poetry’s sociality inheres not in what it communicates but, rather, in its 
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power to solicit us into this scene of (obscure, even contentless) communi-
cation.73  Under this understanding of lyric, we might conclude that Whit-
man’s embodied poetics— his denial of poetry’s meaning and insistence 
on its physiological eventfulness—is not, in fact, antipoetic but, rather, 
articulates the terms of the poetic proj ect tout court.74 However, to see 
Whitman as an exemplar of Tiffany’s lyric theory may be to narrow 
the claims that Whitman is making about obscurity. For Tiffany, the ob-
scure objects that are poems constitute a unique class of objects— poems 
are especially obscure, or obscure in some special (poetic) way. For Whit-
man, however, obscurity is not a feature par tic u lar to poetry; it is, rather, 
a condition endemic to all embodied life. In other words, obscurity is not 
an effect of Whitman’s lyr ics (it is hard to imagine clearer, more prosai-
cally candid lines than his) but rather Whitman’s poetry is about obscu-
rity: he is trying to articulate the philosophical prob lem of the obscurity 
of embodied being. When he says that he “cannot tell how my ankles 
bend . . . .  nor whence the cause of my faintest wish,” he’s not telling a 
riddle; he’s telling us about the riddle that ankles and wishes are.75
More precisely, Whitman is noting the mystery of the way ankles and 
wishes work— the hows and whences of their bendings. This specification 
is an impor tant one, since the real and fundamental source of ontological 
obscurity for Whitman is the fact that bodies are open- ended: receiving 
and disseminating effects, perpetually undergoing reinscription, they are 
materially although not metaphysically transcendent. If most of us do not 
won der about our bends and bents, it is  because we take  these  things to be 
expressions of our willful intentions. But as we have seen, on Whitman’s 
bioelectric theory intentions are a kind of optical illusion. At best, they de-
scribe a misleadingly thin slice of a material history that in fact engulfs 
intention in its cascade of preceding  causes and unpredictably sprawling 
effects. The lyric obscurity that he is talking about, then, and that makes 
him unable to say what a poem fi nally means (even just what it fi nally  causes) 
is the consequence of a condition that poetry shares with literally every-
thing:  every embodied  thing is, for Whitman, a  thing in flux. To say “who 
I am or what I mean,” one would have to find a way to stand outside of 
time and space, looking back from their ends, in order to cata log the fi-
nally completed sequence of material history that passed through a given 
body or poem. One must write a tremendously long cata log, and even then, 
the cata log would not contain itself.
Put differently,  there is an impor tant difference between something that 
is unsayable  because its meaning is encrypted (as in lyric obscurity, or as 
in the hermetic value of Imagism’s poem- of- being) and something that is 
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unsayable  because its meaning is unfinished— because the  thing itself is still 
unfolding. And therefore, unlike the obscurity of Tiffany’s occulted sub-
jects or the self- sufficiency of MacLeish’s autonomous ones, Whitman’s 
embodied subjects (lyric,  human, or other wise) confront us with a prob lem 
of recognition that is unique to his poetics. As I  shall explore in the next 
section, the ineffability of Whitman’s pro cessual bodies— what I have de-
scribed, in the prior section, as the self- loss or identity- lessness of his con-
tinuously evolving subjects— lands us in a world in which recognition of the 
other would seem to be impossible  because the other is perpetually chang-
ing. Accordingly, the next section asks, if the bioelectrical body does not so 
much confer identity as efface it by tracing our lineaments out through the 
vast network of our sensuous attachments, then what does this do to Whit-
man’s conception of racial difference and  human equality? And what kind 
of democracy can subsist in a world of such indiscrete individuals?
Infinity at Auction: Interracial Sympathy  
in Whitman’s Democracy
Reviving one of Spiritualism’s preferred terms for bioelectrical communi-
cation, Jane Bennett reads Whitman’s porous bodies as, above all, sympa-
thetic ones. Thus she argues that Whitman’s interest in sensuous 
susceptibility highlights “sympathy’s capacity to imprint or act upon the 
flesh,” alerting us to the ways in which sympathy moves as “a more- than- 
human or natu ral force” between bodies that are “continuously affecting 
and being affected by each other and by atmospheres.”76 In this way, Whit-
man challenges us “to form a conception of sympathy that is more than a 
dynamic of ‘identification’ between two or more (aspirationally) sovereign 
individuals,” and in  doing so, Bennett suggests, Whitmanian sympathy 
avoids the most glaring ethical flaw in sympathy as it has conventionally 
been conceived. Saidiya Hartman explains that this flaw arises when “in 
making the other’s suffering one’s own, this suffering is occluded by the 
other’s obliteration”; in other words, in the act of identifying with the other, 
we risk overwriting the other’s identity with our own.77 By contrast, Ben-
nett suggest that Whitman helps us to imagine a form of sympathy that is 
not premised upon an  imagined projection (which is also an erasure) but is 
instead embodied, grounded in “a trans- individual model of receptivity, 
affectivity, and sociality.”78 On this reading, sympathy names a bodily sus-
ceptibility that reveals not simply our notional similarity or speculative 
equality with the other, but our material involvement with— our depen-
dence upon and constitution through— the body of the other.
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In this section, I propose to both extend and critique this conception of 
Whitmanian sympathy by examining how its substitution of mutuality for 
equality informs Whitman’s antislavery argument in “I Sing the Body 
Electric.” If the  human body, as Whitman conceives of it, is the ever- 
shifting tally of an ongoing and hence ineffable creative pro cess, then 
how can the politics of recognition proceed? What happens to the phe-
nomenon of interracial sympathy when neither the subject nor the object 
in a given scene of identification can be identified? What, indeed, could a 
demo cratic politics without discrete persons even look like? The pro-
cessualism of Whitman’s embodied poetics challenges us to shift our 
attention from individuals and the drama of their interpersonal interac-
tions, to systems and the ecol ogy of their material intra- relations. In this 
section I propose to consider the po liti cal affordances and limitations of 
this embodied ontology, particularly as it informs Whitman’s antislavery 
thought.
Although neither an ardent nor even a particularly consistent antislav-
ery advocate, Whitman provides at least one clear enunciation of his op-
position to slavery in the climactic slave auction scene of “I Sing the Body 
Electric.”79 As its title (appended in 1867) suggests, this poem is a paean to 
bioelectric embodiment, and ultimately it reproduces the contradiction of 
antebellum Spiritualist theology, asserting the divinity of the ner vous body 
while pointing to the paradoxically mundane physics of its purely pro-
cessual transcendence. (“The man’s body is sacred and the  woman’s body 
is sacred,” Whitman affirms; “Each has his or her place in the pro cession / All 
is a pro cession, / The universe is a pro cession with mea sured and beautiful 
motion.”)80 The poem famously closes with a scene in which Whitman’s 
speaker “helps” at a slave auction by clambering up onto the auction block 
to take over the work of enumerating the features of the Black bodies for 
sale. He does so in order to assert that  every life is invaluable and that 
“each belongs  here or anywhere just as much as the well- off . . . .  just as 
much as you.” This message of inclusion has earned the poem the reputa-
tion of being a cele bration of “a fully inclusive and egalitarian democ-
racy.”81 As Martin Klammer, Betsey Erkkila, Karen Sánchez- Eppler, and 
Jimmie Killingsworth variously argue, the poem mounts a power ful “de-
fense of black personhood” (Erkkila) and reaffirms the “sacred” nature of 
 every body (Killingsworth).82
 Things get complicated, however, for the very notion of “personhood” 
as this poem mounts its defense of the invaluable body. Whitman affirms 
at the poem’s outset that “the expression of the body of man or  woman 
balks account” and its concluding scene, in which the speaker takes over 
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the work of accounting from an auctioneer who “does not half know his 
business,” offers a strikingly literal demonstration of this statement. Whit-
man’s own, better calculus unfolds in a series of cata logs that demonstrate 
the absurdity of buying and selling persons:
Gentlemen look on this curious creature,
What ever the bids of the bidders they cannot be high enough for him,
For him the globe lay preparing quintillions of years without one animal 
or plant, 
For him the revolving cycles truly and steadily rolled.
In that head the all- baffling brain,
In it and below it the making of the attributes of heroes.
Examine  these limbs, red black or white . . . .  they are very cunning in 
tendon and nerve; 
They  shall be stript that you may see them.
Exquisite senses, lifelit eyes, pluck, volition. . . .  
Within  there runs this blood . . . .  the same old blood . . the same red 
 running blood; 
 There swells and jets his heart . . . .  There all passions and desires . . all 
reachings and aspirations. . . .  
This is not only one man . . . .  he is the  father of  those who  shall be 
 fathers in their turns, 
In him the start of populous states and rich republics,
Of him countless immortal lives with countless embodiments and 
enjoyments. 
How do you know who  shall come from the offspring of his offspring 
through the centuries? 
What might you find you have come from yourself if you could trace back
 through the centuries?83 
By the end of this extended cata log, we would still be hard- pressed to 
identify the enslaved man at its center (is he old? young? tall? short?). In 
place of an individualizing portrait, Whitman gives us a natu ral history of 
this man’s body. The polemical force of this move is that it allows Whit-
man to underscore how deeply entangled this ostensibly solitary figure in 
fact is in the material fabric of the shared world.84 If the institution of slav-
ery has left this man kinless, Whitman’s cata log reminds us that his gene-
alogy is nonetheless epically long and unbroken, that his body is the product 
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of a cosmic history: first the earth cohered from a nebula, then soils crum-
bled from bare rock, and fi nally myriad stages of development brought us 
the “cunning” design of this man’s limbs and the  human passions of his 
blood. Thus Whitman affirms that the slave’s story is a branch of humani-
ty’s history as a species, and extends even farther back through the larger 
material history of the earth and stars. If this asserts the shared history of all 
bodies, it also insists on each body’s limitlessness: in Whitman’s eyes, this 
man is the index of an unimaginably long history (“quintillions of years”) 
that culminates in him, and of a  future that exfoliates out from him (in 
“countless immortal lives”) whose horizon is equally unforeseeable. Hence 
Whitman concludes, “This is not only one man”; the only seemingly singu-
lar figure we see is an integral part of a recombinatory and creatively unfold-
ing physical cosmos.
No ordinary slice of antislavery rhe toric, then, this passage argues 
that no bid could be high enough for this enslaved man  because no one can 
say precisely what it is that they are bidding on in the first place. “How 
do you know” what the true scope of his life  will turn out to have been? 
And if you cannot know, how dare you presume to assess the value of 
something with such unknown par ameters—to put a price on an open- 
ended pro cess? If the slave auction scene is uncomfortable— and it is in 
a number of ways— this is not least  because Whitman’s critique of slav-
ery refuses to explic itly condemn the immorality of selling persons. The 
objection this passage raises is not that  human life is priceless  because it 
is “sacred” (i.e., morally exceptional to materialist systems of value); it is, 
more specifically, that the value of any body is inestimable. This man 
“balks account”  because he is the temporary individuation of an unfold-
ing cosmos, the momentary instantiation of a material and social pro-
cess so awesomely boundless that it enfolds both his and our pasts and 
 futures in its vast transhistorical sweep. “All is pro cession,” Whitman 
exclaims in the lines that introduce this scene: “The universe is a pro-
cession with mea sured and beautiful motion.” Within this pro cessual 
plenum, it is impossible to circumscribe being into discrete objects, to 
tell where one body ends and another begins.
Critics have not always looked kindly on Whitman’s emulsifying 
 vision. D. H. Lawrence famously accused Whitman of substituting the 
sloppiness of “merger” for the delicate mutuality of interpersonal sympa-
thy.85 More recently, Sánchez- Eppler faults Whitmanian sympathy, in 
terms that echo Hartman’s critique of sympathy, for failing to inspire a 
truly interracial sympathy. Whitman simply “dissolves the bodies” of 
both slave and spectator, Sánchez- Eppler observes, effacing the enslaved 
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man’s specificity in the pro cess of uniting slave and spectator into an 
undifferentiated, transpersonal  whole.86
We may now be in a position to see how this “failure” is not just inte-
gral to this scene but structural to Whitman’s poetics and its under lying 
ontology. Indeed, one now begins to see why Whitman volunteers for the 
auctioneer’s job, for he has done more than any other poet to show how 
the auctioneer’s cata log might be a kind of spiritual (even Spiritualist) ex-
ercise— a kind of chanting hymn to the transcendental nonsingularity, the 
fi nally uninumerable multiplicity, of any one  thing. A solitary slave at auc-
tion is also a prehistoric globe, revolving seasonal cycles, rich republics, and 
countless  future lives; a poet is also a book of poems, a leaf of grass  under 
our bootsoles. Every thing exceeds its immediate body and in this sense, equally 
enmeshed in a sympathetically united cosmos, every thing is ultimately 
one. But what could equality look like in this sprawling, heterogeneous 
unity? Is the sameness of two  things that are conjoined (one) the same as 
the sameness of two  things that are comparable (equal)? That is, is assert-
ing our universal material mutuality  really tantamount to establishing 
our universal moral equality? What would it mean to be equal to some-
thing that is, in the final analy sis, not just like but part of yourself?
Thus we may begin to appreciate the nonhumanism of Whitman’s ar-
gument with slavery, and the extent to which it undermines the metaphys-
ics of personhood in which democracy and racial equality have both 
traditionally traded. In the liberal humanist tradition enshrined in the U.S. 
founding documents, “all men are created equal” and are vested with cer-
tain “unalienable Rights.” From this premise, as Douglass saw, the ques-
tion of  whether or not slavery is consistent with this princi ple of equality 
before the law depends upon establishing  whether or not slaves should be 
recognized as “men,” and as such endowed with what Chief Justice Taney, 
in his Dred Scott decision, terms “rights which the white man was bound 
to re spect.” And thus, as I have suggested across the preceding chapters of 
this book, the effort to establish the humanity of the slave is how race, as 
a system of vis i ble differences and attitudes  toward  those differences, came 
to seem so impor tant. Look at this hair, this skin, the turn of this hip: do 
you, white American, recognize this body as categorically like yours, or 
dif fer ent? Can you see yourself in this body, feel sympathy for it?
Whitman moots  these questions of recognition; in the ontology that 
he articulates and makes the marrow of his revisionary poetics, equality 
operates by a very dif fer ent logic. As the auction scene in “I Sing the Body 
Electric” makes clear,  there can be no politics of recognition for the Whit-
manian self  because this self is fundamentally unrecognizable—it is 
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impossible to even determine the shape of the phenomenon that it (they?) is 
( will have been?). Instead, the egalitarian ethos of his verse, such as it is, turns 
on the notion that the sameness of material contiguity (you are physically con-
nected to me) can be seamlessly substituted for the sameness of moral equal-
ity (you are as good as me). Leaves flirts with this conversion from its 
outset: “ Every atom belonging to me, as good belongs to you,” it begins, 
provocatively refusing to choose between the moral claim that you and I 
are of equal worth (your atoms are as good as mine) and the empirical claim 
that you and I share  matter (my atoms may one day be yours— check your 
bootsoles).87 Indeed, throughout his first three editions, Whitman con-
tinually works the slippage between material mutuality, affective inti-
macy, and moral equality, but however closely he conflates them, it is not 
clear that  these modes of imagining po liti cal community are interchange-
able. The fluidity of the Whitmanian person defies the calculus of equal-
ity, dissolving the units ( here persons) that equality compares into an 
undifferentiable unity. His defense of the Black body’s equality is thus 
arguably useless in the same way that his poetics is, strictly speaking, use-
less: both highlight the illimitable natu ral history of bodies and poems, but 
since empirical expansiveness is a feature of  every object in Whitman’s on-
tology, it does not suggest how or why  these objects specifically  ought to be 
valued.88 What  legal rights are due to  human bodies as opposed to grass 
or blood or a poem? Why should we read a poem as opposed to blood or 
grass or a  human body?
Like his antihermeneutic poetics, then, Whitman’s materialist account 
of persons is anti- identitarian. Stripping both poems and persons of con-
ventional subjecthood (individual identity or intentional meaning), he re-
turns them to us as empirically infinite pro cesses, entangled aspects of a 
procreant “real ity . . . .  materialism first and last imbueing.”89 At once dis-
concertingly modest and astoundingly epic, this pro cessualism does away 
with identity by proliferating it such that both poems and persons threaten 
to lose their normative or ethical force. We are no longer tasked with rec-
ognizing what they “truly” mean, who they “ really” are. Instead, Whit-
man’s politics follow his poetics in inviting us to marvel at the ineffable 
(although not otherworldly) won der of interconnected being, to acknowl-
edge how “ every spear of grass and the frames and spirits of men and 
 women and all that concerns them are unspeakably perfect miracles all 
referring to all.”90
The force of this admirably ecological vision— the truly exquisite com-
plexity of the relational world it discloses—is therefore also what seems to 
render it po liti cally inert. For without discrete units it is not clear that  there 
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can be  either democracy or equality as we know them;  there is only, and 
always already, attachment and unity. Moreover, even if we permit our-
selves to act as if the temporary organ izations of  matter we call bodies 
 were countably distinct, the fact remains that, by Whitman’s lights, liter-
ally  every material body ( whether  human, animal, vegetable, mineral, or 
textual) is incalculable, and thus invaluable. This confronts us with the 
prob lem of a moral polity constituted by literally every thing. Conceived 
in terms of its material interinvolvement, this polity displaces the ques-
tion of its constituents’ similarities and differences and thus bypasses the 
politics of repre sen ta tion and recognition that subtend the politics of 
race, class, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, and species rights 
as we currently know them. As I  shall discuss in Chapter 4 and the Coda, 
the prob lem of making this pro cessual ontology speak to the concerns 
of embodied specificity and racial difference continues to trou ble con-
temporary posthumanism  today.
In the foregoing three chapters I have been excavating a materialist strain 
of antislavery thought that began to crystallize in the writings of Doug-
lass, Thoreau, and Whitman in the 1850s as an embodied alternative to 
biological racism. This antislavery materialism coalesces in their work nei-
ther as a consistent po liti cal platform nor as an explic itly codified theory 
but, rather, as a tendency of thought arising from their efforts to reimag-
ine “the  human” in light of burgeoning midcentury discourses of  human 
embodiment. Departing from both mainstream abolitionism (which largely 
denied the relevance of bodily difference to  human equality) and biologi-
cal racism (which argued that certain bodies— Black, native, female— are 
biologically determined and hence naturally inferior),  these authors embrace 
the materiality of  human being and use it to dismantle the notion of bio-
logical hierarchy. In  doing so, their writings invoke a physical cosmos 
whose dense interdependencies preclude the erection of racial and specio-
logical hierarchy (Douglass), in which the ceaseless drift of evolutionary 
change belies racial and speciological essentialism (Thoreau), and in which 
the pro cessual becomings of our permeable bodies blur the distinction be-
tween entities (Whitman). In place of racial science’s static typological 
system,  these antebellum materialisms give us an anti- essentialist ontology 
in which identity is contingent and fluid,  shaped by the dynamic interrelation 
of biological and cultural forces.
In navigating this third way between disembodied antislavery and bio-
logical racism,  these authors invite us to radically rethink the category of 
the  human. This effort was, at least in part, strategic: a response not only 
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to the rising cachet of empirical science but also to the mutual support 
liberal and racist ideologies lent each other in the nineteenth  century. In-
deed, as we have seen, although liberal humanism’s universalism and rac-
ism’s hierarchism would seem to be antithetical, biological racism in fact 
quite happily invoked liberal humanism’s account of the  human as a form 
of being that is uniquely in de pen dent of the material order. The figure of 
the autonomous, disembodied liberal self funded midcentury racism’s hi-
erarchical distinction between “fully”  human white persons (whose char-
acteristic racial trait is to be rationally in de pen dent of their bodies) and 
“lesser” forms of racialized, gendered, bestialized, and objectified beings, 
whose identities are biologically predetermined. Thus despite its ostensible 
materialism, antebellum racism shared liberalism’s fundamental assump-
tion that the most fully  human was the least embodied; meanwhile, de-
spite its ostensible universalism, antebellum liberalism needed the fatally 
embodied form of life racism supplied in order to secure its own self- 
definition. As Russ Castronovo observes, this reciprocal exchange yields a 
singularly deathly episteme: between the  human citizen whose body is ef-
faced by the purifying fires of liberal universalism and, by contrast, the 
dehumanized noncitizen who is sentenced “to excessive and lethal embodi-
ment,” this modern liberal- raciological order proves singularly hostile to 
embodied life.91 Stepping outside the deadly either/or of a disaffectedly ab-
stract liberal personhood on one side and a dehumanized materiality on 
the other, Douglass, Thoreau, and Whitman demonstrate that empiricism’s 
entry into antebellum po liti cal reasoning in fact afforded a wider range of 
embodied discourses than  these two alternatives allow. Insisting upon the 
materiality of all  humans,  these authors frame a tentative and experimen-
tal but provocative counterdiscourse that resists biological racism and 
points beyond liberal humanism’s conception of the  human.
At the same time, as I have tried to show, this revisionary materialism 
was not without cost to  these authors insofar as their forays into embod-
ied thinking undermined aspects of the progressive liberalism and roman-
tic individualism with which they are broadly associated. Their incipient 
materialism often appears as a subversively contrapuntal theme in their 
thought, at odds with the liberal commitments they elsewhere espouse. 
Douglass’s strategic embrace of animality is, for instance, in tension with 
his determination to establish beyond doubt his race’s claim to the rights 
and privileges of full humanity. Thoreau’s appeal to evolution as an agent 
of moral change conflicts with his faith in the power of the conscientious in-
dividual to effect profound personal and po liti cal reform; and Whitman’s sense 
of himself as an expansively interconnected material plenum (“a kosmos”) is 
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   133 11/1/17   11:57 AM
134 Bioelectricity and the Prob lem of  Human Meaning
disconcertingly at odds with his sense of himself as a discrete and self- 
possessed liberal subject (“Walt Whitman”) and representative of a class 
(“an American, one of the roughs”). This is to suggest, then, that  there is a 
distinctly illiberal tendency in the materialist swings of  these authors’ 
thought— that their explorations of  human ontology undermine their ap-
peals to  human rights, agency, and selfhood as liberal humanism constructs 
them. This heretical tendency marks the opening of their work onto radi-
cally new modes of imagining the  human—to alternative epistemes that 
are not only antiracist but whose antiracism moreover transforms our con-
ception of  human being and its modes of community from the ground up.
In the modern politics of demo cratic pluralism, the effort to end rac-
ism and other exclusions based on embodied identity involves a strug gle at 
once for inclusion and against incorporation into a disembodied univer-
salism that ignores or denies the embodied difference of  these lived iden-
tities. The challenge of this pluralistic politics of sympathy is thus to insist 
upon individual and embodied specificity while also asserting the equality 
of  humans and universality of  human rights. The material pro cessualism 
that subtends  these antebellum antislavery materialisms can light up the 
difficulty of making con temporary posthumanist discourses of ontologi-
cal fluidity—in assemblage theory, new materialism, and “affirmative” bio-
politics, for instance— speak to discourses of racial and social justice. As I 
 shall explore in Chapter 4 and the Coda, although like Douglass, Thoreau, 
and Whitman many posthumanists  today understand themselves to be 
working  toward an expanded demo cratic politics and in the ser vice of a 
more radically egalitarian and inclusive ethics, it is not clear that the ma-
terialist ontology they embrace can support the redeemed democracy they 
envision. At the very least, I  shall suggest that this conversation, already 
begun, is one that we now need to be having.
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In this chapter I would like to explore the present- day status and stakes of 
the epistemic overhaul that I have been tracing through the antislavery ma-
terialisms of Frederick Douglass, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whit-
man. The preceding chapters have suggested that  these authors’ embodied 
accounts of the  human bear certain affinities with the materialist turn of 
con temporary posthumanist theory.  There is, of course, a kind of knowl-
edge and also a kind of plea sure to be had in recognizing the slant rhymes 
of historical recurrence. However, this chapter starts from the premise that 
antebellum antislavery materialism should be in ter est ing to us now not 
simply  because of its shadowy prescience of posthumanist theory, but also 
 because its divergence from con temporary theory can help to light up 
absences and aporias in posthumanist discourse  today.
The absence that antebellum antislavery materialism makes con spic u-
ous is the missing term of race in con temporary posthumanist theory. As 
I have argued, the proto- posthumanism that Douglass, Thoreau, and 
Whitman developed in the 1850s was triggered by the rise of racial sci-
ence and the consolidation of modern biological racism. Race is the found-
ing proposition around which their antislavery materialisms gather, like 
C h a p t e r   4
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so many antibodies, to wrest  human materiality away from its conscrip-
tion by racist ideology. Against the backdrop of this history, the margin-
ality of race in con temporary posthumanist discourse is puzzling. In this 
regard, examining the transhistorical echoes between antislavery and 
con temporary posthumanist materialism can help to bring the latter’s un-
dertheorized relationship to histories of racism and social justice into 
sharper focus. In  doing so, I hope to amplify demands that posthuman-
ism’s current critics are already making for a fuller accounting of posthu-
manism’s racial politics.
Indeed, a growing number of critics now suggest that the absence of race 
from posthumanist theorizing constitutes a considerable theoretical and 
ethical failure. This absence registers most notably in what Zakiyyah 
Jackson describes as posthumanism’s “resounding silence” on the subject of 
racism, which remains one of the most power ful and resilient technologies 
for delimiting and policing the border between the “fully”  human and the 
“nonhuman.”1 Race’s absence furthermore registers in the posthumanist ar-
chive’s general neglect of theorists of color whose analyses of “the tight 
bonds between humanity and racializing assemblages in the modern era” 
prefigure posthumanism’s critique of Western humanism’s abjection of the 
nonhuman. As Alexander Weheliye points out, black feminists like Sylvia 
Wynter and Hortense Spillers began calling for revisionary “genres” or con-
ceptions of the  human long before con temporary posthumanism picked up 
this refrain.2
To be fair, most critics working  under posthumanism’s large tent un-
derstand themselves to be advancing a critique of humanism’s exclusions 
that is sympathetic to antiracism while seeking to go beyond the anthropo-
centric terms it offers. For  these critics, posthumanism is a liberatory 
proj ect that proposes to radically extend the demo cratizing efforts that anti-
racism and antisexism pioneered. Thus when Bruno Latour proposes that 
the exclusion of nonhuman being from moral and po liti cal consideration 
“ will soon appear . . .  as extravagant as when the Founding  Fathers denied 
slaves and  women the vote,” he identifies posthumanism as the successor 
to antiracism: a related but ultimately distinct po liti cal strug gle.3 Whereas 
antiracist and antisexist movements speak up for the equality of what 
they construe as dehumanized  humans, posthumanism’s “flat ontology” 
 makes the case for the ethical and po liti cal standing of nonhuman being, 
 human or other wise.
At its broadest, this chapter proposes that this distinction between de-
humanized and nonhuman beings— a distinction that insists that “ human” 
is not just a biological but a natu ral moral identity— lies at the root of racism’s 
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marginality in posthumanist discourse, as well as the marginality of specie-
sism in antiracist discourse. Although theorists from both of  these schools 
insist that “the  human” is an ideological construct— a moral category whose 
borders have been willfully drawn and redrawn throughout Western hu-
manism’s history— both schools nevertheless regularly naturalize the  human 
by conflating this moral category with the biological category Homo sapiens. 
Thus, for instance, when posthumanists denounce  human exceptionalism 
and defend nonhuman rights, they generally understand themselves to be 
speaking up for non– Homo sapiens. But in conflating the  human with Homo 
sapiens, their critics observe, posthumanists ignore the long and ongoing 
history of racism that has systematically demoted targeted populations of 
Homo sapiens to the status of “nonhuman.” Meanwhile, if posthumanism 
fails to acknowledge that “the nonhuman” may include some Homo sapiens, 
for their part antiracist theorists also tend to argue that this inclusion is a 
heinous category  mistake. That is, when antiracist critics document the 
genocidal consequences suffered by  those to whom Western humanism has 
denied  human status, they tend to insist that this moral category is in truth 
natu ral: that all Homo sapiens are  human and  ought, therefore, to be ac-
corded equal  human rights. Between posthumanism’s biologization of the 
moral category, “ human,” and antiracism’s moralization of the biological 
category, Homo sapiens, the artificiality of “the  human”— something both 
discourses, in other moments, quite compellingly flag— recedes from view.
To argue that the  human is not synonymous with Homo sapiens is to ob-
serve something so  simple, so very basic to posthumanist and antiracist 
theorizing, that it sometimes strikes me that I might be embarrassing my-
self. Forging ahead nonetheless, this chapter aims to demonstrate that the 
slippage between the  human and Homo sapiens (or, conversely, between the 
nonhuman and non– Homo sapiens) is per sis tent in posthumanist and social 
justice criticism and contributes to their mutual alienation. The first two 
sections below  will therefore rehearse some of the most trenchant objec-
tions and correctives to posthumanist theory offered by recent antiracist 
and social justice criticism. Although this discussion is bound to offer a 
critique of posthumanist theory, it is not meant to condemn the post-
humanist proj ect tout court but, on the contrary, to strengthen it by sug-
gesting how posthumanism might productively engage with antiracist 
and social justice theory  going forward. As I  shall suggest, a closer col-
laboration between posthumanist and social justice theories can help to 
clarify the broad common ground that they in fact share.
 Toward this end, my third and final section  will highlight posthumanism’s 
resonance with the work of the anticolonial and Black feminist theorist, 
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Sylvia Wynter. I focus on Wynter’s work  because, more than any other 
critic now writing on Blackness and justice, Wynter insists that overcom-
ing racism is not simply a  matter of redeeming liberal humanism but rather 
commits us to inventing new “genres of the  human” that look beyond 
Western humanism’s episteme of “Man.” Wynter’s work, then, frames so-
cial justice as an explic itly posthumanist proj ect— a proj ect of moving be-
yond Western humanism— and as such it offers the most fertile site for 
discerning crosscurrents between posthumanist and social justice proj ects. 
This third section therefore lays out my vision for the partial reconcilia-
tion and  future collaboration between posthumanist materialisms and 
posthumanist social justice theories. One major advantage of this collabo-
ration, I suggest, is that read through one another,  these theories speak 
each other’s lapses, illuminating blind spots the other cannot see. Thus I 
show how each attempts to preserve a central feature of the episteme they 
ostensibly oppose: posthumanism remains committed to liberalism’s indi-
vidualist politics while even Wynter’s social justice theory remains invested 
in Western humanism’s philosophy of  human exceptionalism. Thus I pro-
pose that, taken together,  these theories spur each other to live up to the 
transformative potential of their epistemic challenge to liberal humanism’s 
construction of “Man.”
At the same time, however, I  shall argue that the clarified posthuman-
ism this collaboration yields also makes the limitations of this proj ect more 
vis i ble— limitations that, I argue, antislavery materialism anticipates and 
therefore can help us to anatomize. Above I have suggested that the ante-
bellum materialism I have been outlining lights up absences and aporias 
in its latter- day counterpart; if the absence is race, the aporia we arrive at 
 here has to do with what I  shall describe, in my Coda, as posthumanism’s 
romanticism. This chapter’s detour through twenty- first- century posthu-
manisms thus ultimately leads us back to the antebellum sources with which 
it starts. In the Coda I  will return to Douglass, Thoreau, and Whitman in 
order to suggest how their antislavery materialism helps us to confront the 
vestiges of romantic naturalism within modern posthumanism and presses 
us to reimagine what a  future posthumanist politics might look like.
Lastly, a note on methodology:  these final chapters depart from the 
broadly historicist and textual approach of my foregoing chapters to en-
gage in a more abstractly philosophical discussion of recent critical the-
ory. They are nonetheless written with a number of dif fer ent potential 
readers in mind: from scholars of the nineteenth  century who have  little 
or no familiarity with con temporary critical theory, to critical theorists 
with  little or no interest in nineteenth- century lit er a ture. I have therefore 
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tried to describe the theories treated in  these final chapters in terms that 
rely as  little as pos si ble upon the idioms or critical jargons characteristic 
of each. To some readers this decision may seem to express a degree of 
skepticism or estrangement from  these critical schools, but my aim is clar-
ity in the hopes that making  these discourses accessible to new readers— 
and more mutually accessible to each other— will contribute to their further 
development.
Myopias of the Anthropocene:  Human ≠ Homo sapiens
Posthumanist materialism confronts us with our inhumanity— our animal-
ity, materiality, and irreducible alterity to ourselves. It pres ents this dehu-
manizing portrait in a spirit of radical generosity: by acknowledging our 
constitution through, and dependence upon, nonhuman beings and 
systems, posthumanists suggest that we may fi nally renounce the specio-
logical chauvinism (and perhaps even the suicidal tendencies) of our self- 
proclaimed autonomy from nature. Honoring that acknowl edgment 
would necessarily entail a profound rearrangement of current modes of ex-
istence at all levels of its ordering. Daunting though this  wholesale revolu-
tion may be, the hope is that we might yet restructure global biopolitics 
and neoliberal biocapitalism, reor ga nize our consumptive and ethical be-
hav iors, and reinvent our cultural and autobiographical narratives to make 
them, as N. Katherine Hayles puts it, “conducive to the long- range sur-
vival of  humans and of other life- forms, biological and artificial, with whom 
we share the planet and ourselves.”4 For posthumanists, the continued 
flourishing of the  human species depends upon embracing its nonhumanity, 
including the sensitive mechanisms of its organism and the fragile ecosystems 
of  human and nonhuman existence on which  human life depends. We 
must learn to think in terms of collective, planetary survival; indeed, given 
the porously networked nature of the  human organism,  there is, posthuman-
ists suggest, no other kind.
But if this effort to dehumanize the  human is not intended to be degrading, 
it is nonetheless still necessary to theorize its relation to the dehumanizing 
assemblages of racism and sexism that precede it— a task that con temporary 
posthumanism has yet to rigorously take up. The urgency of specifying 
this relation is in part a  matter of bridge building. Posthumanism’s em-
phasis upon  human animality and objecthood understandably sets off 
alarm bells for  those who are or who work on behalf of  those struggling to 
be recognized as fully  human and as rights- bearing persons before the 
law. Christopher Peterson observes that posthumanists therefore “cannot 
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expect racial minorities simply to forget the prolonged history of their 
dehumanization, as if to say, ‘We are all animals, so get over it!’ ”5 Insofar 
as posthumanist critics have begun to address this re sis tance,  there is evi-
dence that they may not yet fully understand its complaint. In the intro-
duction to a recent collection on “the nonhuman turn,” for instance— a 
collection that proposes “to name, characterize, and therefore to consoli-
date” this emerging posthumanist bent— Richard Grusin suggests that 
skepticism  toward this turn arises from a default suspicion of materiality 
that is the result of social constructivism’s predominance in the past fifty 
years of critical discourse.6 “Participants in liberatory scholarly proj ects,” 
Grusin offers, tend to presume “that any appeal to nature . . .  could only 
operate in ser vice of a defense of the status quo.”7 While Grusin’s diagno-
sis may well be true in many cases, it fails to account for the most compel-
ling concerns raised by scholars of social justice, as I  shall attempt to 
demonstrate below. It also discounts the move away from strict social con-
structivism that has unfolded across “liberatory” critical discourses, in-
cluding work in feminist, queer, postcolonial, and critical race theory in 
recent years— some of which has been vital to posthumanism’s emergence.8 
As we  shall see in this chapter, then, the concerns that social justice theo-
rists bring to posthumanism do not neatly boil down to an objection to 
posthumanism’s materialism per se but, rather, raise questions about its 
inattention to  human in equality.
This inattention to racism and other forms of discrimination finds ex-
pression in posthumanism’s rhetorical tendency to invoke the  human in 
the monolithic singular—as if, writes Alexander Weheliye, “we have now 
entered a stage in  human development where all subjects have been granted 
equal access to western humanity.”9 But of course, as Aimé Césaire mem-
orably observed, Western civilization has as yet never lived “a true human-
ism— a humanism made to the mea sure of the world”; instead, as I have 
discussed in Chapter 1,  under biopolitics, Western liberal humanism has 
sorted biological  humans along a racially and sexually coded spectrum from 
the “fully”  human to the “nonhuman.”10 A concern for social justice there-
fore commits us to attend to the ways in which the human/nonhuman 
binary not only functions to privilege Homo sapiens above other animal spe-
cies but is si mul ta neously deployed to differentiate Homo sapiens into dif-
fer ent categories of  legal and social protection. In light of the lethally 
uneven attribution of “humanity” across Homo sapiens, posthumanism’s in-
vitation to divest from Western humanism’s privileging of humanness 
can appear to be inequitable itself insofar as it demands a disavowal that is 
potentially far more costly to  those whose life chances are already lowered 
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by their marginalization from the  human. Hence Jinthana Haritaworn 
urges us to ask, “for whom might identifying with the nonhuman be too 
risky a move?”11
On the face of it, this question raises a concern that might easily be 
countered.  After all, it assumes that dehumanized populations have more 
to lose by identifying with the nonhuman whereas, arguably, divesting 
from the  human promises to be costlier to  those populations whose lives 
have heretofore been systematically protected by this episteme than it is 
to  those who are oppressed and exterminated by it.12 At the very least, 
 whether biopo liti cally condemned populations would be better off fighting 
for recognition  under the auspices of Western humanism or, conversely, 
fighting to overthrow this episteme is a complicated question whose answer 
cannot be known in advance and whose risks may look very dif fer ent in the 
short and the long term. Neither is it clear how the immediate individual 
perils of living without full liberal recognition can or should be mea sured 
against the collective planetary risks of persisting in this epistemic order. 
What good  will a perfected humanism be to a  human population facing 
mass extinction in a climate inimical to  human life?
Nonetheless, by flagging the unequal distribution of humanness among 
Homo sapiens, Haritaworn’s question crucially interrupts a conflation of the 
 human with Homo sapiens that pervades posthumanist critiques of anthro-
pocentrism. The term “anthropocentrism” has been broadly used in both 
posthumanist and environmentalist circles to indict a myopic selfishness 
that is, in this critique’s strongest formulations, not just ideological but 
structurally inherent to  human consciousness. In recent years, the strong 
version of this critique has become a central feature of “speculative real-
ism,” a distinctive school of posthumanist theory that endeavors to 
think beyond  human “finitude”— beyond, that is, the phenomenologi-
cally “centered points of view” endemic to the “organic perception” of 
all Homo sapiens as “sensing and world- oriented beings.”13 This speculative 
school—which encompasses proj ects like Claire Colebrook’s efforts to en-
vision thought  after  human extinction, as well as proj ects that belong to 
the subfield of object- oriented ontology (OOO)— proposes to think beyond 
the structural limitations that are physiologically built into the perceptual 
and cognitive apparatus of Homo sapiens. Thus in contrast to the main-
stream of posthumanism, which aims to think beyond a par tic u lar (West-
ern liberal humanist) episteme of the  human, this school of thought 
attempts to imagine (if that is still the right word) an inorganic perspec-
tive divorced from Homo sapiens’ embodied mind. It seeks to pioneer a per-
spective that “ frees itself from folding the earth’s surface around  human 
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survival” and from what Quentin Meillassoux terms “correlationism,” the 
philosophical notion that our perception of “real ity” is inevitably a repre-
sen ta tion  shaped by (correlated with) the faculties par tic u lar to our spe-
cies.14 In short, this school of posthumanism explores ways to speculatively 
move beyond what it views as the “anthropocentric” bias that organically 
limits the  human mind.
The po liti cal trou ble with this proj ect arises from the way its critique 
of “anthropocentrism” allows for slippage between a critique of cognitive 
finitude (an epistemological limitation biologically endemic to Homo sapi-
ens) and a critique of environmentally exploitative practices (an ethical fail-
ing ideologically endemic to Western civilization).15 The po liti cal fallout 
of that slippage becomes vis i ble in discussions of the Anthropocene period 
that blame humanity’s anthropocentrism for the environmental degradation 
of the planet. As Jason Moore points out, what ever its other liabilities, the 
term “Anthropocene” paradoxically locates the origins of the modern 
geohistorical shift it names in a distinctly ahistorical force: “Not class. 
Not capital. Not imperialism. Not even culture. But . . .  the Anthropos: 
humanity as an undifferentiated  whole.”16 Anthropocenic discourse thus 
acts as if all anthros  were equally “anthropocentric”—as if it is Homo sapiens, 
and not a certain (Western) mode of being Homo sapiens, that is destroying 
the Holocene and has been since “we” discovered Amer i ca, in ven ted the 
steam engine, exported industrialism to “our” colonies, or exploded the atom 
bomb (wherever the “golden spike” of the Anthropocene is to be set). By 
this sleight of hand, Moore objects, the idea of the Anthropocene collec-
tivizes responsibility for climate change without stopping to consider the 
“inequalities, alienation, and vio lence inscribed in modernity’s strategic 
relations of power and production” that have ushered in this new geologi-
cal real ity.17 In this way, critiques of the Anthropocene and of anthropo-
centrism threaten to naturalize  those power relations by treating the 
extractive economy and social injustice licensed by the West’s reigning 
episteme as if this  were the organic expression of Homo sapiens’ innately 
limited mind— the inevitable fallout of the ineluctable humanness of 
 human perception. In both its speculative or object- oriented and its envi-
ronmentalist forms, then, the critique of anthropocentrism frames the 
pres ent ecological crisis as an outcome determined by a speciological rather 
than a cultural myopia: the product of epistemological limitations onto-
logically organic to Homo sapiens rather than the contingent results of the 
hierarchical and extractionist episteme of modern Western civilization.
As advocates for social justice point out, this faulty diagnosis not only 
ignores the history of  human in equality but moreover may intensify that 
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in equality. By suggesting that all humanity (Homo sapiens) is accountable 
for “anthropogenic” climate change, the concept of the Anthropocene jus-
tifies charging minority and postcolonial  peoples with responsibility for 
redressing an environmental crisis they have not only not engineered but 
whose costs they have disproportionately shouldered as the populations 
most heavi ly exploited by industrial capitalism and most acutely exposed to 
its environmental consequences (including poisoned  water, landslides, flood-
ing, and climate change– related disasters like Hurricane Katrina). Social 
justice– minded critics thus point out the inequity implicit in environmen-
talist policies that, premised on the notion that “we  humans” are responsible 
for engendering a pos si ble sixth mass extinction event, have, for instance, 
moved to criminalize indigenous hunting practices. Or even more com-
monly, where such traditional ways of life have been irrevocably interrupted 
by imperial and economic expansion, indigenous and postcolonial  peoples 
have often come to rely on extractive industries that are now the target of 
environmental restrictions. As Elizabeth Povinelli observes, despite their 
devastating effects on the landscape, extractive industries are often among 
“the few alternatives for landholding groups to sustain their homelands, if 
in an often severely compromised fashion.”18 Therefore, while the effort 
to more tightly regulate extractive and polluting industries remains vitally 
impor tant, advocates of social justice contend that environmentalists must 
also be attentive to the ways in which even well- intentioned environmen-
tal policy may perpetuate historical inequities by further burdening  those 
who have benefitted the least from the ecological despoliations of Western 
economic “development.”
Expendable Populations: “Nonhuman” ≠ Non– Homo sapiens
Broadly viewed, then, current theoretical discourse has a tendency to cross 
its biological and ideological wires. In the instances I have just discussed, 
anthropocenic discourse confuses ideological and biological critique when 
it conflates the anthropocentric bias of the modern Western episteme with 
a critique of the perceptual limitations of Homo sapiens as such. If this con-
flation of “the  human” with Homo sapiens is problematic, in this section I 
examine how the corollary conflation— a tendency to treat “the nonhuman” 
as a category synonymous with non– Homo sapiens— likewise makes posthu-
manism vulnerable to impor tant critiques. Indeed, I submit that, above all, it 
is posthumanism’s tendency to conflate “nonhuman” with non– Homo sapiens 
that lies at the root of its failure to recognize its deep congruencies with the 
antiracist proj ects of social justice.
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The commonness of this conflation of nonhuman with non– Homo sapiens 
is perplexing given that it is roundly condemned in one of posthumanism’s 
founding texts— Jacques Derrida’s collection of essays The Animal That 
Therefore I Am.  Here Derrida rebukes the “asinanity” [bêtise] of the practice 
of referring to “the animal” in the monolithic singular, arguing that 
the definite article elides “a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living, or more 
precisely . . .  of organ izations of relations between the living and dead.”19 
Derrida thus underscores that, like “the  human,” “the animal” is also sorted 
into dif fer ent biopo liti cal and necropo liti cal molds— e. coli,  cattle, wolves, 
and French bulldogs enjoy very dif fer ent life chances and are subject to 
widely differing regimes of state scrutiny, ranging from  legal protection to 
systematic extermination, exploitation, or lethal neglect. Derrida’s point, then, 
is (as we might expect) antibinaristic: oppositions like human/nonhuman 
oversimplify our view of extant biological and biopo liti cal realities, mocking 
the speciological diversity of planetary life as well as the heterogeneity of 
ethical relations (all of them contingent, none of them ontologically given) 
that or ga nize the planetary distribution of living and  dying.
In highlighting the myriad relations of similarity and in equality that cut 
across species lines, Derrida’s essay therefore reminds us that the human/
nonhuman binary is not, in fact, a speciological distinction but rather an 
ideological one. Indeed, as Thoreau’s transmutationalist critique of Agas-
siz insists (or as anyone even cursorily familiar with the “trees” of modern 
evolutionary science knows), species are not originally and immutably dif-
fer ent but rather emerge and branch out from each other, fanning into 
shades of proximate relation or ga nized by differences of degree rather than 
kind (and featuring, as Derrida insists, differential rather than categori-
cally dif fer ent capacities for  things like language, culture, intelligence, 
feigning,  etc.). The scales of differentiability that speciological evolution 
creates thus simply do not obey the categorical rules of binaristic logic. 
Which is to say that Homo sapiens, kin as it is to other species, is not the 
antithesis of the nonhuman; only the  human is. “ Human” and “nonhuman” 
are ideological designations by which forms of being that are deemed 
moral and thus worthy of protection are distinguished from forms of be-
ing (including object being or “nonlife”) that are deemed morally negli-
gible and therefore expendable. As a designation of moral value, the  human 
floats  free of the speciological body, trailing a hierarchy of privilege that 
insinuates divisions both within and among species— dividing citizens from 
slaves and pets from pests, while conversely conflating  human chattel with 
 cattle, the poor with the feral, racial  others with beasts. The  human, in 
short, is an ideology masquerading as a species.
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The force of this point is therefore to suggest that posthumanism is a 
form of antiracism that does not consistently recognize itself as such. Brack-
eting for now the speculative branch of posthumanism discussed above— 
that which understands itself to be attempting to move beyond Homo 
sapiens’ perceptual limitations— the vast majority of posthumanists work-
ing in this loose- jointed field understand themselves to be engaged in an 
effort to deconstruct liberal humanism’s arbitrary and anti- empirical distinc-
tion of  human from nonhuman being. Broadly encompassing posthuman-
ist critics working in and  after poststructuralism (such as Derrida, Cary 
Wolfe, Neill Badmington), in science and technology studies (N. Kath-
erine Hayles, Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour), in materialist feminism and 
new materialism (Jane Bennett, Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, Mel Chen, 
Stacey Alaimo), and  others, this main branch of posthumanist theory 
seeks, in par tic u lar, to depose the drastically reductive materialist philos-
ophy that subtends the transcendental liberal subject, and according to 
which liberal humanism equates  human being with moral freedom and au-
tonomy while condemning all other forms of being to a rigid biological 
determinism. Against this hierarchical account of the  human, posthuman-
ism’s revisionary materialism instead highlights the inextricability of  human 
being from the animality and embodied materiality that it derogates and 
disavows, tracing the imbrications of mind and  matter, and natu ral and 
cultural agencies within the larger “vital, self- organizing, and yet non- 
naturalistic structure of living  matter itself.”20
Posthumanism’s effort to deconstruct liberal humanism’s hierarchy of 
the  human is therefore nothing less than an effort to dismantle the racial-
izing regime that has functioned to differentiate valorized ( human) from 
devalorized (nonhuman) Homo sapiens life. Indeed, as I  shall elaborate be-
low, Wynter’s work makes this connection particularly explicit by main-
taining that, since at least the  Middle Ages, the erection of racializing 
hierarchies (Christian/pagan, and  later human/Black) has been the primary 
function of the Western humanist episteme. As Wynter argues, the task 
of social justice must therefore be to move beyond the  human of this hu-
manist tradition. But although posthumanism’s ambition to dismantle the 
human/nonhuman binary coincides with such antiracist endeavors to de-
construct this same epistemic formation, posthumanism has been slow to 
recognize the relevance of race to its theoretical undertaking. Indeed, Za-
kkiyah Jackson observes, “given that appositional and homologous (even 
co- constitutive) challenges pertaining to animality, objecthood, and thing-
liness have long been established in thought examining the existential 
predicament of modern racial Blackness, the resounding silence in the 
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posthumanist . . .  lit er a tures with re spect to race is remarkable.”21 Despite 
sharing a common  enemy— Western humanism’s hierarchical conception 
of the  human—as well as a common critique—of the false empiricism 
that condemns nonhuman being to embodied essentialism and biologi-
cal determinism— posthumanism has generally understood itself to be an 
ontological rather than an antiracist discourse.
In one view, this failure of recognition stems from the prob lem of 
posthumanism’s theoretical canon. Despite its commitment to moving 
beyond the episteme of Western liberal humanism, posthumanists have 
largely gone searching for inspiration in the rec ord of Western philosophy 
and theory— looking to Derrida and Niklas Luhman, Michel Foucault 
and Giorgio Agamben, Baruch Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze, Lucretius and 
Niels Bohr, Charles Darwin and Silvan Tomkins. As Alexander Weheliye 
observes, posthumanism has thus “rarely considered cultural and po liti cal 
formations outside the world of [Western] Man that might offer alterna-
tive versions of humanity.” More pointedly, Weheliye notes that posthu-
manism’s neglect of postcolonial and minority criticism means that it has 
been all the less likely to come across works that could help it to theorize 
“the tight bonds between humanity and racializing assemblages in the 
modern era.”22 In this way, the Western bias of its canon may explain post-
humanism’s tendency to disregard racism’s centrality to (perhaps even 
synonymity with) the epistemic formation that it critiques.
However, posthumanism’s failure to recognize antiracist and postcolo-
nial criticism as its pre ce dents may also derive from its per sis tent conflation 
of the nonhuman with non– Homo sapiens species. That is, despite the crit-
ical care they take to identify the object of their critique as a par tic u lar 
episteme of the  human, posthumanists nonetheless overwhelmingly tend 
to treat the nonhuman as if this  were a speciological category referring to 
animals, plants, and objects—to, that is, non– Homo sapiens entities— rather 
than an ideological category referring to forms of being that have been 
deemed morally negligible. This slippage from the moral category “non-
human” to the biological category “non– Homo sapiens” leads posthuman-
ists to focus on the way Western liberal humanism has systematically 
devalorized nonhuman species and objects— a form of discrimination they 
then compare to racism and sexism rather than identifying racism and sex-
ism as other names for the structurally discriminatory logic they protest.23 
In other words, this slippage invites posthumanists to imagine that racism 
and sexism are not what they are talking about when they talk about eman-
cipating the nonhuman.24 In this way, posthumanism’s tendency to treat 
the nonhuman as a speciological category (designating non– Homo sapiens) 
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rather than a moral one (compassing dehumanized Homo sapiens as well as 
non– Homo sapiens beings) in turn works to obscure the relevance of anti-
racist and social justice discourses to the epistemic critique posthuman-
ism frames.25
This critique of posthumanism’s Western theoretical bias may register 
as an accusation, but it is even more pressingly an invitation to wider col-
laboration. By holding more tightly onto the distinction between  human 
and Homo sapiens, and between nonhuman and non– Homo sapiens, posthu-
manism opens itself up to a  whole new archive of antiracist and social justice 
thought, and a closer conversation between  these theories  going forward 
could produce a power ful new critical matrix. To begin this conversation, 
my next section turns to the work of Sylvia Wynter, whose sustained critique 
of Western liberal humanism’s constitutive racism affords a particularly 
productive starting place for thinking conjunctively (although not, as 
we  shall see, seamlessly) across posthumanist and social justice theories. 
As I  shall argue, putting  these two discourses in conversation can help 
each to refine its philosophical commitment— and perhaps, too, the limits 
of that commitment—to moving beyond the Western episteme of “the 
 human.”
Mutual Encounters: Posthumanism as Social Justice
Sylvia Wynter’s theory of social justice highlights the structural role that 
racism plays in the episteme of Western liberal humanism. Her major in-
tervention into the fields of postcolonial, Black, and feminist studies has 
been to underscore the futility of seeking social justice within this West-
ern episteme of “Man,” and to call, therefore, for a posthumanist model of 
social justice. For Wynter, the story of Western humanism’s development 
cannot be separated from the history of New World colonialism and, in 
par tic u lar, Black slavery. Expanding and sharpening Foucault’s genealog-
ical account, Wynter tells the story of Western Man’s epistemic develop-
ment in three  grand movements.26 In the  Middle Ages, Western Eu rope 
operated with a Christian hierarchy of the  human, with the faithful oc-
cupying the status of fully moralized beings, and pagans constituting mor-
ally negligible beings. In the Re nais sance, this Christian hierarchy was 
partially overwritten by the ostensibly more secular idea of liberal “Man,” 
who is defined not by his relation to God (Christian or pagan) but rather 
by his relation to the state (citizen or noncitizen, bios or zoe). In the third 
movement, which began in the late eigh teenth  century, the liberal defini-
tion of “Man” was further (if again only ostensibly) secularized by the rise 
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of biologism and Darwinian evolutionism. Since this “second variant of 
Man” was understood to originate “in Evolution rather than as before, in 
Divine Creation,” Wynter argues that this “biocentric” turn in Western lib-
eral humanism consolidated racist hierarchy. For whereas in the Re nais-
sance and  Middle Ages the  human had been understood to have been 
universally made in God’s image (and only subsequently parsed into Chris-
tians/pagans, or citizens/noncitizens), now the  human was to be repre-
sented as an unevenly developed species “in the slow pro cess of evolution 
from monkey into man.”27 The biologization of Western Man thus intro-
duced the idea of “the ge ne tic nonhomogeneity of the  human species,” dis-
tributing Homo sapiens along a racialized spectrum from apelike (“the 
Negroid”) to “man” (“the Caucasian”).28
In Wynter’s hands, then, the history of Western liberal humanism is a 
history of factualizing—of making biologically “scientific”— a hierarchy 
of  human being that has been inscribed in the Western episteme from its 
earliest days. Of course, this episteme is only one out of a potentially infi-
nite number of stories one could spin about what it means to be  human. 
And yet, as Wynter observes, by posing as an objectively empirical rather 
than a subjectively po liti cal, ethical, philosophical, or religious account of 
the  human, this episteme made it “impossible for [Western thinkers] to 
conceive of an Other to what they called and continue to call  human.”29 In 
the West and its former colonies, the supposed naturalism of this “genre” 
of  human being worked alongside the hegemony of Western power to 
conceal the contingency of this Western ideology and to occlude the exis-
tence of—as well as the possibility of inventing— alternative epistemes of 
the  human.30
Wynter’s larger aim  here is therefore posthumanist in the sense that her 
antiracist theory calls upon us to dismantle liberal humanism’s hegemonic 
conception of Man. Indeed, a central premise of her proj ect is that the task 
of redressing inequity and discrimination ultimately cannot be accom-
plished by simply redistricting the  human within the terms this episteme 
provides. It is not enough, she suggests, to revalorize marginalized popu-
lations and thus, bit by bit, shuffle more beings into the lifeboat of moral 
privilege that liberal recognition affords. “Such a moralistic approach,” she 
writes, “is the logical result of taking our isms [racism, sexism] as isolated 
rather than systemic facts.”31 Instead, she insists, the proj ect of social justice 
requires us to move beyond the pres ent episteme of the  human. For as her 
genealogy of Western humanism underscores, discrimination is structural 
to the Western humanistic tradition: this episteme has always operated by 
constituting “a negative ontological category” (pagan, foreign, Black) to 
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serve as the foil to its repre sen ta tion of the  human. Accordingly, Wynter 
argues that the plight of humanism’s dehumanized  Others, “like that of 
the ongoing degradation of the planetary environment, is not even posable, 
not to say resolvable, within the conceptual framework of our pres ent order 
of knowledge.”32 Thus, instead of a more pluralistic liberal politics, Wyn-
ter calls for a radical break from the hierarchical and discriminatory 
episteme that funds liberal politics, pluralistic or other wise. “In order to 
call in question this ontologically subordinated function, ‘minority dis-
course’ can not be merely another voice in the pres ent ongoing conversa-
tion,” she insists: the challenge is not to expand the conversation but to 
change it.33 Linking the dehumanization of racialized, feminized, and im-
poverished populations to the exploitation of animals and the destruction 
of the nonhuman environment, Wynter envisions something like a unified 
minority (or nonhuman) movement that would seek to “bring closure to 
our pres ent order of discourse” and inaugurate a new one no longer pre-
mised upon the derogation of  others.34
Wynter’s conviction that ending racism entails moving beyond (i.e., 
post-) humanism marks an entry for thinking about the deep congruen-
cies, and perhaps equally entrenched differences, between posthumanist 
materialism and posthumanist social justice theory. It is, at least, arguable 
that posthumanist materialist discourse is where the conceptual work Wyn-
ter calls for— this effort to conjure new “genres of the  human”—is cur-
rently and most actively getting done. Like Wynter, posthumanism attacks 
the “biocentric” or deterministic logic that arose in the eigh teenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and that holds that  human identity is essentially 
coded in the body, and that bodies can in turn be located along a spec-
trum of moral evolution “from monkey to man.” Against this essentialist, 
deterministic, and teleological account of embodiment, posthumanism’s 
revisionary materialism insists that acknowledging the imbrication of iden-
tity with embodiment does not condemn us to erecting racist, sexist, 
speciesist, or any other form of moral hierarchy.
Indeed, posthumanism’s materialist ontology bears  little resemblance 
to the watchmaker’s world of bestial automata and chains of being that sub-
tends the biocentric account of  human identity that Wynter decries. In-
stead, its founding assumption is that acknowledging the force of material 
embodiment does not condemn us to biological determinism. In this way, 
posthumanist materialism hopes to displace racial science’s taxonomic and 
hierarchical order of being with a monistic vision of ontological mutual-
ity, or what José Muñoz terms “the potential and  actual vastness of being- 
with.”35 As Karen Barad describes this ontology (drawing upon the theory 
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of quantum entanglement), embodied being primordially consists of on-
going “relations without preexisting relata.”36 Before we are anything or 
anyone individually, and thus before any hierarchical system of ordering 
differentiated entities, we exist more primally as a collective: in other words, 
the mutuality of being is ontologically prior to any system of order that 
we might impose on being’s dynamically relational field.37 Before individ-
ual subjects and objects, before  causes and effects, being is imbricated and 
unfolding, a complexly conjoint becoming. Posthumanism thus conjures 
what Roberto Esposito describes as “the flesh”: a “vital real ity that is ex-
traneous to any kind of unitary organ ization.”38 As a dynamic material het-
erogeneity that is as resistant to totalization as it is to individuation and 
hierarchical ordering, “the flesh” is at once “singular and communal, generic 
and specific, . . .  undifferentiated and dif fer ent.”39
The deterministic essentialisms of biological racism, sexism, and specie-
sism can thus find no purchase in this ontology  because the materiality of 
being- with defies attributions of identity. Indeed (much like we have just 
seen in Whitman), posthumanism’s ontology defies individuality. The pri-
mordial relationality of being means that any frame we put on being— any 
attempt to articulate a par tic u lar being out of being- with (to carve a par-
tic u lar “relatum” out of quantum entanglement or an individual body out 
of “the flesh”)— could only ever be provisional, perspectival, a revisable 
construction. On this view, far from being grounded in being, individual 
identity can only ever appear as a kind of denial or misrepre sen ta tion of 
being’s primordial relationality, a pro cessualism that resists identity. Hence 
Jasbir Puar describes identity as an attempt “to still and quell the perpet-
ual motion of assemblages, to capture and reduce them, to harness their 
threatening mobility.”40 This is to say that  whether or not we choose to 
see identitarian regimes as intentionally repressive, posthumanism insists 
that they are, at least, inherently reductive, premised on the disavowal “of a 
relation of otherness that is destined to force open the identity presupposed 
by the body proper.”41 In posthumanism’s ontology of “the flesh,” bodies, 
such as they are, are irreducibly open- ended, porous, compound, relational; 
identities unravel into ongoing pro cesses that are riven with complexity 
and creative contingency; all nouns melt into verbs. Where racism and sex-
ism imprison identity in the body, posthumanist materialism  frees the 
body of identity, reimagining the “boundary” of the skin as a site of chias-
matic continuity with an alien yet intimate world.42
So the question I have been posing is this: Could posthumanism be de-
scribing something like the posthumanist “genre of the  human” that 
Wynter envisions? To what extent might posthumanist materialism and 
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posthumanist social justice be thought together as two fronts in the same 
fight against liberal humanism’s hegemonic hold on “the  human”? The 
summary of  these two theories that I have just offered attempts to high-
light their common interests: posthumanist materialism explodes the dis-
criminatory hierarchy of being that Wynter diagnoses as structural to the 
Western episteme she opposes. But to answer the question of their con-
gruency properly, we would have to know  whether posthumanist materi-
alism and posthumanist social justice oppose the same  thing when they set 
themselves in opposition to liberal humanism. And the answer to this ques-
tion, which I  shall elaborate in my discussions below,  will be no, they 
 don’t. That is, when we put  these theories in conversation it becomes clear 
that Wynter ultimately endorses humanism’s faith that  human life is 
uniquely endowed with freedom and moral import, whereas posthuman-
ist materialism consistently challenges this premise. But if the preserva-
tion of  human exceptionalism suggests that Wynter’s theory does not 
wholly break with the Western liberal humanism it critiques, posthuman-
ist theory likewise seeks to conserve key aspects of this episteme. As I  shall 
elaborate, despite the anti- individualism of its relational ontology, posthu-
manism’s politics remain deeply indebted to the individualistic institu-
tions of modern liberal democracy. In outlining  these two dif fer ent 
conservative tendencies below I  will be suggesting why it makes sense to 
view them as theoretical prob lems for the ostensibly posthumanist and 
posthumanist critical traditions in which they respectively arise. Ultimately, 
however, I  will suggest in my Coda why falling short of a radical break from 
liberal humanism might set desirable or even necessary limits on our 
posthumanism.
Humanism’s Holdovers in Posthumanism
For its part, posthumanism sets itself up in opposition to liberal human-
ism’s transcendental subject; however, this opposition does not extend to a 
rejection of the liberal po liti cal institutions that  were or ga nized to honor 
and accommodate the liberal humanist subject. On the contrary, posthu-
manists regularly gloss the mutuality of being that their ontology discov-
ers as an invitation to a pluralistic expansion of demo cratic politics. From 
Esposito’s “affirmative” biopolitics to Latour’s “parliament of  things” to 
Levi Bryant’s “democracy of objects,” posthumanist ontologies routinely 
double as blueprints for a more pluralistic (a more- than- human) demo cratic 
politics whose constituency  will fi nally encompass all beings without 
exclusion.
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On this description, the material connectedness of  human and nonhu-
man being in the primordiality of being- with becomes an argument for 
extending ethical recognition to nonhuman being on the model of demo-
cratic liberalization. As Jane Bennett puts this thought, “If  human culture 
is inextricably enmeshed with vibrant, nonhuman agencies, and if  human 
intentionality can be agentic only if accompanied by a vast entourage of 
nonhumans, then it seems that the appropriate unit of analy sis for demo-
cratic theory is neither the individual  human nor the  human collective but 
the (ontologically heterogeneous) ‘public.’ . . .  Surely the scope of democ-
ratization can be broadened to acknowledge more nonhumans in more 
ways, in something like the ways in which we have come to hear the po-
liti cal voices of other  humans formerly on the outs.”43 The logic, then, of 
this vision of posthumanist politics imagines that the enmeshed and de-
pendent nature of  human being argues for extending re spect and recogni-
tion to devalued forms of being through which, it turns out,  human life 
and agency move. Between the ontology outlined in the first part of this 
quote and the pluralism endorsed  after the ellipses, we move from a pro-
cessual materialism that deconstructs individual identity to a politics that 
is premised upon individual recognition.
Such a comprehensively inclusive politics would seem to constitute a ma-
jor ethical advancement— how could it not?— and yet it is not immedi-
ately clear how posthumanism’s ontology supports the pluralistic politics 
posthumanists invoke. Posthumanism, as we have seen, begins by point-
ing to the pro cessual nature of being, recasting apparently solid objects as 
open- ended pro cesses. But this pro cessual ontology creates difficulties for 
any politics we would construct on its back. The fact of process— what Ben-
nett calls the “public” but what we might more accurately, by Bennett’s 
lights, view as the “publicity” or collectively “enmeshed” nature of all be-
ing—is not,  after all, a “unit of analy sis” but, on the contrary, an account 
of the ideological contingency (the fictionality) of any unit whatsoever. 
Nouns like “public” and noun phrases like “a vast entourage of nonhu-
mans” help Bennett manage the contradiction between her pro cessualism 
and the demo cratic theory she turns to by precipitating the pro cessual as-
semblage of being back into a countable array of discrete entities with 
self- possessed “voices” and po liti cal interests. Bennett’s vision for a 
broadened democracy that would “consult nonhumans more closely” and 
“listen and respond more carefully to their outbreaks, objections, testimo-
nies, and propositions” thus seems like an ethically admirable program 
that nonetheless sacrifices the central insight of her posthumanist materi-
alism. For her compelling account of agency as a force distributed across 
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 human and nonhuman actants—an account that thereby deconstructs 
differences between  human and nonhuman, self and other, vital subjectiv-
ity and “vibrant” materiality— suggests, to the contrary, that we exist in a 
world that is not divisible into speakers and listeners. Indeed, even in 
Barad’s quantum ontology— which does suggest that we might frame lo-
cal “units of analy sis” that temporarily resolve “intra- action” into “inter- 
action”—it is not clear that any entity would have the longevity, let alone 
the personality, sufficient to support anything we could call an objection, 
testimony, or proposition.
Versions of this contradiction between posthumanism’s pro cessual on-
tology and its liberal politics recur throughout posthumanist work. It shows 
up, for instance, in Barad’s injunction to “intra- act responsibly,” which 
seems to commit us to an impossibility by enjoining us to act ethically 
(make choices, take into account)  toward a mode of relation (“intra- action”) 
which Barad defines as belonging to a state of entanglement that is onto-
logically prior to the differentiation between subjects and objects, or  causes 
and effects. But, of course, in this state of entanglement ethical obligation 
has nothing or no one to which it might attach.44 As Matt Taylor argues in 
his critique of Latour’s “parliament of  things,” ontological theories like 
 these fail to explain how we are meant to adjudicate “between a pro cessual 
relationality that precedes entities, on the one hand, and a procedural pol-
itics or ethics between entities, on the other.”45  There is, in other words, 
no way to navigate between the ontology of being- with and the unit- based 
calculus of liberal politics and ethics—at least,  there is no way to effect this 
translation that does not simply betray the mutuality of being that post-
humanism champions. Indeed, it seems particularly dubious that an on-
tology that is, as posthumanists regularly stress, distinctly inimical to the 
figure of the sovereign and autonomous liberal self could be translated 
without loss into an expanded liberal politics. Thus while posthumanist 
plans for incorporating non– Homo sapiens into liberal demo cratic politics 
seem laudible, they also seem curiously perverse, for invariably they 
shunt us back into liberal, ethical, and po liti cal grammars in which the 
radical imbrication of being is reduced to interactions between individual 
beings whose inherent sovereignty, freedom, and autonomy demand to be 
recognized. In this sense, posthumanism’s habit of positioning itself as an 
emancipatory discourse working in the pluralizing tradition of abolition-
ism and first- wave feminism arguably undersells the radicalism of its 
philosophy.
In fact, this is one impor tant area in which a more sustained engage-
ment with social justice theory could help posthumanism to refine its 
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understanding of its own proj ect. Confirming Wynter’s sense of the 
acute limitations of trying to seek social justice within the terms of the 
Western episteme, recent work in indigenous studies has highlighted 
the epistemic coerciveness of liberalism’s regime of rights and recognition. 
 These studies reveal the steep price of admission exacted from indigenous 
communities seeking po liti cal recognition.46 As they demonstrate, the very 
pro cess of establishing claims to rights and sovereignty often subjects in-
digenous groups to a kind of epistemic neo co lo nial ism, forcing them to 
abandon or reframe their traditional cultural conceptions of subjectivity, 
kinship, and community with the nonhuman environment so as to bring 
them into alignment with liberal accounts of personhood, race, and terri-
tory. Indeed, Taiaiake Alfred observes, even multiculturally minded liberal 
policies tend to resolve any “disconnect between [their] rights- based lib-
eral philosophical orientation and the fundamentals of Indigenous teach-
ings and worldviews” at the latter’s expense. In this way, the pro cess of 
securing tribal rights can end up coercing indigenous  peoples to relinquish 
“traditional notions of belonging . . .  and [replace] them with race and 
gender- based notions of membership designed to reconstitute Indigenous 
 people in ways acceptable to Euroamerican ideologies.”47 Over generations— 
and, more pointedly, as a result of po liti cal policies ostensibly designed to 
accommodate cultural difference— indigenous  peoples can thus come to 
“hold ideas about identity and their nationhood which reflect colonial atti-
tudes,” losing touch with an indigenous “worldview that is illuminated by 
notions of fluidity [and] flux.”48
Kim TallBear echoes this critique in her recent study of the popular-
ization of DNA testing in North Amer i ca as a mechanism for establishing 
claims to tribal belonging. Although this practice offers seemingly straight-
forward and objective answers to questions about tribal belonging, TallBear 
shows how it does so by reducing tribal identity to a ge ne tic fingerprint, 
drastically simplifying the intricate interplay of both genealogical and cul-
tural inheritances (including what TallBear describes as the “sense of inex-
plicable inheritance”) that has traditionally  shaped the logic of tribal 
belonging. DNA testing therefore proposes to convert a complexly biocul-
tural phenomenon into a set of “par tic u lar ideas and vocabularies of race, 
ethnicity, nation,  family, and tribe” that have been codified by the Western 
liberal- raciological episteme over the past two hundred years. But “for 
and by whom are such categories defined?” TallBear inquires. “How have 
continental- level race categories come to  matter? And why do they  matter 
more than the ‘ peoples’ that condition indigenous narratives, knowledges, 
and claims?”49 Thus, like Alfred, TallBear calls attention to the ways in 
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which the tools for gaining po liti cal recognition often subject non- Western 
 peoples and epistemes to a kind of neo co lo nial disciplining. By underscor-
ing the epistemic price of liberal inclusion— what Elizabeth Povinelli dubs 
“the cunning of recognition”— indigenous social justice studies like  these 
can serve to alert posthumanists to the ways in which its focus on extend-
ing liberal rights and recognition to nonhuman beings may be hostile to 
the more radical epistemic transformation— the emancipation of being- 
with— that they ultimately seek.50
Indeed, studies of recognition’s “cunning” coercions suggest that post-
humanism’s faith in liberal recognition might not simply sell short its pro-
cessualist ontology but, rather, sell it out. By demonstrating how liberal 
recognition can act as a straightjacket as much as a means to liberation, 
Alfred, TallBear, and Povinelli help us to see how posthumanism’s advo-
cacy for nonhuman recognition and inclusion may in fact be antithetical 
to the kind of change its ontology tasks us with when it suggests that inclu-
sion is, for better or worse, inescapable— that we are always already onto-
logically conjoined  whether or not we recognize each other as equals. This 
is to suggest, as Cary Wolfe also reminds us, that posthumanist materialism 
in fact has nothing to do with the question of which bodies “ matter” 
(Homo sapiens? All primates? All animals? Black lives? All lives?).51 That is, 
its key proposition is not to champion the sovereignty (the entitlement to 
freedom, rights, and recognition) of nonhuman beings but rather to disclose 
the fictionality of sovereignty as such in a material world in which  every 
being is relationally constituted in and through the being of  others.
But if  these social justice critiques of liberal politics help us to discern 
the conservatism of posthumanism’s faith in liberal recognition, posthu-
manism’s critique of  human exceptionalism can, conversely, help us to dis-
cern the humanism that still haunts even Wynter’s ostensibly posthumanist 
theory of social justice. Although Wynter calls out the discriminatory hi-
erarchy that lies at the heart of the Western liberal humanist tradition, 
the alternative “genre of the  human” that she outlines ultimately looks a 
lot like the liberal humanist subject she proposes to displace. Wynter’s ge-
nealogy of Western Man pivots on the notion that “the  human” is a rep-
resentation—an enunciation that passes itself off as a natu ral fact. Seizing 
on this demonstration of humanity’s capacity for self- narration (which she 
terms, borrowing from Frantz Fanon, “sociogeny”), Wynter argues that 
this capacity marks out  human being as exceptional to nature. As she ex-
plains, sociogeny is an endowment unique to Homo sapiens, which affords 
this species an additional “nonphysical princi ple of causality”— the power 
to self- generate cultural codes that prescribe our beliefs and be hav iors for 
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us over and above the promptings of our inherited ge ne tic code.52 Socio-
geny thus liberates  human action from material causation: in contrast to the 
“purely biological” being of other species (whose identities, she argues, “are 
genet ically preprescribed for them”), we  humans “are si mul ta neously story-
telling and biological beings.”53 For Wynter, this unique speciological ca-
pacity not only affords Homo sapiens an intrinsic moral freedom lacking in 
all other forms of being, but it si mul ta neously guarantees the moral equal-
ity of all Homo sapiens to each other, for if Homo sapiens are sociogenic 
(self- creating) by definition, this speciological trait means that no mem-
ber of the species could be genet ically “preprescribed” by race or sex. For 
Wynters, then, sociogeny not only makes alternative genres of the  human 
pos si ble (by exposing Western humanism’s genre of the  human to be a so-
ciogenic rather than an organic fact), but it also (and somewhat paradoxi-
cally) provides an ostensibly biological justification for upholding the 
exceptional autonomy of all Homo sapiens (as the only species endowed with 
this special power).
The irony  here is thus that Wynter’s account of sociogeny reproduces 
a version of the same moral hierarchy and “biocentric” reasoning that she 
denounces in the Western episteme of Man. Indeed, it’s not hard to hear 
the echo of racism’s biological determinism in her cele bration of  human 
exceptionalism. Scientific racists like Josiah Nott also maintain that  human 
beings are uniquely  free of the biological determinism that rules lesser 
forms of being. And although clearly Nott differs from Wynter insofar as 
he maintains that this capacity is endemic to only certain races of Homo 
sapiens and not the  whole species, the under lying logic of biological 
exceptionalism— the proposition that select organisms are auto- instituting 
while all  others are physiologically determined— remains the same in both 
Nott’s and Wynter’s accounts of the  human. That Nott’s racism and Wyn-
ter’s antiracism are both able to adopt the same criterion to such differing 
ends underscores the contingency of the standards by which racial or spe-
ciological “autonomy” is defined. That is, what ever we might choose to 
count as evidence of a capacity for sociogenic self- making must always it-
self be an artifact of culture rather than a strictly biological fact. Thus the 
definition of what qualifies as “articulate” speech as opposed to animalis-
tic noise, “rational” thought as opposed to brutish self- interest, or “cul-
tured” be hav ior as opposed to instinctive action may be— and historically 
has been— stipulated and gerrymandered as power sees fit.
Indeed, that sociogeny yields its own version of the “cunning of recog-
nition” is a lesson brought home to us by Frederick Douglass, who recog-
nizes in its discrimination of speech from noise a key to the “blood- stained 
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gate of slavery.” At the start of the Narrative, Douglass harrowingly recalls 
witnessing his aunt Hester’s torture at the hands of Captain Anthony, dur-
ing which “no words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed 
to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose.” As numerous critics have 
pointed out, Douglass’s masterful per for mance of literacy in the prose of 
this scene, and throughout the Narrative, functions as a power ful testa-
ment to his humanity, demonstrating his rational intelligence. And yet this 
primal scene si mul ta neously  labors to expose the brutal capriciousness of 
language as a test of humanity in the first place. Douglass’s depiction of 
Anthony’s indifference to Hester’s “words,” “prayers,” and “heart- rending 
shrieks” lays bare the ease with which Anthony dismisses her utterances 
as merely instinctive, animalistic noises (morally indistinguishable from 
the bellows of the cow whose slaughter would have furnished the “blood- 
clotted cowskin” at this scene’s center).54
Douglass’s ambivalence in this scene— his implicit appeal to language 
as expressive of moral being and simultaneous critique of the ease with 
which language may be dismissed as mere sound— confronts us with what 
posthumanists describe as the necessarily ideological, rather than empiri-
cal, nature of any distinction between  human (autonomous, sociogenic) and 
nonhuman (embodied, “purely biological”) life. Thus Derrida argues that 
correcting the injustice this arbitrary distinction inscribes into being is 
“not just a  matter of giving back to the animal what ever it has been re-
fused” (by, for instance, demonstrating vari ous animals’ capacities for 
“speech, reason, experience of death, mourning, culture” and so forth); in-
stead the challenge is “a  matter of questioning oneself concerning the 
axiom that permits one to accord purely and simply to the  human or ra-
tional animal that which one holds the just plain animal to be deprived 
of.”55 It is not enough, in other words, to discover that hitherto excluded 
beings are capable of “testimony” (to return to Bennett’s word). To do this 
is simply to keep moving the chains down the field of humanism when the 
task, instead, is to escape the rules of its game. Thus Derrida demands that 
instead of trying to perfect the axiom by which we distinguish which ut-
terances count as “speech,” which events count as “actions,” or which be-
ings count as “ free,” we  ought to be asking ourselves whose interests that 
axiom serves.
But if posthumanism’s critique of  human exceptionalism thus calls into 
question Wynter’s faith in, and commitment to, Homo sapiens’s sociogenic 
autonomy, its skepticism also arguably forwards Wynter’s larger proj ect. 
Weheliye suggests that Wynter’s effort to think “freedom beyond the world 
of Man” commits us to listening for “language that does not rely on 
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linguistic structures, at least not primarily, to convey meaning . . .  trans-
parent to the world of Man.”56 Taking up this invitation (and perhaps tak-
ing it farther than Weheliye means it to go), we might conclude that 
Wynter’s desire for a posthumanist genre of the  human not only commits 
us to listening for language among  those not already counted as  human but 
also urges us to listen for the nonhumanity of  human language. Put differ-
ently, instead of imagining that sociogeny (language, culture) is the antith-
esis of ge ne tic determinism, we can imagine it as a kind of emergent 
complication within biological order.  After all, if the capacity for sociogeny 
is somehow in Homo sapiens’ “nature,” then the degree of freedom it intro-
duces into  human be hav ior is not a negation of humanity’s ge ne tic inheri-
tance but an expression of it. Using this description, then, a capacity for 
sociogeny does not designate a transcendental freedom but rather intro-
duces a degree of play—of unpredictability or creativity— into speciological 
be hav ior. From this perspective,  human being still exceeds the embodied 
determinism which, for Wynter, characterizes racist “biocentrism”; how-
ever, that freedom no longer liberates  human being from its embodiment, 
categorically distinguishing Homo sapiens from non– Homo sapiens being. 
When we begin to think sociogeny as an embodied trait in this way, it takes 
on the double movement of Derrida’s posthumanist vision, designating a 
capacity that is something less than the absolute “ human” freedom human-
ism had posited, and therefore identifying something that is potentially 
more widely shared, to varying degrees, among the diversity of animal life.
Again, my sense is that adopting a more posthumanist view of the  human 
would clarify and strengthen Wynter’s proj ect. Exorcising the  human ex-
ceptionalism from her vision brings it a step closer to realizing her goal of 
articulating a new episteme that embraces the materiality of “the flesh- 
and- blood individual subject.”57 Indeed, as Katherine McKittrick demon-
strates, Wynter regularly suggests that decolonizing Western Man  will 
mean learning to see how “our flesh and blood and brain  matter” work to 
“unsettle and enmesh the other wise bifurcated and dichotomized episte-
mological clusters of science and creativity,” or biological and sociogenic 
production.58 Moreover, posthumanism’s view of the conjugation of free-
dom with embodiment forwards Wynter’s ambition to “move us  toward 
a . . .  correlated  human species, and eco- systemic ethic.”59 Throughout her 
work, Wynter calls attention to the ways in which the racism, sexism, and 
colonialism of the modern era are structurally conjoined with the necrop-
olitics of the sixth extinction event now underway. All of  these phenom-
ena, she argues, arise from the same source: liberal humanism’s hierarchical 
division of being. They are, in other words, one prob lem with several 
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heads: an integrated “poverty- hunger- habitat- energy- trade- population- 
atmosphere- waste- resource prob lem.”60 Wynter’s sense that social injus-
tice and environmental destruction are systemic to the Western genre of 
“the  human” underscores the urgency of decommissioning this episteme’s 
foundational move of disavowing  human materiality and thus segregating 
“ human” being from the entangled being- with of planetary life.
By  these routes, Wynter’s critique of Western Man and posthumanism’s 
materialist ontology begin to coalesce more clearly. The essential inter-
vention of both proj ects— what constitutes their departure from Western 
humanism—is their effort to renounce the transcendentally autonomous 
 human subject whose freedom is constituted through the derogation (the 
racialization/animalization/objectification) of embodied life. Both thus aim 
to deconstruct this hegemonic episteme—to disassemble, and not simply 
redistrict, the bounds of the  human as we know it. Moreover, when read 
through one another, each of  these proj ects helps the other to see where 
their work threatens to collapse back into the hierarchical ontology they 
wish to revise— where, for instance, posthumanism’s liberal politics and 
Wynter’s  human exceptionalism betray their primary commitments to rei-
magining  human being as a mode of being- with in which the distinction 
human/nonhuman no longer holds.
From a certain perspective, this coalescing vision of a thoroughly 
decolonized posthumanism promises to be radically liberatory. Ultimately 
pointing beyond the liberal politics of pluralism,  these posthumanist 
proj ects challenge us to inaugurate a new episteme made to the mea-
sure not just of “Man” nor Homo sapiens nor even all biological life, 
but to the heterogeneous and radiantly interanimated ontology of worldly 
being. Unleashing the revolutionary generosity unwittingly implicit in 
Césaire’s appeal, they urge us to conceive a po liti cal ethics truly “made 
to the mea sure of the world”—an episteme no longer premised upon 
the manufacture of a “lesser” class of devalued and exploitable being 
but, rather, one that embraces all being as one densely conjoined world.
Viewed from another  angle, however, it is not clear that liberation is a 
term that can meaningfully be applied to an ontology of entanglement. 
Liberation, as we know it, implies disentanglement—an unburdening that 
restores us to a natu ral state of freedom, honoring our inherent right, as 
autonomous selves, to self- sovereignty. But none of  these  things— freedom, 
autonomy, sovereignty, the singular “self”— remain readily legible in a 
world in which being is primordially relational.
In light of this prob lem, the holdovers of humanism within  these posthu-
manistic discourses may,  after all, prove to be strategic inconsistencies. As 
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my readings of Douglass, Thoreau, and Whitman have tried to underscore, 
the ontology of embodiment has distinctly illiberal tendencies, undermin-
ing appeals to  human rights, agency, and selfhood as we understand  these 
 things. Thus while I began this chapter by suggesting that antislavery 
materialism may be useful to us  today by helping to spotlight the absence 
of race as a critical term in con temporary posthumanist theory, I’d like to 
propose now that it also lights up a further aporia in our pres ent discourse. 
 There is an evident tension in  these antebellum proj ects—in the ambiva-
lence with which Douglass embraces animality, aware of the costs of dehu-
manization; in the fatalism with which Thoreau appeals to evolutionary 
change despite his desire to believe in the power of conscientious action; 
and in the manic optimism with which Whitman welcomes the prospect of 
his own dissolution into an unspooling material cosmos. The unease we 
find  here stems from the incommensurability of  these materialist visions 
with the liberal and romantic ideals  these authors also held.
In  these ways,  these authors’ antislavery materialisms confront us with 
the dreams deferred by a more rigorously materialist account of being. And 
thus, although critics like Latour and Wynter often frame their work as 
attempts to construct an empirical episteme that  will fi nally be grounded 
in material fact rather than in the truths that ( human, Western) power in-
vents, we must learn to assess this episteme by a further standard. The 
question before us is not simply  whether a materialist, posthumanist on-
tology gives us a truer, more empirically accurate account of real ity. For 
 whether or not it is truer, the question remains  whether the episteme this 
ontology sponsors is ethically preferable to the humanism it seeks to dis-
place. I turn to this question, via antislavery materialism, in the Coda.
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C o d a
After Romantic Posthumanism
In an impor tant and difficult passage in “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” 
Hortense Spillers describes an opening of freedom that paradoxically 
 appears amid the horrific confinement of the  Middle Passage:
 Those African persons in “ Middle Passage”  were literally suspended in 
the “oceanic,” if we think of the latter in its Freudian orientation as an 
analogy for undifferentiated identity: removed from the indigenous 
land and culture, and not- yet “American”  either. . . .  They  were the 
culturally “unmade,” thrown in the midst of a figurative darkness that 
“exposed” their destinies to an unknown course. Often enough for 
the captains of  these galleys, navigational science of the day was not 
sufficient to guarantee the intended destination. We might say that 
the slave ship, its crew, and its human- as- cargo stand for a wild and 
unclaimed richness of possibility that is not interrupted, not “counted”  
/“accounted,” or differentiated,  until its movement gains the land 
thousands of miles away from the point of departure.1
In this brief but provocative moment, Spillers invites us to detect a “richness 
of possibility” opened up by the sheer unpredictability of physical systems. 
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As she suggests, the uncertainty of this ship’s fate— its vulnerability to 
volatile Atlantic winds and tides— lays bare the irreducibly speculative 
and provisional nature of any discursive account of this ship, temporarily 
suspending cultural authority and unmaking the identities that cultures 
confer.  Until the ship “gains the land” and makes good on the captain’s 
intentions for it, the precise nature of this venture remains undecidable: 
neither American nor indigenous language speakers can claim to define 
the “unknown course” they are on, nor can they say for sure if they are “cargo” 
and “crew” or something else— future mutineers and shark fodder; or 
every one the future- drowned. For Spillers it is not only the kidnapped 
Africans, physically chained and culturally unmoored in the ship’s hold, 
who are exposed to a “wild and unclaimed” unmaking; this  whole oceango-
ing assemblage— “the slave ship, its crew, and its human- as- cargo”— exists 
as an “undifferentiated identity” suspended in the “darkness” of an uncer-
tain journey.
Although Spillers is not a posthumanist, her account of oceanic suspen-
sion could easily come from the pages of recent posthumanist theory. The 
assemblage of ocean, ship, crew, and human- as- cargo that she conjures 
highlights the distribution of power across both  human and nonhuman 
agencies in this scene. And in mapping this complex intersection of mate-
rial and cultural forces (oceanic weather, colonizing and indigenous lan-
guages), she insists that neither culture nor  matter is fi nally decisive; each 
is vulnerable to the other. Spillers thus qualifies the linguistic determin-
ism of social constructivism as well as the physical determinism of bio-
logical essentialism by discovering something altogether dif fer ent in this 
moment— not determinism but a complexity that produces uncertainty, 
which she glosses as an unclaimed and unclaimable freedom. In a scene of 
what other wise appears to be total domination, Spillers finds bright 
cracks— interstices of possibility opening up in the unpredictable encoun-
ter of myriad forces: the skill of the captain’s navigational science inter-
secting with the power of Atlantic winds, the iron fastness of the chains 
that hold  human cargo countered by the force of that cargo’s memory of 
her name.
But if Spillers’s map of  human and nonhuman entanglement in this mo-
ment is reminiscent of posthumanist accounts of “the flesh,” ultimately in 
this essay she provides an account of “flesh” that is quite dif fer ent. In the 
larger essay, the force of nonhuman materiality fades from view and the 
materiality that concerns Spillers is specifically the flesh of  human being, 
and the power of this  human flesh to obdurately persist even  after ideology 
has other wise denied that being’s humanity. Flesh is, as she writes, “that 
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zero- degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment 
 under the brush of discourse.” What has made her account of the flesh so 
influential is her counterintuitive suggestion that nonrecognition may 
also be liberating, that existing at the “zero degree of social conceptual-
ization” might in fact enable the inhabitants of the flesh to instantiate an 
alternative subjectivity not colonized by the dominant social order. Thus 
Spillers concludes this essay by reclaiming the “monstrosity” of the flesh, 
recasting the abjection of nonrecognition as an “insurgent ground” from 
which to “rewrite . . .  a radically dif fer ent text” of  human being.2
A discrepancy exists between the legibly  human agency of the flesh that 
Spillers ultimately champions and the posthumanist vision of material 
agency that briefly appears in her account of the  Middle Passage. For my 
purposes, this article offers a case study of the difficulty of sustaining a 
materialist perspective of the actions and events that we call po liti cal and 
that we understand to be charged with ethical significance. Even Spillers, 
who is deeply committed to thinking about how materiality resists and 
exceeds ideological inscription, and who is no less deeply committed to 
changing the terms in which politics is  imagined, nevertheless continues 
to or ga nize her account of po liti cal change around the drama of recognition 
and the strug gle between competing constructions of the  human. In this 
sense, her essay may be postrecognition but it is not posthumanist; like 
the posthumanist and posthumanist social justice discourses I have exam-
ined in Chapter  4, Spillers ultimately suspends her vision of material 
complexity and entanglement to restore us to a world in which  human 
agency is once again intelligible, and recognition of  human sovereignty is 
once again the endgame.
The question I have promised to ask  here is  whether this move may be 
ethically preferable,  whether suspending the radically materialist perspec-
tive that posthumanist assemblages offer might be necessary in order to 
construct a po liti cal vision we can admire. We might put this even more 
polemically: the question, at its most extreme, is  whether a truly posthu-
manist materialism can sustain an ethics or a politics at all. My sense is 
that it cannot, but more impor tant, in  these closing remarks I would like to 
suggest that one  great advantage of studying antislavery materialism  today 
is that  these nineteenth- century texts make the apolitics of materialism 
vis i ble in ways that con temporary posthumanist discourse does not.
Consider, by way of instructive contrast, Frederick Douglass’s account 
of the insurgent slave ship in the climactic scene of The Heroic Slave. Even 
 after Madison Washington has seized control of the ship, the white mate, 
Tom Grant, denies the legitimacy of the coup and Washington proceeds 
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to lecture to him on the justice of his revolt. But as we have seen, it is not 
the ethical force of Washington’s words but rather his superior physical 
force— and then the even more overwhelming force of a sudden squall— 
that ends their showdown.
The wind howled furiously,— the ocean was white with foam, which, 
on account of the darkness, we could see only by the quick flashes of 
lighting that darted occasionally from the angry sky. All was alarm 
and confusion. . . .  For awhile we had dearer interests to look  after 
than slave property. A more savage thunder- gust never swept the 
ocean. Our brig rolled and creaked as if  every bolt would be started . . .  . 
The first words [Madison Washington] uttered  after the storm had 
slightly subsided  were characteristic of the man. “Mr. mate, you 
cannot write the bloody laws of slavery on  those restless billows. The 
ocean, if not the land, is  free.”3
Interrupting the parley between Washington and Grant, Douglass gives 
this sublime storm the last word in their dispute. Still refusing to acknowl-
edge that “the princi ples of 1776” might apply “to one whom I deemed my 
inferior,” Grant is silenced by the squall that threatens to destroy them all. 
But this is also no merely fortuitous vortex of high wind and waves: this 
wind howls “furiously”; this sky is “angry.” The anthropomorphism of 
Douglass’s prose turns the squall into an avenging god, an impression con-
firmed by Washington’s pronouncement that the storm is a sign of nature’s 
inherent hostility to “the bloody laws of slavery.”
Just as Spillers imagines, ocean weather rises up in The Heroic Slave to 
exert its own kind of countercultural force, compelling Grant to relinquish 
his claim to “slave property.” Arguably, however, the only  thing that makes 
this storm’s suspension of slavery po liti cal is Washington’s gloss of it— his 
insistence that the storm is not just interruptive but insurgent, that its ma-
terial force is ethically oppositional. By contrast, when Spillers conjures 
the possibility of a slave ship blown off course, she offers this image as an 
example of the way in which  matter’s restless volatility is ultimately hostile 
to all fixed laws and systems, slaveholding or other wise. For Spillers, in 
this moment, the ultimately ungovernable dynamism of the ocean- ship- 
cargo- crew assemblage means that  every ideological system ultimately 
rests upon precariously fluid ground. Bruno Latour also insists that the 
world’s material assemblages are perpetually unsettling to po liti cal  orders. 
As he writes, what the materialist perspective “calls back into question with 
such remarkable effectiveness is precisely the possibility of collecting the hi-
erarchy of actors and values, according to an order fixed once and for all. 
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An infinitesimal cause can have vast effects; an insignificant actor becomes 
central . . .  . With po liti cal ecol ogy, one is always caught off- guard, struck 
sometimes by the robustness of systems, sometimes by their fragility.”4 In 
contrast to Douglass’s specifically antislavery ocean environment, the post-
humanist materialism that Latour and Spillers (in her  Middle Passage 
moment) embrace invites us to recognize the contingency of all po liti cal 
and ethical  orders. The complexity and unpredictability of material entan-
glement means that the “bedrock” of empirical real ity is, in the long view, 
oceanic. This fluid materiality is at once the condition of possibility for 
regimes of  human meaning and a force for their continual upheaval. In 
light of this incalculable restlessness,  every  future is uncertain;  every 
order is provisional;  every life is a life lived at sea.
And herein lies the crux of the prob lem. However much we may be 
tempted to conflate this restive unsettling with revolutionary insurgency, 
or “lines of flight” with liberation, changefulness and open- endedness in 
and of themselves are neither an ethics nor a politics.5 Posthumanism’s pro-
cessualist ontology helps us to map the profusion of nonhuman agencies 
and affectivities at play in  human experience and amidst the events and 
procedures that we call  human politics. This mapping shows us, for in-
stance, how lead’s mobility and toxicity can re- inflect American racial 
imaginaries, or how the  labor of worms can change national topogra-
phies.6 And by learning to recognize  these nonhuman dimensions of po-
liti cal life, we arrive at a new and more comprehensive po liti cal realism. But 
this powerfully expanded map of the entanglements of being and knowing 
does not tell us what we  ought to do with its information. If the dynamic 
fluidity of posthumanism’s assemblage ontology promises openings for 
change, it cannot tell us what changes to wish for. Its materialist perspec-
tive thus helps us to recognize the more- than- human forces that populate 
politics, but it does not yield a materialist politics.
This is a lesson, I would like to suggest, that antislavery materialism 
brings home to us particularly vividly by virtue of the providentialism that 
so explic itly supplements the embodied politics of Douglass, Thoreau, and 
Whitman. In their late romantic texts, nature itself has an ethics. Thus 
the physical force of Douglass’s “restless billows” is po liti cal  because for 
Douglass (as we have seen),  there is an ethical code inscribed in the mate-
rial order of nature. Likewise, the force of evolutionary transformation is 
po liti cal in Thoreau’s hands  because for Thoreau evolution is morally pro-
gressive. And if, for Whitman, we are only temporary instantiations in a 
cascade of material causality (our identities, bodies, desires, and actions ar-
riving on the crest of a wave of antecedent events, and departing in a froth 
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of proliferating consequences), this “vast clear scheme” of material relation-
ality is nonetheless ethical  because for Whitman this fateful system is both 
perfect and just.7 Thus even as  these authors confront me with the materi-
ality that therefore I am, the engulfment of my liberal autonomy and the 
subsumption of  human history into natu ral history do not register, in  these 
accounts, as losses. For,  these authors assure us, this is an ethical world: 
slavery is even now being abolished by the gravitational tug of our animal 
instincts; racism is literally being driven from our hearts by evolution; ra-
cial equality is already an ontological fact regardless of what auctioneers or 
Supreme Court justices say. Thus if  there is a kind of fatalism in Douglass’s 
invocation of “forces in operation which must inevitably work the downfall 
of slavery,” in Thoreau’s  really passive re sis tance, and in Whitman’s renun-
ciation of authorial (or po liti cal) intent, each of  these authors nonetheless 
greets our dispossession as a kind of grace  because he believes that nature’s 
changefulness is meliorating.8 Fate is providential: we are instances of an 
unfolding cosmos that is benevolently edging  toward greater perfection.
We are, moreover, primed to notice the normativity of the natu ral sys-
tem in  these accounts  because we know  these authors as late romantics, and 
the beneficence of nature is one of  those  things we think of as characteristic 
of romantic thought. Romanticism’s nature is strongly normative: “natu ral” 
is, for the romantics, a synonym for “true” or “good.”9 Thus when, in “Frost 
at Midnight” Coleridge sends his son to the countryside so that he might 
“see and hear / The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible / Of that eternal 
language, which thy God / Utters, who from eternity doth teach / Him-
self in all,” he is speaking of a nature that is above all moral, not simply 
material as empiricism frames it for us.10 Nor is this normative view of 
nature limited to the ostensibly unempirical realms of romantic poetry; 
through the mid– nineteenth  century, scientific writing was similarly con-
vinced of the material order’s beneficence, its empirical outlook still con-
tiguous with natu ral theology. Hence Louis Agassiz understood science 
to be “an investigation into the ways of nature, into the ways of the 
Creator,” and his colleague Arnold Guyot could describe the earth’s geo-
logical development as “the realization of an intelligent thought . . .  of 
love to man, who is the end and aim of all creation.”11 Indeed, the ease with 
which racial science converted into po liti cal doctrine speaks to how wide-
spread the assumption was at midcentury that the material order spells out 
natu ral hierarchies of being and that natu ral change is progressive, with 
humankind at its cutting edge.
In retrospect, the antebellum moment has come to seem like the twi-
light of this mode of thought. The publication of On the Origin of Species in 
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1859 is often, if not wholly accurately, understood to have rung natu ral the-
ology’s death knell and displaced romanticism’s normative nature with a 
vision of materiality that refuses “anything like telos or directionality . . . 
or a commitment to progressivism.”12 Although it would take several more 
years to take hold, the indifferently changeful nature that Darwin intro-
duced drained the moralism out of natu ral systems. Nature could no lon-
ger be capitalized, and once no longer credited with a perspective or moral 
aim, it also could not be credited with a politics. Against this backdrop of 
romantic science and its eclipse, the renewed po liti cal impulse of con-
temporary materialist discourses swims more clearly into view as an ata-
vism, an impulse to return to the premise that the study of ontology may 
bear ethical insights. If what the turn to ontology promises is something 
like a new realism— a return to the obdurate  matter that social construc-
tivism seemed to dismiss, and a reaffirmation that this fleshy real ity re-
sists “concealment  under the brush of discourse”— then what we find within 
 these con temporary materialisms is the stealing back in of suspended 
norms, the recolonization of a material system with ethical values.
In this Coda and the previous chapter, I have been tracking this sub-
tle yet pervasive reemergence of normativity in con temporary materi-
alist discourse. Thus as we saw in Chapter 4, although posthumanist 
materialism demonstrates the nonsingularity of being (its entanglement, 
its constitutive being- with), posthumanist politics tend to revert to the 
individualizing logic of liberal recognition, as if the proprietary values 
of freedom and equality  were (as Douglass suggests) universally natu ral 
demands. By this route, too, the purely material relations this ontology 
maps start to seem morally laden: in posthumanist discourse, interdepen-
dence starts to look like community, entanglement like obligation, mutu-
ality like equality, porosity like love.13 A version of this naturalization of 
ethics also occurs in posthumanist social justice theory. Again, as we have 
seen, although theorists like Wynter and Spillers demonstrate that “the 
 human” is not a natu ral kind but a status conferred on some bodies and 
not  others for ideological reasons, their politics nonetheless presume that 
certain material organ izations (Homo sapiens, monsters of “the flesh”) 
naturally bear humanity in them, regardless of  whether their humanness 
goes unrecognized. This is how  these par tic u lar nonhumanized organ-
isms can serve, in Wynters’s and Spillers’s formulations, as instantia-
tions of alternative genres of the  human— because  these bodies are 
understood to always already be  human, making “the  human” once again 
a natu ral kind. In  these ways, posthumanist and posthumanist social jus-
tice theories reinject systems of value into the ostensibly extra- ideological 
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material real ity to which they appeal. At the end of the day, their na-
tures are normative as well.
My reason for highlighting this remnant romanticism is not, however, 
to call it out. On the contrary, I want to suggest its necessity.  Because  these 
discourses do not simply wish to be descriptive— because they have an eth-
ics and a politics to recommend— they cannot be strictly materialist; they 
must be dual- facing. At the same time, however, I think that  there is ana-
lytical value in marking the distinction between descriptions of material-
ity and affirmations of it. We might, then, think of the turn to ontology 
not as a way to suture the divide between  matter and meaning, nor as a 
surreptitious attempt to disguise policy as nature, but rather as an effort 
to subject our politics to the per sis tent skepticism that materiality affords.
Jasbir Puar voices one version of this thought when she suggests that 
intersectional theories of identity might be productively supplemented by 
assemblage theory  because  these theories are “frictional.” Assemblage 
theory’s pro cessualist materialism puts pressure on the static identities, 
representative politics, and recognition that intersectionality strives for. 
Thus, Puar proposes, “No  matter how intersectional our models of 
subjectivity . . .  these formulations may still limit us if they presume the 
automatic primacy and singularity of the disciplinary subject and its iden-
titarian interpellation.”14 The question therefore becomes how assem-
blage theory’s skepticism of subjectivity and identity might be brought 
into the po liti cal realm. If we embrace nonrepre sen ta tionalism, letting go 
of positionality, identity, and their demands for recognition, what kinds 
of new politics would we do? “What kinds of po liti cal strategies, of ‘poli-
tics of the open end,’ might we unabashedly stumble upon? Rather than 
rehashing the pros and cons of identity politics, can we think instead of 
affective politics?”15 Although Puar does not answer this question, she 
remains committed to the sense that it has one.
I am offering a slightly dif fer ent account of the productive frictionality 
that Puar describes  here. I would like to suggest that posthumanist mate-
rialism’s usefulness to politics is not a  matter of grounding (authorizing a 
new politics of assemblages or affects) but of ungrounding. If politics can-
not but be a system of allocating finite attention, concern, and resources, 
what this materiality does is remind us that our systems of ordering are 
inherently partial, exclusionary, unjust; that no  matter how posthumanist 
our politics, by virtue of being politics they  will never be wholly posthu-
manist. I have suggested above that posthumanism provides a vastly di-
lated map of the unacknowledged constituents of politics—of the 
nonhuman agents and material agencies involved and affected— but this 
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meta phor now needs qualification. If this ontological realism is a map, it is 
a medieval one— pointing to the unknown in all directions, indicating 
where our knowledge fails on the scale of immea sur able quantum phenom-
ena, on the scale of incomputable cosmic complexity, in what Spillers de-
scribes as the “figurative darkness” of the unpredictable  future. Instead of 
being used to ground or authenticate (naturalize) a po liti cal ethics, then, 
posthumanism’s unmap of worldly entanglement might better serve to sug-
gest the importance of not settling into our convictions. It suggests that 
embracing a par tic u lar po liti cal ethic might in fact not mean committing 
to a par tic u lar arrangement of politics but to constantly readjusting our 
attentions and revising our sense of who and what counts.
With this view, then, posthumanist materialism becomes a kind of ho-
rizon  toward which our thought leans, and an abyss that our politics stare 
into. The reflection it does not return flags the unavoidable mismatch be-
tween our political- ideological orderings and the entangled, pro cessual, 
and fi nally unpredictable “flesh” of the world. This incommensurability 
may well give us reason to hope, as Spillers proposes in describing that 
“richness of possibility” that even slavery could not expunge, or as, for in-
stance, William Connolly suggests in describing the “fragility” of neolib-
eralism’s hegemony to the chaotic dynamics of material and social systems.16 
But the first lesson of this posthumanist materialism is that possibility and 
fragility yield changes we ultimately cannot foresee or control. Complex-
ity is thus a feature of this ontology that cuts both ways. If it is grounds 
for hope that we might tip the scales  toward change, it is also grounds to 
believe, as Whitman reminds us, that the changes we make  will never be 
quite (perhaps not even anything like) what we meant.
But in what sense is this useful? How is this reminder of the incomplete-
ness of our knowledge and partiality and provisionality of our politics not 
just a license for resignation? Thoreau offers an image that  will do for my 
answer when he writes of his desire not for knowledge but for “a sudden 
revelation of the insufficiency of all that we called Knowledge before.” It 
is, he writes, “a lighting up of the mist by the sun.”17 In other words, the 
value of posthumanism’s ontology may be that it ends not in the catharsis 
of exposure (what D. A. Miller describes as “the ‘flash’ of increased visibility”) 
but in the brilliance of overexposure: its makes our myopias more radiant.18 
Less mystically, this materialist perspective enjoins us to a form of episte-
mological modesty. This is dif fer ent from the ethical modesty that 
posthumanists endorse when they invite us to check our hubristic “anthro-
pocentrism,” to recognize and re spect nonhuman being, and to cultivate won der 
for this world. I am receptive to all of  these ethical recommendations, but as 
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I have argued, I do not think they are endemic to or entailed by this ontol-
ogy. More immediately, this ontology invites us to recognize the limits of 
our practical capacity to proj ect our intentions upon a complexly rela-
tional world.
Unlike ethical modesty, then, epistemological modesty does not chiefly 
seek to check  human hubris; if anything, it argues that we  ought to be more 
ambitious in our thinking. For if the unmap of entanglement insists that 
real ity  will always exceed our thought of it, and that our policies’ effects 
 will always overflow their intentions, by the same token it also reminds us 
to remain alert to the constitutive uncertainty— the fallibility, the human-
ness—of our knowledge. Just as a Falling Rocks sign resigns us to disaster 
but also makes us look up, epistemological modesty can provoke us to try 
to better anticipate, to the extent that we can, the unintended consequences 
of our actions. Thus though it may not help us to ground our po liti cal eth-
ics, a posthumanist epistemology can help us to assess the actions we take 
in that ethics’ name. For by training our attention on the world’s systemic 
complexity and the externalities this creates, it encourages us to build 
better, more comprehensive, and dynamic models of material intercon-
nections on spatial and temporal scales we are not used to imagining. 
While this work of modeling is obviously an empirical endeavor, it is also 
an imaginative  labor, an effort to think the unthought spidering of effects 
and to conjure the unseen multiplicity of  human, nonhuman, embodied, and 
discursive forces interacting upon any given site of action. This may even 
be a habit of thought that reading, in par tic u lar, can help us to cultivate.19 
By tracing  these proliferating externalities, we may find ways to fold them 
into better calculations of cost and risk, to take a larger view of politics’ 
constituents and a longer view of po liti cal action so as to better anticipate 
what crop our seeds in fact sow. And if, like Whitman, we must be willing 
to accept that we cannot ultimately control what results from our efforts, 
we can nonetheless, like Whitman, refuse to view this as a reason to stop 
working. We are launched upon unknown  waters, like always.
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 Because experience is sprawlingly continuous but narrative likes shape, this 
proj ect feels like one that has moved with me through several, almost dif-
fer ent lives. The pres ent book would not exist without the support of the 
En glish Departments at Johns Hopkins University and the University of 
Mississippi. I have encountered few readers as keenly lucid and generous 
as Sharon Cameron; the acute energy of her attention has taught me what 
it looks like to believe that the words on the page  matter. The critical sen-
sibilities, advice, and encouragement of Christopher Nealon, Michael 
Moon, and Frances Ferguson have likewise been invaluable and helped me 
to develop as a scholar in ways that I am continuing to belatedly realize. 
Jane Bennett’s seminar on Thoreau and Whitman many years ago was for-
mative for my thinking about  these authors, but equally impor tant, Jane 
taught me about mentorship by welcoming me— first as a foundling semi-
nar student from a dif fer ent department, and  later as a neophyte assistant 
professor—to think alongside her as she worked through an argument. As 
hallucinatory as it was, the feeling of being a colleague and potential col-
laborator gave me a much- needed taste of what it might be like to do this 
work without feeling like a pretender to it. Meanwhile, my friends in gradu-
ate school  were my oxygen; for their intelligence, humor, barbecue, and 
zeal for good  music and indiscriminate dancing, I might even bury a body 
for Jennifer Lin, Rob Higney, Hadley Leach, Shlomit Barnea, Daniela 
Ginsburg, Michael McCarthy, Elisha Cohn, Jason Hoppe, Dewayne Dean, 
Tony Wexler, Jake Greear, Mabel Wong, Jeremy Arnold, Noora Lori, Suvi 
Irvine, Adam Culver, Stephanie Fishel, Jairus Grove, Simon Glezos, 
Bridget Pupillo, Ben Parris, Tara Bynum, Mark Noble, Jason Gladstone, 
and Dave and Stephanie Hershinow.
At the University of Mississippi, I have been the grateful recipient of 
summer research grants and a well- timed partial course release that al-
lowed me the time I urgently needed to get this work done. Ivo Kamps 
may be sick of hearing it at this point but he is an irreplaceable chair whose 
blend of ambition and pragmatism helped me to navigate substantially 
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introduction. beyond recognition: the prob lem  
of antebellum embodiment
 1. Spillers, “Mama’s Baby Papa’s Maybe,” 70.
 2. I capitalize “Black” in this study in keeping with what has increasingly 
become standard usage in American studies and critical race studies scholar-
ship. I make this choice in sympathy with this usage’s assertion that, at least 
in North Amer i ca, to have black skin is to belong, ascribe, or be assigned to 
Blackness as an identity, and in support of this usage’s instinct to combat, 
even in this small way, the systematic devaluation of Black life. The decision 
to capitalize Black is, however, not a  simple one, particularly in the context 
of this book, which  will critically examine the historical emergence of 
modern racialist thought— including the notion that skin color confers 
identity. Indeed, at issue throughout this study  will be a tension between the 
kinds of idealism needed to posit stable identities (racial or other wise) and 
materialisms in which stable identities— indeed, in which all nouns, proper 
or other wise— are untenable in light of the porosity, mutuality, and pro-
cessual changefulness of embodied being. This friction between the 
reification of identity signaled by the capitalization of “Black” and the 
dissolution of identity implicit in both antebellum and con temporary 
posthumanist materialisms  will come into par tic u lar focus in Chapter 4 and 
the Coda, which mine the commonalities and conflicts beween posthumanist 
and social justice theories.
 3. In works like The Order of  Things and The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault 
dates this transformation in the Western conception of Man to philosophi-
cal changes brought about by Enlightenment sciences. However, postcolo-
nial theorists including Sylvia Wynter argue that Western colonialism in 
the three centuries prior to this moment “prepare[d] the way for changes 
in the second modernity which are often thought to be the exclusive domain 
of Enlightenment thought” (Suarez- Krabbe, Race, Rights, and Rebels, 7. See 
also Wynter, “1492.”)
 4. Foucault, History of Sexuality, 142.
n o t e s
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 5. Foucault, Order of  Things, 346.
 6. Readers interested in tracing the paths of  these discourses prior to 
where this study takes them up might begin with Kramnick’s study of 
embodied accounts of action in eighteenth- century philosophy and lit er a ture, 
in Actions and Objects; Richardson’s examination of embodied accounts of 
mind in romantic- era science and lit er a ture in British Romanticism; and 
Murison’s survey of embodied accounts of mind in nineteenth- century 
American popu lar culture and lit er a ture in Politics of Anxiety.
 7. Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 54.
 8. As Wynter (“On How We Mistook”) describes this, the biologization 
of man thus effects an “overall devalorization of the  human species” by 
draining “the  human” of the moral significance— the unique and universal 
freedom from material causality— that humanism had accorded it. To 
unpack this point more fully: whereas humanist “Man” is morally distinct 
from all other organisms by virtue of his freedom from his body, the 
biological  human is strictly an embodied organism. It may therefore be 
distinguished from other embodied organisms by differences of degree but 
not by differences of moral kind: it is endowed with features that character-
ize the physical uniqueness of the species Homo sapiens, but the materialist 
idiom to which this figure belongs prevents it from laying claim to features 
(e.g., soul, moral freedom) that are categorically exceptional to the material 
order. Thus biological humanity may be more sentient or more communica-
tive or more cognitively complex than other species, but in the end  these 
embodied features do not amount to a categorical break such as that posited 
by the doctrine of humanity’s transcendence of its materiality that has 
traditionally grounded claims for humanity’s unique moral value.
 9. Russ Castronovo’s influential argument in Necro Citizenship, for 
instance, divides this era into two ideological camps, with liberal humanists 
committed to a disembodied and generic personhood on the one side, and 
racists, who “sentenced  women and slaves to excessive and lethal embodi-
ment,” on the other (10). Castronovo’s thesis— that liberalism can be as hard 
on the body as racism—is incisive about the limitations of liberal person-
hood. However, it also risks flattening the field of antebellum embodied 
thought. For while it’s entirely true that the rising cachet of biological 
materialism was deployed to underwrite racist and sexist exclusion, racism 
and sexism  were not the only ideologies of embodiment circulating in 
antebellum Amer i ca. Thus my readings of antislavery materialism in 
Frederick Douglass, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman endeavor to 
show how  these authors navigated between Castronovo’s punishing either/
or, threading the needle between the disembodied universalism of abolition-
ist humanism and the dehumanizing hierarchies of biological racism.
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inaccuracies, see Gould, Mismea sure of Man.
 12. Alaimo and Hekman, Material Feminisms, 1, 3.
 13. I also prefer “posthumanism” to the alternative term currently in 
circulation— “nonhumanism”— because in the context of my analy sis of race 
and slavery, “nonhumanism’s” closer rhetorical connection to animals and 
animality may invite readers to assume that any argument with humanism 
is an argument for the dehumanization of  peoples. It is precisely my purpose 
 here to complicate this sort of assumption. For alternative perspectives on 
what name this broad theoretical re orientation  ought to go by— posthumanism, 
nonhumanism, inhumanism, and the like— see, for instance, Luciano and 
Chen, “Has the Queer Ever Been  Human?” 195–96. See also Grusin’s 
introduction to Nonhuman Turn.
 14. Levinson, “Of Being Numerous,” 635.
 15. Jackson, “Outer Worlds,” 216.
 16. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus, 9–10.
 17. Thomas Taylor, Rights of Brutes, iii, 103.
 18. Ibid., v– vi.
 19. See Kramnick, Actions and Objects, for an investigation of this line of 
reasoning in eighteenth- century philosophy and lit er a ture.
 20. Thomas Taylor, Rights of Brutes, 11.
 21. Ibid., 103.
 22. American fugitive slave James W. C. Pennington attests to this logic 
when he writes, “The being of slavery, its soul and its body, lives in the 
chattel princi ple, the property princi ple, the bill of sale princi ple. . . .  You 
cannot constitute slavery without the chattel princi ple” (quoted in David 
Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 193).
 23. Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 271. See also Wynter, “On How We 
Mistook,” 122–26. Note that this biologization of “Man” is sometimes sold 
as part of a story about the secularization of modernity, but it is nothing so 
 simple as that. As J. Kameron Car ter notes, “the discourse of theology aided 
and abetted the pro cesses by which ‘man’ came to be viewed as a modern, 
racial being,” while at the same time theology itself underwent a “subtle, 
inner transformation . . .  in giving itself over to the discursive enterprise of 
helping to racially constitute the modern word as we have come to know it” 
(Race, 3).  Here I depart from Wynter’s suggestion that biologized Man is a 
“purely secular” figure (“On How We Mistook,” 123).
 24. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 245.
 25. Ibid., 245. See also Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics.
 26. Brown, Undoing the Demos, 83.
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racism’s enabling relation to biopower, he nonetheless arguably underesti-
mates the centrality of racism to the biopo liti cal order. In defining racism’s 
role in biopower in Society Must Be Defended, Foucault ambivalently repre-
sents racism as endemic to biopolitics or, alternatively, as supplementary to 
biopolitics (as he writes, “racism intervenes” in the biopo liti cal state’s 
commitment to cultivating populational life in order to introduce a rationale 
for making or letting some of that population die [254]). For a trenchant 
revisionary account of biopolitics as a racializing assemblage, see Weheliye, 
Habeas Viscus.
 29. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 255.
 30. Esposito, Immunitas. For an incisive account of how descriptions of 
biopolitics, such as the one I have just broadly sketched, systematically 
overlook how biopolitics also reinvented the state’s relation to animal life, 
see Shukin, Animal Capital.
 31. Wynter, “1492,” 28–50.
 32. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 5.
 33. Thrift, Non- Representational Theory, 5.
 34. McGurl, “New Cultural Geology,” 388.
 35. “Transcorporeal” is Stacy Alaimo’s term, riffing on Donna Har-
away’s suggestion that the  human body does not “end at the skin.” See 
Alaimo, Bodily Natures. “Intra- active” is Karen Barad’s term; see Meeting the 
Universe Halfway. Esposito defines “the flesh” as the continuum of living 
 matter that “precedes the body,” constituting “a being that is both singular 
and communal, generic and specific . . .  undifferentiated and dif fer ent” 
(Esposito, Bios, 167).
 36. Puar, “ ‘Rather Be a Cyborg,’ ” 57.
 37. Bennett, Vibrant  Matter; Mel Chen, Animacies. See also Latour, Politics 
of Nature.  Because it envisions life as an entangled continuum or network of 
being, posthumanism is sometimes described as framing a nongenocidal or 
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Giorgio Agamben calls for “a politics in which bare life is no longer separated 
and excepted”—in which the material plenum of being is no longer artifi-
cially segregated into selected (“fully”  human) and dysselected (“bare” or 
nonhuman) forms (Agamben, Homo Sacer, 9).
 38. For instance, several new works in medieval studies spotlight 
proto- posthumanisms in medieval texts. See Mitchell, Becoming  Human; 
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Joy and Dionne, “When Did We Become Post/Human?”; Cohen, Medieval 
Identity Machines. Or again, although  these studies do not mention 
 posthumanism by name, Justin E. H. Smith’s investigation of Leibniz’s 
proto- biological empiricism and Jonathan Kramnick’s exploration of the 
philosophy of action and  mental causation in the eighteenth- century novel 
are examples of scholarship that points the way to a prehistory of con-
temporary posthumanism in early modern and Enlightenment thought. 
See Justin E. H. Smith, Divine Machines; and Kramnick, Actions and 
Objects.
 39. McGurl, “New Cultural Geology,” 381.
 40. Frederick Douglass, “West India Emancipation,” speech delivered at 
Canandaiga, N.Y., August 3, 1857, in Selected Speeches and Writings, 368.
 41. Thoreau “Last Days of John Brown,” 148.
 42. Ibid., 147.
 43. Castiglia, Interior States; Coviello, Intimacy in Amer i ca, 4.
 44. Bruno Latour lays out his proposal for a “parliament of  things” in 
Politics of Nature; Levi Bryant describes “a democracy of objects” in Democ-
racy of Objects; the longer quote is from Bennett, Vibrant  Matter, 109.
 45. Bennett, “Systems and  Things,” 224.
 46. Emerson, Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks, 3:70.
 47. Murison, Politics of Anxiety; Thrailkill, Affecting Fictions.
 48. Tompkins, Racial Indigestion; Boggs, Animalia Americana.
 49. Matt Taylor, Universes without Us; Mark Noble, American Poetic 
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1. douglass’s animals: racial science and the prob lem  
of  human equality
 1. The framers of the Constitution deferred the question of suffrage to 
the states, most of whose laws of suffrage remained largely unchanged from 
the pre– Revolutionary War era. While the rules of suffrage in most states 
 were modeled on British law,  there  were variations in property, race, and sex 
requirements from state to state.
 2. Adams cited in Keyssar, Right to Vote, 1. As Keyssar notes, although 
the irrationalism of the poor was the most commonly cited rationale for not 
enfranchising them, this argument “that the poor should not vote  because 
they had ‘no  will of their own’ coexisted with an altogether contradictory 
argument, often expressed by the same  people: that the poor or propertyless 
should not vote  because they would threaten the interests of property— that 
is, they would have too much  will of their own. If men without property 
could vote, reflected the judicious conservative John Adams, ‘an immediate 
revolution would ensue’ ” (Keyssar, Right to Vote, 9).
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 3. Ibid., 35. The proposition Keyssar is quoting, “that  every full- grown, 
featherless biped, who wears a hat instead of a bonnet, has a natu ral right to 
vote,” is G. S. Hillard (writing as “Silas Standfast”), contributor to Discussions on 
the Constitution Proposed to the  People of Mas sa chu setts by the Convention of 1853, 117.
 4. Proceedings and Debates of the  Virginia State Convention of 1829–30 
(Richmond: Samuel Shepherd, 1830), 27.
 5. Standfast (Hillard), Discussions on the Constitution, 118.
 6. Walker, “Walker’s Appeal.”
 7. Garrison, “To the Public,” 1.
 8. Bay, White Image, 13.
 9. Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 50.
 10. Douglass, “The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered” 
(pamphlet, Rochester N.Y., 1854), in Selected Speeches and Writings, 287.
 11. Douglass, “West India Emancipation,” speech delivered at Canan-
daiga, N.Y., August 3, 1857, in Selected Speeches and Writings, 368.
 12. As Kyla Schuller argues, racial scientists often explic itly positioned 
their empiricism (which is based upon sensory experience) as offering a 
usefully restrained antidote to antislavery sentimentalism. As she writes, in 
this discourse “the Anglo- Saxon female absorbs the instability of impress-
ibility and its tendency to excess, leaving her male counterpart to enjoy the 
benefits of sentiment while relieving him of the liabilities of sentimentality” 
(“Taxonomies of Feeling,” 278). Dana D. Nelson examines the role of 
sentiment in polygenist science in “ ‘No Cold or Empty Heart.’ ”
 13. Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 457.
 14. Linnaeus cited in Agamben, Open, 24.
 15. Jordan cited in Bay, White Image, 19.
 16. Tucker, Moment of Racial Sight, 61.
 17. Thus, for instance, Nancy Stepan won ders “why it was that, just as 
the  battle against slavery was being won by abolitionists, the war against 
racism in Eu ro pean thought was being lost,” and Susan Buck- Morss lam-
bastes the “glaring discrepancy between thought and practice” in the era of 
liberalism and slavery. Stepan, Idea of Race in Science, 1; Buck- Morss, “Hegel 
and Haiti,” 821.
 18. As Tucker argues, racialism is the direct product of “two not entirely 
compatible princi ples of the [Enlightenment] era: a commitment to univer-
sal equality and a commitment to the truth of evidence drawn from empiri-
cal observation” (Moment of Racial Sight, 25).
 19. Samuel Stanhope Smith, Essay, 204.
 20. “Are not the blacks of Guinea, the dwarfs of Siberia, degenerate races 
compared with the inhabitants of France, or  England, of Turkey, or Persia?,” 
Smith rhetorically asks (ibid., 311).
153-71159_ch01_3P.indd   178 11/1/17   11:57 AM
Notes to pages 31–34 179
 21. Thus Smith assures us that even the “degenerate” Guinean and 
Siberian “are found to improve in their appearance and form, by being 
removed from their own climate,” even as “the Eu ro pean, on his removal 
to Africa or Lapland,” comes to bear “a nearer resemblance to the natives 
of  those countries” (ibid., 311). Already, he observes, “The American negro 
is visibly losing the most uncouth peculiarities of the African person” 
(252).
 22. Frederickson, Black Image, 97.
 23. Catlin, Letters and Notes, 61; Conway quoted in Lemire, “Miscegena-
tion,” 129.
 24. Frederickson, Black Image, 101.
 25. Samuel George Morton, Crania Americana, 3.
 26. Gossett, Race, 65; Dain, Hideous Monster of the Mind, 225.
 27. M. Jacquinot cited in Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 56; 
Agassiz, “Sketch of the Natu ral Provinces,” lxxiv.
 28. For instance Agassiz, a steadfast creationist, defended his polygenist 
views by arguing that the “greatness, prescience, omniscience, [and] provi-
dence” manifest in the orderly distribution of life on earth could only be the 
handi work of God, proving that species have not haphazardly migrated 
across the earth and evolved, “but have made their successive appearance 
upon earth by the immediate intervention of the Creator” (Agassiz, Contri-
butions, 135). Elsewhere, Samuel Cartwright defended the scriptural bona 
fides of polygenism with a complicated biblical hermeneutics, arguing that 
in the original Greek, Genesis 1:24 refers to the separate creation of Black 
and Native American races among the “living creatures” and “beasts of the 
earth” that God creates before Adam. “If the 24th verse of the 1st chapter 
 were literally and fully translated, it would save the necessity of torturing 
Scripture and scientific truth to procure a white  father and  mother for the 
Missouri negroes and the Missouri Indians,” he concludes (Cartwright, 
“Unity of the  Human Race,” 132). For a full account of the polygenist 
reading of Genesis, see Frederickson, Black Image, 86–89. For a broader and 
trenchant discussion of the anachronism of trying to distinguish “scientific” 
from “theological” argument in midcentury racial science, see Hickman, 
“Douglass Unbound,” 323–62.
 29. Douglass, “Claims,” 287.
 30. For instance, see Cartwright’s reading of Genesis 1:24 discussed 
above.
 31. Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, 258; Fitzhugh, Cannibals All!, xi.
 32. Bachman, Doctrine of the Unity, 8.
 33. Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, liii. Thus, as Thomas Cobb 
concludes in his 1858 Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States 
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of Amer i ca, the difference between polygenism and monogenism is “much- 
mooted”: “ Whether the negro was originally a dif fer ent species, or is a 
degeneration of the same, is a  matter indifferent in the inquiry as to his 
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 34. Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 54.
 35. Garrison, “No Compromise,” 55.
 36. Mays, “Divine Legation,” 529.
 37. Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 50, 59.
 38. Frederickson, Black Image, 126–27.
 39. Diamond, “Difficulty of Real ity,” 57.
 40. Nelson, “No Cold or Empty Heart”; Schuller, “Taxonomies of Feeling.”
 41. Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 50.
 42. I sense a version of this reluctance to embrace Douglass’s post- 
Garrisonian politics in the tendency of several readers to stress the continu-
ity between Douglass’s pre- and post- Garrisonian biographies. Thus, for 
instance, Elizabeth Barnes and Colleen Glenney Boggs suggest that in My 
Bondage and My Freedom (1855) Douglass does not distance himself from the 
rhe toric of sympathy and moral suasion but rather deploys it in modified 
form. See Barnes, “Manhood”; Boggs, Animalia Americana.
 43. Chesnutt, Frederick Douglass, 69.
 44. Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom (1855), in Autobiographies, 374.
 45. Noble, “Sympathetic Listening,” 58.
 46. Douglass, “Claims,” 287.
 47. Dain, Hideous Monster of the Mind, 249.
 48. Douglass, “Claims,” 282.
 49. Bay (White Image) begins her study of this tradition with John 
Russworm’s 1827 essay, “The Mutability of  Human Affairs.” Russert also 
documents this rich tradition in “Science of Freedom.”
 50. Bay, White Image, 37.
 51. Russwurm quoted in ibid., 30.
 52. Easton, Treatise, 43.
 53. Ibid., 26.
 54. Garnet, Past and Pres ent Condition, 7.
 55. Easton, Treatise, 20.
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 57. Easton, Treatise, 18, 20.
 58. Bay, White Image, 71.
 59. Ibid., 36.
 60. Delaney, “Po liti cal Destiny,” 247.
 61. Ibid., 252.
 62. Douglass, “Claims,” 295.
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 63. Ibid., 283.
 64. Ibid.
 65. Ibid., 284.
 66. Ibid., 284, 287, 289, 287. The truth of Douglass’s statement specifi-
cally as a critique of polygenist science has been demonstrated by Stephen 
Jay Gould’s failed efforts to replicate Morton’s craniological mea sure ments 
(narrated in The Mismea sure of Man).
 67. Ibid., 285.
 68. Ibid., 286–87.
 69. Hickman, “Douglass Unbound,” 333.
 70. Douglass, “Claims,” 296.
 71. Ibid., 296.
 72. Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 274; Douglass, “Claims,” 296.
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 74. Ibid.
 75. Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, 263.
 76. Douglass, The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass (1845), in 
Douglass, Autobiographies, 46.
 77. Douglass, “The Heroic Slave” (1853), in Selected Speeches and Writings, 
221.
 78. Wilson, Specters of Democracy, 33.
 79. Douglass, “Freedom’s  Battle at Christiana,” Frederick Douglass’ Paper, 
September 25, 1851, in Selected Speeches and Writings, 182.
 80. Indeed, in an 1873 speech, Douglass condemns the abuse of farm 
animals in terms that expressly invoke his analy sis of the slave’s proper duty 
to an oppressive government.  There he advises, “All loud and boisterous 
commands, all brutal flogging should be banished from the field, and only 
words of cheer and encouragement should be tolerated. A  horse is in many 
re spects like a man. He has the five senses, and has memory, affection and 
reason to a limited degree. . . .  Convince him that he is a creature of law as 
well as of freedom by a judicious and kindly application of your superior 
power, and he  will conform his conduct to that law, far better than your 
most law- abiding citizen” (Douglass, Address). I’m grateful to my gradu ate 
student Savannah DiGregorio for bringing this passage to my attention.
 81. Sund quist, To Wake the Nations; Castronovo, Fathering the Nation.
 82. Castronovo, Fathering the Nation, 190.
 83. Douglass, “Is It Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnapper?,” Frederick 
Douglass’ Paper, June 2, 1854, in Selected Speeches and Writings, 277–80.
 84. I further develop this idea that freedom is endemic to nature in 
Douglass’s 1850 writings in my article, “Amoral Abolitionism,” which 
identifies this as a key theme of My Bondage and My Freedom.
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gua, N.Y., August 3, 1857, in Selected Speeches and Writings, 368 (emphasis 
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at a rather nihilistic “view of society as a cycle of conflict, riven by power 
strug gles” for domination. However, I do suggest that he has begun to 
understand slavery’s moral dimension as unnecessary— though by no means 
irrelevant—to the argument for abolition (Giles, “Narrative Reversals and 
Power Exchanges,” 803).
 89. Douglass, “Heroic Slave,” 223.
 90. Noble, “Sympathetic Listening”; Foreman, “Sentimental Abolition”; 
DeLombard, “Eye- Witness to the Cruelty.”
 91. Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, 184.
 92. For discussions of Douglass’s transnationalism in the 1850s, see 
Marrs, “Frederick Douglass in 1848”; Giles, Virtual Amer i cas; Tamarkin, 
Anglophilia.
 93. Douglass, “The Revolution of 1848,” speech at West India Emancipa-
tion Cele bration, Rochester, N.Y., August 1, 1848, in Selected Speeches and 
Writings, 105. I am indebted to Cody Marrs for bringing this passage to my 
attention; see Marrs, “Frederick Douglass in 1848.”
 94. Boggs, Animalia Americana, 86.
 95. Ibid., 106–7.
 96. Fielder, “Animal Humanism,” 488, 510.
 97. Pratt, “Douglass and Recognition  after 1845,” 265.
 98. Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, 179; Douglass, “The Mean-
ing of July Fourth for the Negro,” address to the Rochester Ladies’ Antislav-
ery Association, July 5, 1852, in Selected Speeches and Writings, 205.
 99. Douglass, “Meaning of the Fourth of July,” 205.
 100. Ibid., 195.
 101. Hyde, “Climates of Liberty,” 489.
 102. Latour, Politics of Nature, 53.
 103. Chen, Animacies.
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2. thoreau’s seeds: evolution and the prob lem of  human agency
 1. Emerson quoted in Davis, Bits of Gossip, 44.
 2. Nott and Gliddon, Types of Mankind, 50.
 3. Cameron, Writing Nature; Buell, Environmental Imagination; Walls, 
Seeing New Worlds.
 4. Mid- twentieth- century critics tended to portray Thoreau as a 
somewhat tragic figure, an aspiring Transcendentalist who fi nally retreated 
into the privacy of nature in the late 1850s out of frustration with his failure 
in the literary marketplace, or  because age had sapped his youthful capacity 
for poetic inspiration. See Miller, Consciousness in Concord; and Paul, Shores of 
Amer i ca. Versions of  these  theses also appear in Van Doren, Henry David 
Thoreau; and Hodder, Thoreau’s Ecstatic Witness. By contrast, in the wake of 
Cameron’s pathbreaking study of Thoreau’s Journal (Writing Nature), Buell’s 
monumental Environmental Imagination, and Walls’s landmark Seeing New 
Worlds, the prevailing narrative has been that Thoreau’s empiricism or 
“ecocentrism” displaced his interest in natu ral symbols, thus yielding a 
discourse on nature that was less and less prone to moral reflection and 
parable making. Of  these three foundational studies, Walls’s stands out for 
resisting the hypostasized distinction between  human and natu ral history 
that, as I argue above, funds the conclusion that Thoreau’s naturalistic 
studies are premised upon a relinquishment of concern for the social world.
 5. Buell, Environmental Imagination, 138, 135.
 6. Buell thus concludes that “the hypothesis of Thoreau as ‘deep 
ecologist’ ” helps us “to overcome the traditional opposition between the 
‘naturist’ and the ‘social protester’ ” (Environmental Imagination, 369). That 
the politics we associate with Thoreau’s late naturalism are more or less 
strictly environmentalist is suggested by the fact that none of  these three 
impor tant studies of Thoreau’s late works mentions the antislavery essays he 
wrote for John Brown at the height of his “ecocentric” phase.
 7. Schneider, “Thoreau’s  Human Ecol ogy.”
 8. Chakrabarty, “Climate of History,” 201.
 9. Cameron, Writing Nature, 24; Robinson, Natu ral Life, 7.
 10. Latour, Politics of Nature, chap. 1.
 11. Lurie, Louis Agassiz, 125; Irmscher, Louis Agassiz, 107.
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 13. Abbot Lawrence in a letter to Harvard Trea surer Samuel Atkins 
Eliot, June 7, 1847, cited in Lurie, Louis Agassiz, 137.
 14. Lurie, Louis Agassiz, 135; James, “Louis Agassiz,” also cited in Walls, 
“Agassiz,”
 15. In giving this account of Agassiz’s preeminence in midcentury U.S. 
scientific circles, I am arguably falling into what Branka Arsić describes, in 
her dazzling reading of Thoreau’s vitalism, as a misguided tendency to 
assign Agassiz “the central place in our understanding of natu ral science at 
Harvard in the 1840s” (134–35). The prob lem with this, Arsić argues, is that 
the overrepre sen ta tion of Agassiz and his theory of sequential special 
creation has functioned to eclipse attention to the strong and countervailing 
tradition of vitalist science at Harvard that crystallized in the 1820s and 
1830s. I am grateful to her study for highlighting this vitalist tradition as 
one source of Thoreau’s own anti- Agassizian science, and although her book 
was not yet available when I wrote this chapter, I now find that my own 
reading of Thoreau’s materialism often resonates strongly with hers (as I 
 shall note below). On this par tic u lar point, though, I would nonetheless 
maintain that in the de cade upon which I am focusing (the 1850s), Agassiz’s 
recent arrival and unpre ce dented visibility at the helm of Harvard’s new 
school of science did, in fact, put Harvard’s remaining vitalists in the 
shade. Although science at Harvard remained theoretically diverse (as 
demonstrated by Asa Gray’s public debates with Agassiz over Darwinian 
evolution), in the 1850s Agassiz’s outsized reputation meant that it was his 
theory of creation and his methodologies that Thoreau felt compelled to 
contend with. For more on vitalism at Harvard, see Arsić, Bird Relics.
 16. Agassiz, “An Essay on Classification,” in Contributions, 61. Robert 
Sattelmeyer reports that Thoreau read this essay in 1857 or 1858 (Thoreau’s 
Reading, 118).
 17. Agassiz, Lake Superior, 142, 145.
 18. Agassiz and Gould, Princi ples of Zoology, 2.
 19. Agassiz, “Essay on Classification,” 7.
 20. Henry David Thoreau letter to Horatio R. Storer, February 15, 1847, 
in Harding and Bode, Correspondence of Henry David Thoreau, 175.
 21. Humboldt cited in Walls, Seeing New Worlds, 84.
 22. Walls, Seeing New Worlds, 11.
 23. Agassiz, “Diversity of Origin,” 35–36.
 24. Thoreau, Walden, in Walden and Civil Disobedience, 214.
 25. Rossi, “Following Thoreau’s Instincts”; Thoreau, Walden, 220.
 26. Thoreau, Walden, 220.
 27. Thoreau, “Walking,” in Excursions, 200.
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 30. Ibid., 140.
 31. Ibid., 149.
 32. Thoreau, Journal, 6:592–94 (July 21, 1851). The scholarly edition of 
Thoreau’s journal is still a work in pro gress; the Prince ton edition currently 
runs to September 1854. The editors of the edition have made transcripts 
of the remaining unedited journal material available online, and I  will 
refer to  these transcripts when citing journal material from  after 1854. 
 Those transcripts are available at http:// thoreau.library . ucsb . edu / writings 
_ journals . html.
 33. Ibid., 6:84–85 (January 30, 1854).
 34. Ibid., 8:242 (October 27, 1851).
 35. Ibid., 3:341 (March 9, 1852).
 36. Ibid., 5:11 (March 8, 1853).
 37. Arsić, Bird Relics, 254.
 38. See Arsić, Bird Relics, for an illuminating account of how this 
“quintessentially materialist” epistemology generates, in Thoreau, a style 
and theory of communication committed to what she terms “literalization,” a 
pro cess that involves “turning the word into some sort of  thing, capable of 
affecting bodies; and bringing words closer to objects, recovering the 
presence of objects in names” (8).
 39. Walls, “Textbooks and Texts,” 3.
 40. Thoreau, Journal, 3:155–56 (December 25, 1851).
 41. Ibid., 6:236–38 (May 6, 1853).
 42. Thoreau, Journal (transcript), November 5, 1857. Reflecting on 
this passage, Robert Richardson argues that “it is highly likely that the 
problematic scientist challenged in the passage is Louis Agassiz, and much 
of Thoreau’s longstanding ambivalence about science— though not about 
natu ral history or botany or zoology— can be understood in the context of 
his long association with and eventual rejection of the views of Louis 
Agassiz” (Richardson, Henry Thoreau, 363).
 43. Thoreau, Journal (transcript), October 13, 1860.
 44. Thoreau, Journal (transcript), October 18, 1860.
 45. Along  these lines, Darwin outlines his theory of the social construc-
tion of speciological difference in On the Origin of Species, concluding that 
“va ri e ties cannot be distinguished from species,” and that all currently 
acknowledged species “once existed as va ri e ties, and thus originated” via 
speciation (47–48). In “Taxonomies of Feeling,” Kyla Schuller profiles a 
fascinating riposte to Darwinian evolution formulated in the 1870s by the 
“American School of Evolution,” which sought to reconcile the fluidity of 
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species with racist hierarchy. Led by Alexander Cope, this alternative school 
of evolution held that insensibility to influence is a defining feature of 
inferior races, whereas superior races are correspondingly more impression-
able and susceptible to change. Intriguingly, if one can bring oneself to 
bracket its racist agenda, this theory’s insistence that sensibility rather than 
sexual se lection is the mechanism of  human development bears certain 
affinities with Thoreau’s sensuous empiricism.
 46. Dean, “Thoreau and Greeley Exchange Letters,” 630. Alfred Tauber 
also observes that “Thoreau actually first noted seeming anomalies concern-
ing the growth of trees and the pos si ble role of animals and wind in dispers-
ing seeds in 1850” (Moral Agency of Knowing, 147). Walter Harding gives an 
account of Thoreau’s early interest in succession, and the pivotal day on 
April 28, 1856, when George Hubbard brought to his attention the phenom-
enon that a pine wood once cut often comes back all oak. See Harding, Days 
of Henry Thoreau, 438–39.
 47. Agassiz, “Sketch of the Natu ral Provinces,” lxxv.
 48. Thoreau, Journal, 5:4–5 (March 5, 1853).
 49. Richardson, Henry Thoreau, 368.
 50. Thoreau, Journal (transcript), March 5, 1858.
 51. Thoreau, Journal (transcript), June 3, 1858. To put Thoreau’s sense of 
scientific superiority in perspective, however, his own guess is that “they fell 
from the clouds in the form of spawn or tadpoles—or young frogs. I think it 
more likely that they fell down than that they hopped up.”
 52. Thoreau, Journal (transcript), August 23, 1858. See also journal 
entries for November 26, 27, 30, 1858, where Thoreau reflects at length on 
evidence of speciological migration and interconnection.
 53. Richardson, Henry Thoreau, 369.
 54. Agassiz, Contributions, vii.
 55. Thoreau, Wild Fruits, 3.
 56. Ibid., 4–5.
 57. Ibid., 83.
 58. Robinson, Natu ral Life, 196; Thoreau, Wild Fruits, 82.
 59. A word search on “racy” reveals no occurrences in A Week on the 
Concord and Merrimack Rivers, Walden, Maine Woods, Cape Cod, or The 
Dispersion of Seeds. Two instances appear in Prince ton’s digitized (post-1854) 
transcripts of the Journal— both referring to the wild apple.
 60. See Lurie, Louis Agassiz, chap. 7; Irmscher, Louis Agassiz, chap. 5. It is 
pos si ble that Thoreau attended one or more of Gray’s lectures: Thoreau was 
in Boston on December 10, 1858, when Gray delivered his first paper in 
support of Darwin’s theory at the Cambridge Scientific Society, and he was 
again in Boston January 11, 1859, when Gray presented crucial evidence that 
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he had been supplying to Darwin about the similarity between Japa nese and 
North American plants.
 61. Gray, “Darwin on Origin of Species.”
 62. Darwin, Origin of Species, 354.
 63. Ibid., 340; also quoted in Berger, Thoreau’s Late  Career, 50–51.
 64. Berger, Thoreau’s Late  Career, 50.
 65. Thoreau, “The Succession of Forest Trees,” in Wild Apples, 95.
 66. Ibid., 96.
 67. Harding, Days of Henry Thoreau, 439–40.
 68. Thoreau, “Succession of Forest Trees,” 93.
 69. The quoted phrases are Laura Dassow Walls’s description of modern 
readers’ reactions (Seeing New Worlds, 200). Harding affirms this impression 
by noting that both the Middlesex Agricultural Society and the Mas sa chu-
setts Board of Agriculture excised  these “humorous” opening remarks when 
they published the lecture (Days of Henry Thoreau, 439).
 70. Walls, Seeing New Worlds, 204.
 71. I am grateful to Bill Rossi for pointing out to me Thoreau’s horticul-
tural pun on “bizarre.”
 72. Fleck, Indians of Thoreau, 7. It is unclear  whether Thoreau planned to 
write a book on “the history and qualities of the North American Indian” (as 
his friend Franklin Sanborn once attested), or  whether, as Robert Sayre 
argues, this research was merely source material for other proj ects.  Either 
way, Thoreau was committed to this work, adding an average of twenty- four 
pages of notes per month to his “Indian Books”  every year from 1850 
through 1861. See Sayre, Thoreau and the American Indians; I have compiled 
Thoreau’s page average from Sayre’s  table (110), absenting notebook 2, 
whose dates are unknown. The standard deviation is eleven pages.
 73. Between 1856 and 1861, Thoreau read several works of racial science 
as well as  others that included scientific speculations about Native American 
racial origins. Indeed, Joshua Bellin suggests that the late notebooks 
“palpably gain in excitement (as mea sured by authorial commentary) 
whenever talk of origins enters their orbit” (Bellin, “In the Com pany of 
Savagists,” 10). The polygenist texts Thoreau read include Morton’s Crania 
Americana (Thoreau had also visited Morton’s skull collection in Philadel-
phia in 1854), Charles Pickering’s The Races of Man, and Nott and Gliddon’s 
two collections, Types of Mankind and Indigenous Races of the Earth (although 
not listed in Sattelmeyer’s indispensable index, Thoreau’s Reading, Thoreau’s 
notes on Indigenous Races appear in “Indian Notebooks,” 12). Both of the 
latter two volumes prominently feature contributions by Agassiz. However, 
Thoreau read a greater number of texts sympathetic to some version of 
monogenism. In 1856 he took fifty- eight pages of notes on James Adair’s 
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History of the American Indians, a book offering “observations, and argu-
ments, in proof of the American Indians being descended from the Jews,” 
and which refers to its subjects as “the copper colour American Hebrews” 
(96). Thoreau also perused a strange  little book by George Burder titled The 
Welch Indians, which speculates about “a  people whose ancestors emigrated 
from Wales to Amer i ca, in the year 1170, with prince Modoc” and who “are 
now said to inhabit a beautiful country on the west side of the Mississippi” 
(Burder, Welch Indians). In addition, in 1851 he read Arnold Guyot’s Earth 
and Man, and in 1856 he read Benjamin Smith Barton’s New Views on the 
Origin of the Tribes and Nations of Amer i ca.
 74. Of course, it is impossible to know with certainty what Thoreau 
thought of the statements he copied out from his readings, since the “Indian 
Notebooks” chiefly contain transcriptions with very  little personal commen-
tary. Nonetheless,  there is a subtly subversive logic to Thoreau’s transcrip-
tions from the polygenist works he read, which suggestively corroborates the 
developmentalist outlook of his Journal. For one  thing, his engagements 
with polygenist texts tend to be rather perfunctory: on Nott and Gliddon’s 
650- page tome, Indigenous Races of the Earth, Thoreau took a comparatively 
scant seven pages of notes. Moreover, in  these few pages he seems to be 
seizing on moments in which the argument for polygenism is particularly 
wobbly. Thus, for instance, from Joseph Leidy’s prefatory letter to the 
volume, Thoreau excerpts the author’s admission that “neither upon nor 
beneath the surface of the earth” are “the bones of the generations of 
red- men, of herds of bison, and of other animals which have lived and died 
in past ages” to be found. As Thoreau dutifully rec ords, Leidy speculatively 
attributes this absence of a fossil rec ord to the work of “devouring succes-
sors, and the combined influence of air and moisture, [which] have com-
pletely extinguished their traces.” From  here, however, Thoreau’s notes skip 
two pages ahead in Leidy’s account to his conclusion that “it is quite as 
probable that the [American Indian] had his origin on this continent, as that 
men originated elsewhere,” Leidy insists. Thoreau’s selective transcriptions 
thus highlight how Leidy inexplicably converts the total lack of physical 
evidence for the ancient tenure of  human beings in the Amer i cas into proof 
of the Native American’s perpetual residence therein.
Leidy is not the only victim of Thoreau’s silently critical reading practice. 
 Later in his notes on Indigenous Races, Thoreau juxtaposes two passages from 
J. Aitken Meigs’s contribution to the volume (an essay on “The Cranial 
Characteristics of the Races of Men, with eighty- seven woodcuts”). First he 
transcribes Meigs’s citation of Morton’s raciological distinction between 
Appalachian  peoples and  peoples living west of the Alleghenies on the 
grounds that the latter, as Morton observes, have distinctly elongated skulls. 
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Without a break in his page, Thoreau next copies a passage from three pages 
 later in this essay, in which Meigs acknowledges evidence that “the Huns 
used artificial means for giving Mongolian physiognomy to their  children . . .  
in an effort to approach a [flattened and elongated] form, which, among the 
Huns, was held in greater regard.” Read sequentially, as Thoreau’s selective 
transcription offers them,  these two moments show how the craniometrical 
method Morton and Meigs use to construct their racial typographies may be 
unreliable, given the susceptibility of skulls to cultural practices of artificial 
shaping. (J. Meigs, “The Cranial Characteristics of the Races of Men,” in 
Nott and Gliddon, Indigenous Races, 332, 335; cited in Thoreau, “Indian 
Notebook,” 12). In the Journal, Thoreau makes similar use of Charles 
Pickering’s Races of Man in 1853, from which he transcribes a passage noting 
that Aesop’s fables migrated eastward to Madagascar and Malaysia. “A fame 
on its way round eastward with the Malay race to this western continent!,” 
Thoreau crows, at the end of his citation: “P. gives California to the Malay 
race!” (Journal 7:30 [September 1, 1853]). Or again,  after reading Morton’s 
Crania Americana in 1852, Thoreau takes par tic u lar note of an anecdote 
Morton relates about how Chinese porcelain vessels had been found in the 
catacombs of Thebes in Egypt. While Thoreau’s comments on this story 
focus on the Chinese inscription (which celebrates the coming of lilies in 
spring), he was no doubt pleased with this evidence of intercontinental 
intercourse “as old as the Pharaonic period” (Journal 5:204 [July 9, 1852]). 
Indeed, that Thoreau understood this anecdote to be relevant to the question 
of racial unity is supported by the fact that sentences from this journal entry 
end up in the concluding discussion of “Slavery in Mas sa chu setts.”
 75. Barton, New Views, v. Thoreau’s notes on Barton appear in “Indian 
Notebook,” 10. Thoreau, Journal (transcript), September 27, 1857. Thoreau’s 
journal entry suggests that by 1857 he had rejected Guyot’s theory that 
Native Americans migrated to North Amer i ca from the west, a theory that (as 
Schneider points out) had inspired Thoreau’s musings on humankind’s 
westering instinct in “Walking,” first drafted in 1851.
 76. Thoreau, Journal (transcript), February 3, 1859.
 77. See Schneider, “Thoreau’s  Human Ecol ogy”; Bellin, “In the Com-
pany of Savagists”; and an excellent piece by Neill Matheson, “Thoreau’s 
Inner Animal.”
 78. Myers, Converging Stories, chap. 3; Sayre, Thoreau and the American 
Indians; Fleck, Henry Thoreau and John Muir.
 79. I have compiled the following timeline of Thoreau’s drafting, 
lecturing, and publishing activities from Bradley Dean’s “Thoreau Chronol-
ogy,” in Wild Fruits, 273–75, and from Raymond Borst’s chronology in 
Thoreau Log, 542–73.
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 80. Richardson argues that  after the memorial ser vice for Brown on 
December 2, 1859, “Thoreau’s absorption in John Brown ceased almost as 
suddenly as it began. By December 8, 1859, Thoreau had picked up his 
natu ral history pursuits again and was absorbed in another rediscovery, 
this time of Aristotle on animals, and the writings of the roman naturalist 
Pliny. Within a month a copy of Darwin’s Origin of Species would arrive in 
Concord and Thoreau’s own vast natu ral history proj ects would take one last 
turn” (Life of the Mind, 372–73). Sherman Paul characterizes Thoreau’s late 
po liti cal essays as moments of weakness in which he proves “insufficiently 
the hermit,” proposing that Thoreau meant to “flee society” in the 1850s but 
found it “increasingly distracting him”  until it “infected him” with the “need 
to champion princi ple” (Shores of Amer i ca, 269–70). Sattelmeyer more 
dispassionately describes this period as one of bifurcation in Thoreau’s 
output, characterizing his mature “development . . .  [as] clearly in the 
direction of increasing interest in the study and writing about nature on the 
one hand, and on the other the expression of increasingly sharp and out-
spoken views on sensitive social and po liti cal issues of the day” (Thoreau’s 
Reading, 78).
 81. Henry David Thoreau, “A Plea for Captain John Brown,” in Reform 
Papers, 119.
 82. Thoreau, Wild Fruits, 80.
 83. Ibid., 83.
 84. Henry David Thoreau, “Re sis tance to Civil Government,” in Reform 
Papers, 81.
 85. Thoreau, Wild Fruits, 83.
 86. I am reasonably confident that Thoreau would have had this 
Latin origin in mind  because— besides his well- known predilection for 
etymology— the eulogy he composed for Brown closes with a translation of 
Tacitus on Agricola’s death, commending the transmission of Agricola’s 
spirit and virtues to his immediate posterity (“Martyrdom of John Brown,” 
in Reform Papers, 139–44).
 87. Thoreau, “A Plea,” 133, 125, 126, 121–22, 121.
 88. Henry David Thoreau, “The Last Days of John Brown,” in Reform 
Papers, 148.
 89. For a description of this trope in racial scientific discourse, see 
Frederickson, Black Image, 57–58. See also Briggs, “Race of Hysteria.”
 90. Agassiz, “Diversity of Origin,” 36.
 91. Thoreau, “Slavery in Mas sa chu setts,” in Reform Papers, 103.
 92. Thoreau, “A Plea,” 135.
 93. Ibid., 136.
 94. Thoreau, “Last Days,” 153, 147.
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 95. Thoreau, “A Plea,” 138.
 96. Dimock, Through Other Continents, 14.
 97. Ibid., 16. For a related revisionary account of po liti cal action, 
defending the efficacy of Thoreau’s po liti cal speeches, see Turner, “Per-
forming Conscience,” 497. Susan Lucas makes a similar argument about the 
catalytic po liti cal force of Thoreau’s public address in “Counter- Frictions.”
 98. Dimock, Through Other Continents, 13, 20.
 99. Thoreau, Dispersion of Seeds, 101.
 100. Thoreau, “Last Days,” 153.
 101. Thoreau, Journal, 3:155–56 (December 25, 1851).
 102. Thoreau, Dispersion of Seeds, 102.
 103. Connolly, Fragility of  Things, 75, 10.
 104. Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, and Protevi, Po liti cal Affect.
 105. McGurl, “New Cultural Geology,” 388–89.
3. whitman’s cosmic body: bioelectricity  
and the prob lem of  human meaning
 1. Whitman, “Song of Myself,” in Leaves of Grass (1855), 679 (l. 487).
 2. Gray, “Darwin on the Origin of Species.”
 3. Indeed, even in its machinic applications— for instance, as the 
operative mechanism of the telegraph— electricity retained a distinct 
connection to the occult, producing what critics like Jeffrey Sconce, Richard 
Menke, and Paul Gilmore have described as the spiritualizing tendencies 
of mid- century media discourse. For further discussion of the curiously 
immaterial materiality of nineteenth- century electrical media, see Sconce, 
Haunted Media; Menke, Telegraphic Realism; and Gilmore, Aesthetic 
Materialism.
 4. John Kucich and Erik Seeman point out that, beyond mesmerism and 
phrenology, the American Spiritualist movement was also importantly 
related to a range of earlier traditions of spiritual communication, including 
Native American spiritualist practices, African conjure and vodun practices, 
and Western Eu ro pean evangelical practices. See Kucich, Ghostly Commu-
nion; and Seeman, “Native Spirits, Shaker Visions.” Similarly, Ann Braude 
(Radical Spirits) also links Spiritualism to mystical traditions within Chris-
tian ity. R. Laurence Moore, however, cautions that “in noting  these impor-
tant and obvious connections” between Spiritualism and other traditions of 
religious mysticism, “we risk losing sight of spiritualism’s connections with 
the dominant cultural values in the nineteenth  century. Any interpretation 
of spiritualism’s impact must begin with what has appeared to many as an 
anomaly. Spiritualism became a self- conscious movement precisely at the 
time it disassociated itself from occult traditions of secrecy. It appealed not 
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to the inward illumination of mystic experience, but to the observable and 
verifiable objects of empirical science.  There was  little new in the spirit 
manifestations of the 1850s except this militant stance, which proved to be 
exactly the right position to gain the attention of an age that wanted to 
believe that its universe operated like an orderly machine” (R. Laurence 
Moore, In Search of White Crows, 7).
 5. American Phrenological Journal (1846) quoted in Mackey, “Phrenologi-
cal Whitman.”
 6. Dods, Philosophy of Electro- Biology, 103.
 7. Ibid., 102.
 8. Andrew Jackson Davis, Philosophy of Spiritual Intercourse, 18.
 9. Andrew Jackson Davis, Morning Lectures, 283.
 10. Phelps, Gates Ajar, 41.
 11. Ibid., 46.
 12. Ibid., 66.
 13. Ibid., 79.
 14. Ibid., 69, 43.
 15. Ibid., 79.
 16. For analyses of Spiritualism’s connection to bourgeois Victorian 
materialism, see for instance Helen Sootin Smith, introduction to Gates 
Ajar; Douglas, Feminization of American Culture.
 17. Davis, Philosophy of Spiritual Intercourse, 18. Phelps’s novel partly 
echoes this sentiment in its suggestion that  those who embrace Spiritualist 
doctrine are (or become) physiologically more refined and advanced than 
 those who do not. The novel’s most out spoken skeptic of Spiritualism is 
Deacon Quirk, a working- class white character who is described in phreno-
logical terms that mark him as racially inferior. Thus in the midst of a 
theological argument with Aunt Forceythe, Quirk is described as sporting a 
“narrow forehead braided tight” as well as an “obstinate face with . . .  stupid, 
good eyes and animal mouth.” By contrast, Aunt Forceythe is described in 
this scene as “the white, finely cut  woman, with . . .  serene smile and rapt, 
saintly eyes,— every inch of her, body and soul, refined not only by birth and 
training, but by the long nearness of her heart to Christ” (Phelps, Gates Ajar, 
86–88).
 18. Andrew Jackson Davis, Pres ent Age and Inner Life, 277; Cox, Body and 
Soul, 195.
 19. Davis, Philosophy of Spiritual Intercourse, 26.
 20. McGarry, Ghosts of  Futures Past, 159.
 21. Braude, Radical Spirits, 58.
 22. Modern, Secularism in Antebellum Amer i ca, 178–79.
 23. LeMenager, “Not  Human, Again,” 407.
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 24. Andrew Jackson Davis, Death and the Afterlife, 4, 9–12.
 25. See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age.
 26. Cox, Body and Soul, 3.
 27. Spiritualism, and the broader currents of what I refer to as bioelectri-
cal bohemia, made its way through Whitman’s New York via traveling 
demonstrations, lectures, séances, and a steady stream of publications, many 
of them issued by the Manhattan- based phrenological firm, Fowler and 
Wells. It was through the Fowlers that Whitman was first introduced to 
phrenology, a related discourse of ner vous embodiment, which he defended 
as belonging “among the sciences”  after attending a lecture in 1846 (Whit-
man, Brooklyn Daily Ea gle, 2). By 1855, when Fowler and Wells became one of 
only two known retailers to carry Whitman’s self- published first edition of 
Leaves of Grass, and 1856, when it brought out Whitman’s second edition on 
the Fowler and Wells imprint, the firm was an established publishing hub 
for a variety of progressive movements including mesmerism and Spiritual-
ism. Moving in the Fowler and Wells circle, Whitman therefore would have 
encountered a community of thinkers for whom bioelectricity was under-
stood to inaugurate a  whole new metaphysics of the self. Indeed, with its 
proclamations of the divinity of the body and of the nonfinality of death, 
Leaves of Grass invokes topoi that would have been readily familiar to readers 
of Fowler and Wells’s other authors, including Andrew Jackson Davis and 
“electro- biologist” Reverend John Bovee Dods. For a more comprehensive 
introduction to Whitman’s exposure to Spiritualist, mesmeric, and phreno-
logical ideas, see Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s Amer i ca and Beneath the Ameri-
can Re nais sance.
 28. Whitman, “Poem Incarnating the Mind,” Notebooks and Unpublished 
Writings, 1:106.
 29. Darwin letter to Asa Gray (February 1860) in Life and Letters of 
Charles Darwin, 2:273.
 30. Whitman, preface to Leaves of Grass (1855), 621.
 31. Maslan, Whitman Possessed, 52.
 32. Readers may recall  here Nott and Gliddon’s pronouncement, likewise 
borne from their embodied theory of personhood, that “the intellectual man 
is inseparable from the physical man; and the nature of the one cannot be 
altered without a corresponding change in the other” (Nott and Gliddon, 
Types of Mankind, 50).
 33. Whitman, “Song for Occupations,” in Leaves (1855), 714 (l. 101).
 34. Whitman, “Song of Myself,” in Leaves (1855), 704 (ll. 1163–66).
 35. Ibid., 710 (ll. 1328–30).
 36. Warner, “Whitman Drunk,” 40.
 37. Whitman, preface to Leaves (1855), 618–19.
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 38. Douglass and Thoreau would recognize the environmentalist theory 
of race invoked in Whitman’s suggestion  here that “the hereditary counte-
nance” that comes down to this poet is itself a product not just of race or 
bloodline but also of local natu ral historical and cultural conditions. 
Moreover, they would recognize that this environmentalism furnishes the 
logic  behind Whitman’s conclusion that the sheer diversity of Amer i ca’s 
landscapes and  peoples promises to make its inhabitants “the race of races”: a 
kind of racial compendium, born of diversity. But whereas the environmen-
talist theory of race imagines this pro cess of physiological adaptation and 
incorporation to span generations, Whitman’s poet, like a medium in 
trance, absorbs impressions from his surrounding world and is at once 
transformed into a channel for  those forces’ expression. The quasi- messianic 
status Whitman ascribes to the poet thus stems from his sense of the poet’s 
peculiar temporality, his untimeliness. More so than his peers, this poet has 
a talent for reception that allows him to embody the culmination “of old and 
new”; he is “himself the age transfigured,” a prophetic specimen, as Thoreau 
might call him, who stands “where the  future becomes the pres ent” and 
“glows a moment on the extremest verge” (Whitman, preface to Leaves 
(1855), 633 (l. 710); 623–24 (ll. 311–15).
 39. Emerson, “The Poet,” in Essays and Lectures, 458; Shelley, “A Defence 
of Poetry,” in Romantic Poetry and Prose, 750.
 40. Whitman, preface to Leaves of Grass (1855), 622 (ll. 249–55).
 41. Both Tenney Nathanson and Mark Bauerlein find Whitman’s 
embodied poetry guilty of magical thinking, and as such of both obfuscating 
mysticism and anti- intellectualism (Nathanson, Whitman’s Presence; Bauer-
lein, Whitman and the American Idiom). Ecocritical readers, by contrast, have 
tended to commend Whitman’s “mysticism” as a laudably ecopoetical effort 
to communicate the “unsaid and unsayable” essence of nonhuman being 
while resisting the anthropocentrism of  human language. Outka, “(De)
Composing Whitman,” 52. See also Killingsworth, Walt Whitman and the 
Earth; and Warren, “Whitman Land.”
 42. Anonymous, “Editor’s  Table,” 699.
 43. In How We Became Posthuman, N. Katherine Hayles develops her 
account of the difference between the conception of information as having  
a body (as being indissociable from the material specificity of its medium), 
and the notion that information is distinct from the medium in which it is 
stored. Hayles tracks  these alternatives through the development of cyber-
netics information theory in the twentieth  century, but, as Richard Menke 
points out, the nineteenth- century discourse of electrical communication 
also raised this question de cades earlier (Menke, Telegraphic Realism,  
75–77).
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 44. This Whitmanian gloss has found new life in some neuroscientific 
circles. On the assumption that brain states may be taken to be expressive of 
 mental states, neuroscientists are currently developing technology that 
proposes to allow us to “read” the thoughts and intentions electrically 
“expressed” in fMRI scans of the brain. See for instance, Kerri Smith, 
“Brain Decoding.”
 45. Whitman, “Song for Occupations,” in Leaves of Grass (1855), 710 
(ll. 1–6).
 46. Nathanson, Whitman’s Presence, 2. Like Tenney Nathanson, Mark 
Bauerlein also finds Whitman’s embodied poetry guilty of magical thinking 
and hence, Bauerlein argues, of anti- intellectualism (Bauerlein, Whitman and 
the American Idiom).
 47. Outka, “(De)Composing Whitman,” 52. See also Killingsworth, 
Walt Whitman and the Earth; and Warren, “Whitman Land.”
 48. Coviello, Tomorrow’s Parties, 49, 64. Coviello’s analy sis leans on two 
major earlier queer theoretical readings of Whitman’s conflation of poems 
and bodies: Michael Warner’s argument that Whitman seeks, thereby, “to 
make sex public,” and Michael Moon’s suggestion that this is a deliberate 
fiction designed to light up the discursiveness of bodily and sexual identity 
more generally, producing a “heightened . . .  sense of the constructedness 
and hence the dense po liti cality of all bodily experience.” See Warner, 
“Whitman Drunk,” 42; and Moon, Disseminating Whitman, 4.
 49. Breitweiser, National Melancholy, 137; Moon, Disseminating Whitman, 5.
 50. Vendler, Invisible Listeners, 36.
 51. Coviello, Intimacy in Amer i ca, 155.
 52. Coviello, Tomorrow’s Parties, 60–61.
 53. In suggesting that sensuality may be a more accurate term than 
sexuality for the generative economy of embodied affinities that Whitman 
describes, I do not mean to suggest that sensuality and sexuality are mutu-
ally exclusive terms. Rather, I suggest that the discourse on sexuality is too 
narrow a lens for understanding the physics of embodied attachment, 
indiscriminate affiliation, and self- loss that distinguish the Whitmanian 
body. To be sure, since Foucault, analyses of sexuality have been careful not 
to limit our understanding of sexuality to only  those be hav iors and affective 
economies explic itly linked to genital sex. But even in its expanded senses, 
the rubric of sexuality tends to filter back to the prob lem of sexual reproduction 
by focusing on economies of feeling (as opposed to sensation generally), 
interpersonal relations (as opposed to both  human and human- nonhuman 
relations), object se lection (at the exclusion of involuntary and indiscrimi-
nate attachments), questions of identity and typology (as opposed to trans-
corporeal contiguity and self- loss), and so forth. As I argue in my discussion 
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of “is this then a touch?,” perhaps the most crucial insight to be gained 
by reading Whitman’s bioelectrical body in light of not just sexuality but 
sensuality more broadly is that  doing so allows us to recognize his sustained 
refutation of autonomous identity. In this sense, my reading of Leaves argues 
more generally for an expanded approach to Whitman’s treatment of 
embodied affinities. Before Darwin made sexual se lection the prime mover 
of evolution, and before the field of sexology made sexuality as a defining 
feature of personal identity, the sensuously impressionable body also 
appeared—in Spiritualist discourse and environmentalist racial theory 
alike—to be world- making, diffusing sympathetic attachments including but 
not limited to  those forms of attachment we deem sexual.
 54. Whitman, “Song of Myself” in Leaves (1855), 663 (ll. 23–24).
 55. Whitman, “Whoever you are holding me now in hand” (originally 
tentatively titled, “ These leaves conning, you con at peril”), in Leaves of Grass 
(1860), 100 (ll. 27–33).
 56. Whitman, “Song of Myself,” in Leaves of Grass (1855), 698–701 (ll. 
990–1081).
 57. Warner, “Whitman Drunk,” 40.
 58. Michaels, Shape of the Signifier, 123.
 59. As Michaels puts this, “Reports of what something makes us feel are 
not beliefs about what it means.” This is to say, in other words, “that  there is 
a logical difference between the effects any work of art actually produces 
and the effects it was intended to produce and that the interpretation of a 
work of art has every thing to do with the effects it was intended to produce 
and nothing whatsoever to do with the effects it in fact produces” (Michaels, 
“Intention at the College”).
 60. Wimsatt and Beardsley, “Affective Fallacy,” 44.
 61. Michaels, Shape of the Signifier, 117.
 62. Michael Fried makes a version of this point in his discussion of the 
function of the frame in modern art in “Art and Objecthood.”
 63. Whitman, “Song of Occupations,” in Leaves of Grass (1855), 712 (ll. 
49–50).
 64. Whitman, preface to Leaves of Grass (1855), 624. Whitman repeats a 
version of this claim in “Song of Myself”: “Do you guess I have some 
intricate purpose? / Well I have . . . .  for the April rain has, and the mica on 
the side of a rock has” (“Song of Myself” in Leaves (1855), 676 (ll. 381–82)).
 65. Pinsky, Situation of Poetry, 3.
 66. MacLeish letter to Norman Holes Pearson (1937), cited in Donald-
son, Archibald MacLeish, 150.
 67. Paul Gilmore observes that Whitman per sis tently “returns to the 
idea that his poetry is necessarily incomplete, that it requires an historically 
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situated reader to produce any sort of meaning, a meaning that is never 
completely stable” (Gilmore, Aesthetic Materialism, 156). While I share 
Gilmore’s sense that poetry is, for Whitman, essentially social, I think it is 
impor tant to stress the paradox implicit in Gilmore’s suggestion that 
Whitman both urgently wants his poems read and is happy for them “to 
produce any sort of meaning.” Gilmore thus puts his fin ger on the unortho-
doxy of Whitman’s sense of poetry, which at once insists on an audience and 
yet denies responsibility or even concern for the outcome of that encounter.
 68. Whitman, preface to Leaves of Grass (1855), 634.
 69. James, “Address at the Centenary,” 1124.
 70. Lee Edelman cited in Tiffany, Infidel Poetics, 13.
 71. Ibid., 4.
 72. Ibid., 12.
 73. Ibid., 8.
 74. Indeed, if we follow Vincent Bertolini’s suggestion that Whitman 
“convey[s] messages that are enveloped even from his own understanding,” 
we might well conclude that Whitman’s disavowals of meaning uncannily 
anticipate Tiffany’s theory of lyric obscurity (Bertolini, “ ‘Hinting’ and 
‘Reminding,’ ” 1050, 1053).
 75. Whitman, “Song of Myself,” in Leaves (1855), 682 (l. 547).
 76. Bennett, “Whitman’s Sympathies,” 608.
 77. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 18–19.
 78. Bennett, “Whitman’s Sympathies,” 616.
 79. For richer accounts of Whitman’s shifting attitude  toward slavery 
and his affinity for white nationalist discourse, see Klammer, Whitman, 
Slavery, and the Emergence of Leaves of Grass, and Coviello, Intimacy in 
Amer i ca. Although my reading of the auction in “I Sing the Body Electric” 
 will highlight its antiracist egalitarianism, I do not mean to suggest that 
Whitman was therefore a committed advocate of antiracism. Instead, my 
focus on the pro cessual logic from which Whitman’s antiracism derives 
should indicate that he was a committed advocate of an embodied ontology 
whose entailments for racial politics he occasionally attempted to specify. 
Whitman’s pronouncements on racial politics remained variable and 
somewhat opportunistic in the 1850s; however, his views on the materiality 
of the body  were clear and consistent.
 80. Whitman, “I Sing the Body Electric,” in Leaves (1855), 735 (ll. 74–79).
 81. Klammer, Whitman, Slavery, 141–42.
 82. Erkkila, Whitman the Po liti cal Poet, 126; Killingsworth, Whitman’s 
Poetry of the Body, 142. See also Sánchez- Eppler, Touching Liberty. Sánchez- 
Eppler highlights a tension inherent in the poem’s desire to assert the 
sacredness of the body by reducing it to a “common” blood, whereas 
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Killingsworth is satisfied that the body constitutes a “common denominator 
among all classes, races, divided groups” (Killingsworth, Whitman’s Poetry of 
the Body, 143).
 83. Whitman, “I Sing the Body Electric,” in Leaves (1855), 735–36 (ll. 
85–103).
 84. My discussion  here draws from my argument in “Numb Networks.”
 85. Lawrence, “Whitman” (1923), in Studies in Classic American 
Lit er a ture.
 86. Sánchez- Eppler, Touching Liberty, 56.
 87. The imagery of inhaled perfumes and atmospheres in the ensuing 
lines invite us to imagine atoms recirculating in and out of the speaker’s 
body; moreover, as Mark Noble argues, the recombinatory nature of  matter 
is central to the materialist imaginary of the early Leaves. As a defense of 
demo cratic equality, however, I submit that this empirical claim does not do 
the work that Whitman asks of it. See Noble, American Poetic Materialism.
 88. My reading  here is partially in agreement with Dimock’s argument in 
“Whitman, Syntax, and Po liti cal Theory.”  There, Dimock argues that the 
radical egalitarianism of Whitmanian syntax makes no concessions to 
the distinctly non- egalitarian logic of affection, which privileges “selec-
tive attachment” over “the demo cratic need for substitutability and 
 interchangeability” (72). She concludes, “If nothing  else, Whitman makes us 
long for what he does not and cannot offer: an ethics of preference, one that, 
in giving voice to what is not exhausted by a language of formal univer-
sals . . .  might suggest some way of reconciling the demo cratic and the 
affective, some way of rescuing ‘love’ from being the lost soul of po liti cal 
theory” (78). Like Dimock, I find that Whitman’s leveling vision precludes 
us from making distinctions between entities. On Dimock’s reading, this is 
a prob lem with the way democracy takes no account of special preference 
(love—or sexual attraction, for that  matter). On my reading, however, the 
undifferentiability Whitman conjures is a prob lem for democracy: Whitma-
nian egalitarianism—an artifact not just of his syntax but of his metaphysical 
commitments— does not allow us to ontologically distinguish one entity 
from another, and therefore is not, properly speaking, an egalitarianism at 
all, since it blurs the individual units in which demo cratic equality trades. 
For what it’s worth, I do not share Dimock’s sense that love is “the lost soul” 
of demo cratic politics; on the contrary, my sense is that love’s “ethics of 
preference” is precisely what demo cratic and  legal formalisms are designed 
to offset. Justice and demo cratic equality ask us to look beyond the biases of 
our affective ties ( whether  these be ties of kinship, tribe, or race—or ties of 
ideological consensus) in order to recognize the claims of even  those whom 
we do not know or love.
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 89. Whitman, “Song of Myself,” in Leaves (1855), 679 (l.487).
 90. Whitman, preface to Leaves (1855), 626.
 91. Castronovo, Necro Citizenship, 8–10.
4. posthumanism and the prob lem of social justice: race and 
materiality in the twenty- first  century
 1. Jackson, “Outer Worlds,” 216.
 2. Ibid.; Weheliye, Habeas Viscus, 8.
 3. Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 297.
 4. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 291.
 5. Peterson, Bestial Traces, 7.
 6. Grusin, Nonhuman Turn, vii.
 7. Ibid., xviii.
 8. Materialist feminism and queer theory, for instance, are liberatory 
scholarly fields that have been engines of posthumanist theorizing.  These 
fields have also held impor tant conversations about the tension between 
their po liti cal and posthumanist commitments (see, for instance, Luciano 
and Chen, “Has the Queer Ever Been”).  There has also been a broader shift 
back to the body in recent theorizing about race, and impor tant new works 
reopen the nineteenth- century question of race’s material ontology. See, for 
instance, Puar, “ ‘ Rather Be a Cyborg’ ”; Saldanha, “Bastard and Mixed- 
Blood”; Hames- Garcia, “How Real Is Race?”; Wright, Physics of Blackness. 
Sarah Ahmed also highlights the risk of oversimplifying poststructuralist 
feminism’s relation to materiality in “Imaginary Prohibitions.” This list 
suggests that the re sis tance to posthumanist theory has other sources than a 
distrust of materiality per se.
 9. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus, 10.
 10. Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 73.
 11. Haritaworn, “Decolonizing the Non/Human,” 212.
 12. Sylvia Wynter, as we  will see, argues that social justice depends upon 
reinventing this current genre of “the  human.”
 13. Colebrook, Death of the Posthuman, 23. Like Colebrook, posthumanist 
scholars associated with speculative realism and object- oriented ontology 
prescribe an ontological turn that does not turn to the ontology of  human being 
(for instance, by emphasizing the materiality of the self and embodied nature of 
knowledge), but that seeks instead to constitute a form of knowledge in de pen-
dent of the mediating function of  human sensation, perception, and cognition.
 14. Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 4. See also Meillassoux,  After Finitude, 
and works by  those directly affiliated with object- oriented ontology: Harman, 
Guerrilla Metaphysics, and Prince of Networks; Bryant, Democracy of Objects; 
Morton, Hyperobjects.
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 15. This slippage is, for instance, particularly notable in the work of 
Graham Harman, the architect of OOO. Harman objects to post- Kantian 
philosophy’s ac cep tance of  human finitude not  because he faults its logic— 
not, that is,  because he thinks  humans do have unmediated perceptual access 
to real ity— but  because he faults its ethics. Harman understands Kant’s 
circumscription of philosophical knowledge to  things “as they appear for 
us” to constitute an ethical vio lence: he describes post- Kantian philosophy 
as a “Hiroshima of metaphysics” that sets up a “global apartheid” against 
speculation into real ity as nonhumans experience it (Prince of Networks, 
102–3). With this description, then, ontological finitude starts to look like 
an ethical choice.
 16. Moore, “Capitalocene,” 2.
 17. Ibid.
 18. Povinelli, Geontologies, 32.
 19. Derrida, Animal That Therefore I Am, 86.
 20. Braidotti, Posthuman, 2.
 21. Jackson, “Outer Worlds,” 216.
 22. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus, 9–10. See also Weheliye’s critique of 
biopolitics discourse in Habeas Viscus, and Julia Suarez- Krabbe’s account of 
the “colonial death proj ect” in Race, Rights, and Rebels.
 23. A word on comparisons of racism and speciesism: the divergence 
between posthumanism’s focus on nonhuman animal life and posthumanist 
social justice’s focus on dehumanized  human life is sometimes expressed as a 
competition over  whether racism or speciesism is the primordial instance of 
the epistemic discrimination that both seek to contest. Thus, for instance, 
Christopher Peterson suggests that “negative ste reo types about nonhuman 
animals are the condition of possibility for negative ste reo types about 
social and po liti cal minorities,” while Jackson contends that “blackness 
conditions and constitutes the . . .  nonhuman” (Peterson, Bestial Traces, 9; 
Jackson, “Outer Worlds,” 216). The point is that Peterson and Jackson are 
both right. That is, when we hold onto the recognition that the moral statuses 
“ human” and “nonhuman” are not synonyms for “Homo sapiens” and “non– 
Homo sapiens,” it becomes clearer that racism and speciesism are two names for 
the same ideological operation: the disaggregation of communal being into a 
typological hierarchy of beings that do, and beings that do not merit moral 
regard. When I suggest that racism and speciesism are two names for the 
same ideological operation, I am not arguing that we  ought to begin to treat 
speciesism as a prob lem that is as ethically urgent as racism. More perplex-
ingly, I am suggesting that part of the challenge of thinking beyond the 
humanist episteme is learning to see antiracism and antispeciesism as struc-
turally conjoined rather than analogous or even competitive social proj ects.
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 24. As Weheliye observes, this in turn leads posthumanists to write of 
the  human as if “we have now entered a stage in  human development where 
all subjects have been granted equal access to western humanity” (Habeas 
Viscus, 10).
 25. To suggest that posthumanism’s Eurocentric bias is methodologically 
unsound is not to suggest that identity and episteme have any natu ral or 
necessary connection. It is not therefore to presume that indigenous, 
postcolonial, or queer of color perspectives necessarily instantiate exemplary 
posthumanist epistemologies by virtue of their eccentric vantage from the 
margins of the hegemonic regime of the  human. Thus Weheliye warns that 
the voices of marginalized  peoples “should not be construed as fountains of 
suffering authenticity” (Habeas Viscus, 82). Nor should  these voices be 
construed as univocal: as Kim TallBear writes of indigenous scholars, “We 
are diverse thinkers” (“Indigenous Perspective,” 230). Conversely, to suggest 
that posthumanists would benefit from consulting more nonwhite and 
non- Western thinkers is not to presume that the work of Western- born 
thinkers is therefore epistemically “Western”: that Deleuze is a white 
Frenchman does not mean that his ontology must necessarily be complicit 
with Western humanism. But it is neither reductive nor essentializing to 
observe that the proj ect of conceptualizing modes of being outside or 
orthogonal to the discriminatory modern Western praxis of “Man” has been 
carried forward in minority scholarly studies for de cades, and in non- 
Western cultural traditions for even longer. As TallBear notes, “indigenous 
 peoples have never forgotten that nonhumans are agential beings engaged in 
social relations that profoundly shape  human lives” (234). And therefore, 
however committed posthumanism is, in theory, to thinking beyond 
Western “Man,” that commitment  will continue to seem gestural and 
incomplete so long as  these extra- and counterhegemonic cultural and schol-
arly traditions remain peripheral to posthumanist work.
 26. Wynter gives several accounts of this genealogy, each of which 
differs slightly.  Here I am most closely following the history she gives in 
“On How We Mistook,” and in Wynter and McKittrick, “Unparalleled 
Catastrophe.” See also Wynter, “1492.”
 27. Wynter, “On How We Mistook,” 118, 127.
 28. Wynter, “1492,” 40.
 29. Wynter, “On How We Mistook,” 123.
 30. Wynter suggests that alternative epistemes in the postcolonial world 
may be rare, and offers the Masai  people of  Kenya as one pos si ble locus of 
thinking outside of the Western episteme. See Wynter, “Unparalleled 
Catastrophe.”
 31. Wynter, “On How We Mistook,” 237.
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 32. Wynter, “No  Humans Involved,” 59.
 33. Wynter, “On How We Mistook,” 233.
 34. Wynter, “Disenchanting Discourse,” 208.
 35. Muñoz, “Sense of Brownness,” 210.
 36. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 139.
 37. Ibid.
 38. Esposito, Bios, 164. Esposito borrows this term from Merleau- Ponty, 
not Hortense Spillers. I  will discuss this divergence in the Coda.
 39. Ibid., 167.
 40. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 213.
 41. Esposito, Bios, 167, 160.
 42. The iconic line  here is Donna Haraway’s, who asks, “Why should 
our bodies end at the skin?” (Simians, Cyborgs and  Women, 178).
 43. Bennett, Vibrant  Matter, 108–9.
 44. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 396.
 45. Matt Taylor, Universes without Us, 176.
 46. In addition to the writings of Alfred, TallBear, and Povinelli cited 
below, see also, for instance, Suarez- Krabbe, Race, Rights and Rebels; 
Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks. For a consideration of how recolonization 
occurs in literary repre sen ta tions, see Rifkin, Beyond Settler Time.
 47. Alfred, “First Nations Perspectives,” 10.
 48. Ibid., 5.
 49. TallBear, Native American DNA, 6–8.
 50. Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition.
 51. Wolfe, “ ‘Animal Studies,’ Disciplinarity, and the (Post)Humanities,” 
in What Is Posthumanism?
 52. Wynter and McKittrick, “Unparalleled Catastrophe,” 34. The phrase 
“nonphysical princi ple of causality” is a citation from Christian theologian 
Keith Ward. The modulation of Wynter’s proj ect I am about to suggest 
would not apply if she  were to follow Ward in believing that  human being is 
uniquely ensouled. If sociogeny, for Wynter, is not in fact a speciological trait 
(i.e., arising from the nature of the body) but rather a trait wholly unrelated 
to  human embodiment—if, in short, sociogeny refers to a form of transcen-
dent freedom that stems from humanity’s possession of an immaterial 
soul— then Wynter’s proj ect is dualistic and cannot be combined with 
posthumanist materialism. However, despite Wynter’s invocation of Ward 
and of sociogeny’s in de pen dence from  matter, her proj ect seems other wise 
distinctly nondualist. As I  shall discuss, she shows a recurring interest in the 
material substrates of sociogeny.
 53. Wynter and McKittrick, “Unparalleled Catastrophe,” 34, 29.
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 54. I am indebted  here to Colleen Glenney Boggs’s astute reading of this 
scene, which differs from my own but which first signaled to me the impor-
tance of animality to this scene’s critical register. See Boggs, Animalia 
Americana, 89–98.
 55. Derrida, Animal That Therefore I Am, 95, 135.
 56. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus, 126. Indeed, Weheliye argues that Wynter’s 
work has been overlooked in con temporary biopo liti cal and posthumanist 
theory precisely  because lingering racism in the acad emy has meant that 
“minority discourses seemingly cannot inhabit the space of proper theoreti-
cal reflection” (6). Ultimately, however— and counterintuitively, given the 
argument I cite  here— Weheliye follows Wynter in insisting upon the 
exceptional freedom of  human being.
 57. Wynter, “1492,” 47.
 58. McKittrick, “Axis Bold as Love,” 144.
 59. Wynter, “No  Humans Involved,” 69.
 60. Wynter citing Barney in “On How We Mistook,” 132.
coda:  after romantic posthumanism
 1. Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” 72.
 2. Ibid., 67, 80. For a far more in- depth analy sis of the distinction 
between Spillers’s “flesh” and posthumanism’s “flesh” (more specifically, 
Agamben’s notion zoe or bare life), see Weheliye, Habeas Viscus.
 3. Douglass, “Heroic Slave,” 246.
 4. Latour, Politics of Nature, 25.
 5. Dana Luciano and Mel Chen offer an incisive and illuminating 
discussion of this tension in “Has the Queer Ever Been  Human?”
 6.  These examples of posthumanism’s wonderful reor ga ni za tion of 
po liti cal physics are drawn from Chen, Animacies, and Bennett, Vibrant 
 Matter. Luciano and Chen also suggest that posthumanism might be “a new 
mode of critical realism,” and I find myself deeply sympathetic to the 
account that they give (“Has the Queer Ever Been,” 191). It is not my sense, 
however, that this realism amounts to a historical “recognition that the nature 
of ‘real ity’ itself is changing as power moves away from the individual” 
 under the conditions of biopo liti cal “control society.” The material realism I 
find in posthumanism does tend to dwarf the agency of the individual by 
contextualizing it within the myriad vectors of  human and nonhuman 
power, but this situation— the comparative smallness of individual agency 
vis- à- vis systemic power—is, on my reading of posthumanism, not an 
artifact of po liti cal history but of  human embodiment, the materiality of 
being as such.
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 7. In the “vast clear scheme” of the world, Whitman insists, “ every 
motion and  every spear of grass and the frames and spirits of men and 
 women and all that concerns them are unspeakably perfect miracles all 
referring to all and each distinct and in its place.” Whitman, preface to 
Leaves of Grass (1855), 626 (l. 422). Indeed, Whitman assures us, the perfec-
tion of this pro cessual universe is both beautiful, just, and good. “The 
fruition of beauty is no chance hit or miss . . .  it is inevitable as life. . . .  it is 
as exact and plumb as gravitation” (Whitman, preface to Leaves (1855), 623 
(ll. 280–81). The good deeds we do in “the direct lifetime” accrue “onward 
afterward through the indirect lifetime . . .  . The interest  will come around” 
(Whitman, preface to Leaves (1855), 631–33 (ll. 625–86). “Whither I walk I 
cannot define, but I know it is good, / The  whole universe indicates that it is 
good. . . .  What is called good is perfect, and what is called sin is just as 
perfect, /  The vegetables and minerals are all perfect . . .  and the imponder-
able fluids are perfect; / Slowly and surely they have passed on to this, and 
slowly and surely they  will yet pass on” (Whitman, “To Think of Time,” in 
Leaves (1855), 723 (ll.116-24).
 8. Douglass, “Fourth of July,” in Selected Speeches and Writings, 204.
 9.  There are, of course, impor tant exceptions to this tendency within 
romantic thought, particularly prevalent in certain treatments of the 
sublime as indicative of the natu ral world’s amoralism and indifference to 
man. See, for instance, Shelley’s “Mont Blanc” and Thoreau’s “Ktaadn.”
 10. Timothy Morton elaborates this reading of romanticism’s normative 
nature in Ecol ogy without Nature.
 11. Agassiz, “Diversity of Origin,” 3; Guyot, Earth and Man, 309.
 12. Grosz, Nick of Time, 90.
 13. Some examples: Karen Barad converts quantum entanglement into a 
call to responsibility— material relation becomes ethical obligation. Jane 
Bennett closes Vibrant  Matter with a “Nicene Creed” to entangled complex-
ity, turning a material condition into an article of not just empirical but 
moral faith. Or Michelle Wright, embracing a fluid ontology of identity, 
concludes that if “we are not fixed quantities but ever- shifting qualities,” 
then “equality . . .  is a  matter of qualitative connection rather than quantitative 
sameness”: mutual involvement  here becomes equivalent to mutual re spect 
(Physics of Blackness, 34).
 14. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 206.
 15. Ibid., 215.
 16. Connolly, Fragility of  Things, 10.
 17. Thoreau, “Walking,” in Excursions, 128.
 18. Although this is a citation from D. A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police, 
the discussion I am thinking of  here is Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s analy sis of 
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the hermeneutics of suspicion (where she quotes this line from Miller) in 
Touching Feeling, 139.
 19. Caroline Levine raises this possibility in her analy sis of the “affor-
dances of form” in literary fiction. In her argument for “broadening our 
definition of form to include social arrangements,” Levine shows how 
formalist analy sis can “be as valuable to understanding sociopo liti cal 
institutions as it is to reading lit er a ture.” Posthumanist materialism can 
itself be understood as chiefly a shift in form—an attempt to reimagine the 
world from the perspective of pro cesses and assemblages rather than 
individuals and identities. In this re spect, we can think of posthumanism as 
a mode of formal analy sis, and lit er a ture as a particularly rich and rewarding 
site for developing our attentiveness to the morphology of connectivity 
(Levine, Forms, 2).
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— — —. Lake Superior: Its Physical Character Vegetation and Animals Compared 
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